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This is a portfolio of work completed throughout the three years of a 
PsychD Clinical Psychology doctorate programme. The PsychD portfolio is 
comprised of two volumes. Volume 1 of the portfolio is a public document 
that is stored at the University of Surrey library. Volume 2 is a private 
volume containing sensitive material, which is therefore stored securely at 
the School of Psychology at the University of Surrey, until it is destroyed 
three years after the award of the degree.
This is Volume 1 of the portfolio, and is divided into three dossiers: 
academic, clinical and research. The academic dossier is comprised of the 
relevant academic assignments completed during the course. The clinical 
dossier contains an overview of the clinical placements and the titles of the 
five clinical case reports completed during training. The research dossier 
includes a log of research experience gained throughout the course, a 
service related research project, and the thesis produced for the Major 
Research Project.
The aim of the portfolio is to present the breadth and depth of work 
completed throughout the three years of the course, demonstrating the 
development of my competencies as a Trainee Clinical Psychologist.
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ACADEMIC DOSSIER
Literature Review
Evaluating the effectiveness of Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy and Mindfulness meditation 
approaches to the treatment of psychosis: A critical 
review of the literature.
December 2010 
Year 1
Word Count=5878
Declaration of Interest and Personal Reflection
The principle reasons for reviewing the literature on the chosen 
topic are two-fold. The first is based on my particular interest in psychotic 
disorders. Having previously worked in an inpatient unit where I witnessed 
some bizarre behaviour as part of clients’ response to hallucinatory and 
delusional experiences, I could not help to consider what recent 
developments may be in store to aid the seriously mentally ill in how they 
manage their experiences. The second major reason is down to a personal 
interest in mindfulness approaches. The review is relevant to my current 
placement in the CMHT, as many of the clients have severe and enduring 
mental illness, sometimes with psychotic symptoms among their 
presentation. I was encouraged by the results of the studies obtained, but 
somewhat disappointed by the volume, and also the lack of scientific rigor 
in many of them.
Abstract
While a range of pharmacological and psychosocial treatments exist 
for people with troubling psychosis, many individuals continue to 
experience distressing psychotic symptoms. It has been suggested that 
psychotic disorders could be well suited to treatment approaches that 
incorporate acceptance and mindfulness teaching, which aim to alter the 
person’s relationship to pervasive psychotic symptoms (e.g. distressing 
voices), rather than struggling to alter their content. Therefore, this review 
sought to evaluate studies in which Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
or mindfulness meditation training have been applied to the treatment of
psychosis. A limited mixture of case studies and controlled and 
uncontrolled trials were critically assessed. While many such studies lacked 
scientific rigor, it remained evident that clinical gains were made which 
appeared to be due to the use of acceptance and mindfulness based 
approaches. Reduced levels of believability in psychotic 
thoughts/hallucinations were probably the most consistent findings. 
However, further well-controlled studies are clearly required.
Introduction
Psychotic disorders are frequently enduring and often highly 
debilitating, resulting in profound personal costs, as well as significant 
economic costs with respect to treatment and care. Effective treatment of 
psychotic disorder, therefore, represents a major challenge.
Psychosis is often distinguished by so-called positive symptoms, 
consisting mainly of auditory and/or visual hallucinations, delusional beliefs 
and disorganised thought processes, while negative symptoms (e.g. flat 
affect, social or emotional withdrawal and demotivation) are also common. 
In fact, the continued experience of positive symptoms has been shown to 
be a major predictor of rehospitalisation (Tarrier, Barrowclough and 
Bamrah, 1991). Currently, intervention for the frequently distressing 
experience of such symptoms still often relies on the use of antipsychotic 
medication. For many, however, these positive symptoms persist, albeit at 
reduced levels, despite following exhaustive medication regimes (Breier, 
Schreiber, Dyer and Pickar, 1991). The situation is further complicated by 
the high rates of medication non-adherence that are apparent in those with
psychotic disorders. Although reported rates of non-adherence vary, a 
mean rate of only 49.5% has been suggested (Lacro, Dunne, Dolder, 
Leckband and Jeste, 2002).
In response to such challenges, a range of psychosocial 
interventions have been developed, such as family therapy, case 
management and social skills training (Bustillo, Lauriello, Horan and Keith, 
2001). However, well controlled studies on these approaches are relatively 
uncommon, and they can also be costly and lengthy methods of 
intervention (Bustillo, Lauriello, Horan and Keith, 2001). To date, the most 
thoroughly researched psychosocial approach to psychosis is probably 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT). A number randomized clinical trials 
(RTCs) have reported positive results for the use of CBT for psychosis 
(Gaudiano, 2005). However, when compared to other approaches, relative 
benefits of CBT for psychosis are less significant, and it remains evident 
that a number of people with psychosis do not respond sufficiently well to 
CBT (Gaudiano, 2005).
In recent years, the newer so-called “third wave” behaviour 
therapies have developed, which incorporate elements of acceptance and 
mindfulness into a cognitive-behavioural framework. Such approaches 
place greater focus on exploring the individual’s relationship to their difficult 
thoughts, rather than aiming to modify the content of these cognitions. 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) is one such approach. This is 
a treatment derived from Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, 2004), and 
it encourages individuals to experience internal events in an accepting and 
mindful manner, while simultaneously pursuing valued behavioural goals 
(Hayes, 2004). Thus, there is far less emphasis on symptom reduction than
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there is in “traditional” CBT approaches. Definitions of mindfulness vary, but 
put simply it involves “paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in 
the present moment, and non-judgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1994, p.4). 
Indeed, Jon Kabat-Zinn has helped pioneer the application of mindfulness 
meditation techniques into formulised psychological therapy (Kabat-Zinn, 
1994).
While ACT and mindfulness teaching have found increasingly 
widespread therapeutic application (Ost, 2008 and Baer, 2003), the 
question posed in this review is whether such approaches have been 
shown to be effective in the treatment of psychosis. Therefore, this review 
aims to critically evaluate the relevant literature that has studied the use of 
ACT and/or Mindfulness meditation in the context of treating people with 
psychosis, and thus consider the effectiveness of these approaches. 
Articles for the review were identified using computerised PsyclNFO 
searches of the English language literature, for peer-review publications 
only. Search items consisted of “acceptance and commitment therapy” as 
keywords, and “schizophrenia OR psychosis OR psychotic” in the abstract. 
For articles relating to the use of Mindfulness, the search term 
“mindfulness” was substituted for “acceptance and commitment therapy”. 
Similar searches using the Web of Science database did not yield 
additional publications relevant for the review. With respect to inclusion 
criteria, essentially all reported case studies and both controlled and 
uncontrolled trials, where ACT or mindfulness meditation treatment was 
performed in the context of psychosis, were selected for discussion. The 
quantity of relevant studies is limited, but sufficient to justify a thorough 
analysis of the methodology and findings of those available.
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ACT and Psychosis: Theoretical rationalisation and Case Studies
One of the first proponents for applying ACT to psychosis is the 
original developer of the approach, Steven Hayes (Bach and Hayes, 2002). 
A relatively detailed rationale for the application of ACT to the treatment of 
psychosis has been outlined by Pankey and Hayes (2003), in an article that 
also presents a case study with which to demonstrate their approach. The 
authors raise objections to the typical symptom-focussed approach to the 
treatment of psychosis, where psychosocial interventions often target the 
reduction in frequency and severity of positive and negative symptoms 
(Bustillo, Lauriello, Horan and Keith, 2001). They argue that such 
approaches can lead to thought suppression and an overly inward focus on 
behalf of the patient, although no direct evidence of this in relation to such 
interventions is provided.
Pankey and Hayes (2003) suggest that those who experience 
distressing positive symptoms engage in experiential avoidance behaviours 
(e.g. talking back to voices, trying not to listen, complying with the voices), 
which only serve to strengthen the effect and importance of the positive 
symptom. This continued process results in cognitive entanglement. Rather 
than attempting to alter the content of undesirable thoughts, ACT attempts 
to alter the individual’s reaction to them. ACT uses a range of exercises 
and didactic metaphors to achieve this sense of mindfulness. According to 
the authors, the process involves; “Dropping the control agenda”, fostering 
a “willingness/acceptance” as an alternative to control, “cognitive defusion” 
in order to literally disentangle themselves from unpleasant thoughts, and 
establishing “Values and Goals” that one is committed to. Thus, people 
experiencing psychosis would be encouraged to minimise strategies which
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attempt to control unpleasant thoughts, but instead notice them non- 
judgmentally without acting on them. Throughout the process, ACT 
attempts “to teach the patient to see thoughts and feeling for what they are 
(experience) rather than what they advertise themselves to be (structured 
reality)” (Pankey and Hayes, 2003, p.319).
While the rationale outlined by Pankey and Hayes (2003) follows a 
logical progression, clearly evidence is then required by which to gather 
support for their rationale. In the same article, they report a single case 
study as a demonstration. The case relates to a 22 year old female with 
schizophrenia and moderate learning disability, and a long history of anti­
psychotic medication. The patient was resident in supported living 
accommodation with 24 hour care available, and presented with grandiose 
and delusional ideation and auditory hallucinations. Current delusions 
included beliefs that staff members were part of her family, and that she 
suffered many health problems (e.g. heart failure). Problem behaviours 
were also noted by staff, including excessive sleep, repeated dismantling of 
objects/appliances, irregular eating and poor adherence to medication. The 
key outcome measures were based on these problem behaviours, although 
none of these measures were targeted directly by ACT treatment, except 
medication adherence.
Four sessions of ACT treatment were provided for the above client, 
although the length and frequency of these sessions was not stated. 
Improvements were noted by staff for each of the target behaviours, 
although no evidence is provided on how these behaviours were 
systematically measured. Furthermore, no baseline levels are reported. 
Thus, while the authors report that the client was not taking apart
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appliances and was sleeping through the night after 3 sessions, and that 
medication adherence was achieved by session 4, no clear context to these 
changes has been provided. It is therefore difficult to reliably assess the 
impact of the intervention on the reported behaviours. Also, no data is 
provided regarding whether or not these improved behaviours were 
maintained upon follow-up.
Self-reported measure of distress, believability and frequency of 
symptoms were obtained on a weekly basis, using a 10-point Likert scale. 
While self-reported distress from her auditory hallucinations reduced 
notable from “8” in Session One to “2” at one-month follow-up, no data for 
the intervening period was provided. Whether this improvement was at all 
consistent is, therefore, not evident. The level of believability in specific 
delusions that were rated dropped for all except her health delusions, which 
remained high. For example, her belief that staff were her family members 
rated as zero by Session 2. However, the consistency of her beliefs in 
specific delusions prior to treatment was not established as, again, baseline 
measurements were not recorded. Once more, it is difficult, then, to assess 
the impact of the treatment without a clear context to the variables being 
evaluated.
Since the above study was reported, other more detailed case 
studies have since been described in the literature, which have also 
employed ACT as the principle intervention for psychosis. An example is 
that reported by Veiga-Martinez, Pérez-Âlvarez, and Garcia-Montes (2008), 
who suggest that ACT be considered as part of a clinical psychologist’s 
routine activity in mental healthcare. The case presented was that of a 30 
year old Spanish male, Victor, who had been diagnosed with schizophrenia
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6 years prior. For the previous three years, Victor had been participating in 
a psychosocial rehabilitation programme. At the time of the study, this 
involved twice daily attendance at a day care centre Mondays to Fridays, 
and included a protected job as part of vocational training. Auditory 
hallucinations were the principle clinical problem presented by the client, 
which persisted frequently despite long-term adherence to anti-psychotic 
medication. Victor was referred for treatment specifically to address these 
hostile and persecutory hallucinations, which were impeding him from 
taking part in the rehabilitation process, and in particular were considered 
responsible for frequent absences from work. The authors hypothesised 
that withdrawal from work and social activity were direct consequences of 
experiential avoidance relating to these threatening voices.
Treatment consisted of a total of fifteen individual sessions 
(inclusive of pre- and post-assessment) lasting 50 minutes each, with 
sessions initially on a weekly and then bimonthly basis over a 6 month 
period. Initial sessions included efforts to build a collaborative 
understanding of Victor’s hallucinations and his attempts to deal with them, 
with consideration of acceptance as an alternative to avoidance. After 
establishing values, life goals and perceived obstacles, the core of the 
treatment sessions involved the use of metaphors and experiential 
exercises common to ACT designed to reduce experiential avoidance and 
promote acceptance of private events, with committed goals set 
throughout.
With respect to assessment of Victor’s progress, pre- and post­
treatment measures of the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS; Lukoff, 
Nuechterlein and Ventura, 1986 - as cited in Veiga-Martinez et al., 2008)
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were obtained. This is a validated 24-item semi-structured clinical interview, 
which assesses a range of psychiatric symptoms with scores from 1-7. 
Results for the ten most relevant items of the Scale were provided. In 
Victor’s case, the hallucinations rating decreased from a score of 5 
(moderately severe) to 3 (Mild) during treatment. The authors relate this 
decrease to a greater acceptance of the voices rather than reduced 
frequency, although no direct or indirect evidence is provided to support 
this assertion. Interestingly, the delusions rating decreased from a score of 
5 (moderately severe) to a score of one (not present). This is notably 
revealing, as such a disappearance is less likely to be due to background 
symptom variability. The authors suggest that this improvement may partly 
be due to clarification of values and realistic goals in the ACT process, but 
possibly also due to an altered, more accepting response to the 
hallucinations. This would follow the view that delusions are often a 
maladaptive response to hallucinations (Maher, 1988; cited in Veiga- 
Martinez et al., 2008). All eight of the other relevant scores from the BPRS 
items that were reported (e.g. those relating to depression, anxiety, 
suspiciousness, etc) also decreased following treatment. This consistent 
reduction in symptom severity appears to indicate generalised clinical 
improvements.
In addition to the BPRS, a session by session self-reported 7-point 
Likert scale designed for the study, the Scale for the Experience of Hearing 
Voices, was also obtained, which evaluated aspects of the hallucinatory 
experience such as annoyance, frequency, volume, etc. The annoyance 
and frequency ratings were presented on a chart together with job 
attendance as a percentage of working days attended per month. Results 
indicated that the annoyance level of the voices actually increased over the
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first few months, during which time job attendance was irregular. 
Attendance in the following three months then improved to stable levels, 
when only time off for therapy was taken, although annoyance and 
frequency levels only drop in the sixth month. In effect, the self-reported 
data indicate a return to pre-treatment levels by the end of therapy in terms 
of frequency and annoyance of the haliucinations, which is at odds with the 
reduction in hallucination symptom severity derived from the BPRS rating. 
Furthermore, the study would have benefitted from adequate baseline 
measures for self-reported data and work attendance (i.e. several weeks) 
to provide a clear context and enable a more meaningful interpretation of 
the client’s progress through therapy. Coupled with an absence of post­
treatment follow up data, which would have established whether the gains 
made during therapy were maintained, it is, therefore, unclear from the 
reported results how effective the ACT treatment actually was in improving 
outcomes related to this gentleman’s auditory hallucinations.
A third case study, involving a more extensive treatment period, has 
been presented by Baruch, Kanter, Busch and Juskiewicz (2009). This 
report discussed a 21 year old male, John, who had not previously received 
any treatment with regards to his mental health, and was diagnosed with 
psychotic disorder not otherwise specified upon assessment, as well as 
dysthmyic disorder. John complained principally of depressed mood and 
persecutory delusions, which appeared to have resulted in significant social 
withdrawal with adverse effects on his relations.
Therapy goals centred on John developing a mindful response to 
his paranoid thoughts, while moving toward valued goals, which principally 
included development of intimate personal relationships. In this context,
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mindful reactions were defined as “noticing the occurrence of thoughts 
without evaluation and being willing to experience discomfort in the service 
of his values” (p.248, Baruch et al., 2009). In total, John received 37 weekly 
or biweekly sessions over the course of a year. As well as the type of ACT 
intervention already outlined, treatment also included aspects of functional 
analytic psychotherapy (FAR), as a complimentary approach, to help 
improve interpersonal functioning.
With respect to clinical outcomes, John’s score on the Beck 
Depression Inventory-ll (BDI-II; Beck, Steer and Brown, 1996 — as cited in 
Baruch et al., 2009) fell from 18 at pre-treatment to 8 at post-treatment. The 
Outcome Questionnaire-45 (00-45; Lambert et al, 1996 -  as cited in 
Baruch et al., 2009) was also administered, which assesses three clinical 
domains. Observed reductions in the Interpersonal Relationships and 
Social Roles domains did not reach clinical significance, although the 
authors emphasise that John reported being very satisfied with steps he 
had made towards greater social interaction and potential romantic 
relations. Notably, the score for the Symptom Distress domain represented 
a clinically significant reduction. In fact, after a one month follow-up, re­
assessment indicated that John no longer fulfilled criteria for any mood or 
psychotic disorder.
Overall, the study appears to provide some reasonable evidence for 
effectiveness of treatment over an extensive treatment period. However, 
given that FAR techniques were also used in therapy, it is difficult to 
evaluate how efficacious the ACT treatment itself was in this example. 
Additionally, more extensive follow-up measurements could have been 
obtained to provide further justification of the lengthy treatment.
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In summary, case studies have been presented of clients from 
varying cultural backgrounds, with some quite different presentations, 
where ACT treatment has resulted in some evident gains.
ACT: Controlled Trials
While the case studies discussed provide some encouraging 
evidence, randomised controlled trials (RTCs) are clearly required to 
provide generalisable conclusions with regards to the effectiveness of ACT 
for the treatment of psychosis. To date, only two controlled trials have been 
reported for this purpose. The first of these trials was conducted by Bach 
and Hayes (2002), which assessed effectiveness of ACT treatment over a 4 
month follow-up period, with particular focus on the effect of treatment on 
rehospitalisation rates. This study randomly assigned eighty inpatients of 
mixed diagnosis, who were experiencing either hallucinations or delusions 
at the time of admission, to treatment as usual (TAU) or four sessions of 
ACT plus TAU. About 1 in 5 of patients who were approached agreed to 
participate in the trial. Of note, comparisons between these participants and 
the typical patients admitted to the hospital with psychosis revealed that the 
participant group were much more likely to have had a prior admission to 
the hospital (90% vs 35%). Although information for detailed comparisons 
between the volunteers and the refusers were not obtained, this information 
alone indicates a possible volunteer bias within the sample. Additionally, as 
the authors point out, it also seems to suggest that the participants 
constitute a relatively chronic sample.
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In this study, TAU consisted of medication and attendance at three 
or more psychoeducational groups (average 40 mins per session). 
Additionally, those patients hospitalised for more than a few days received 
individual psychotherapy (minimum of once a week). Following discharge, 
TAU included monthly meetings with regard to medication management. 
Also available were psychosocial rehabilitation classes, psychotherapy and 
Assertive Community Treatment. According to the authors, only 60% of 
subjects participated in these outpatient services. It should be noted, 
though, that the degree of participation in outpatient services was not 
included as a between-group comparison, which could be important as this 
represents a potential confounding variable.
In addition to TAU, participants in the ACT condition received four individual 
ACT sessions (45-50 mins each), with each session within 3 to 5 days of 
each other. The initial sessions included discussion of the participants’ prior 
efforts to deal with their positive symptoms, followed by the suggestion of 
just noticing thoughts and experiences without doing anything with them. 
Cognitive diffusion exercises and metaphors were then utilised, followed by 
establishment of valued life goals and consideration of coping strategies 
that would minimise barriers to achieving those goals.
Although both groups displayed high hospitalisation rates during 
baseline, the rehospitalisation rate following treatment for the ACT group 
was only half that of the TAU group at 4 month follow up. This represented 
a difference between the groups which remained significant when 
controlling for baseline hospitalisation rates. Also, this difference in 
outcome could not be accounted for by group differences in medication 
compliance. In fact, according to simple Likert scale ratings that were
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obtained, the ACT group were significantly more likely to report psychotic 
symptoms (hallucinations and/or delusions) at foliow up than the TAU 
group, but reported decreased believability of symptoms and decreased 
associated distress. It is suggested by the authors that this apparently 
paradoxical finding was the result of the ACT group's acceptance of their 
symptoms. They hypothesise that, in the context of greater acceptance, 
such people are more likely to acknowledge their existence and less likely 
to deny them, while also having altered their relationship to the symptoms 
such that they are able to see them more as mere thoughts which come 
and go, eventually resulting in reduced believability and distress.
This study has evident limitations, however. Several variables have not 
been controlled for, including the degree of involvement in community 
services foliowing discharge, and significant demographics such as 
educational and socioeconomic background. Furthermore, there was an 
apparent lack of standardisation in the control treatment.
In an effort to replicate and extend the findings of Bach and Hayes 
(2002), a second RCT was conducted by Gaudiano and Herbert (2006). In 
this pilot trial recently hospitalised patients, again of mixed diagnoses but 
fulfilling DSM-IV criteria for psychotic disorder, were randomly assigned to 
enhanced treatment as usual (ETAU, 15 subjects) or to ACT plus ETAU (14 
subjects). In this study, ETAU included pharmacotherapy, case 
management, psychoeducational groups, and unstructured individual 
therapy as needed. The ACT therapist also met with the participants in the 
ETAU condition on a daily basis in an attempt to control for the effect of 
extra individual attention from a therapist.
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In this study, ACT intervention was designed such that sessions 
could be delivered in a “stand alone” format. While this may have enabled a 
greater number of participants to enter the study, the clear downside is the 
resulting variation in therapy that the participants received, with the number 
of ACT sessions per client ranging from 1 to 5, with a mean of 3 sessions. 
As in the above study, rehospitalisation rates were again obtained at one 
month follow-up. In this case, the difference in rates between the group was 
not statistically significant, although the rehospitalisation rate was clearly 
lower for the ACT group compared to ETAU (28% vs 45%). The ACT group 
showed significantly greater reduction in self-rated distress related to 
hallucinations than controls. Furthermore, decreases in the believability of 
hallucinations were only observed in the ACT group. This study was clearly 
underpowered, which may explain the fact that the significant difference in 
rehospitalisation rates found by Bach and Hayes (2002) was not replicated. 
Of note, both of these trials consist of very brief ACT interventions, and it is 
still encouraging that group differences were found over a four month 
period.
Mindfulness Meditation and Psychosis
Promotion of mindfulness is an integral part of the ACT treatment 
process, in which clients are encouraged to experience the present, 
including unpleasant experiences, without judgement. However, the 
application of more meditation-based mindfulness approaches, as derived 
from the Buddhist tradition, are also emerging in the treatment of 
psychosis. Up until recently, though, the literature examining the 
relationship of meditation with psychosis had consisted almost entirely of
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uncontrolled casé reports, which were generally cautionary (e.g. Chan-Ob 
and Boonyanaruthee, 1999).
In view of the cautionary literature, a preliminary evaluation of 
mindfulness training by Chadwick, Newman-Taylor and Abba (2005) aimed 
only to promote a mindful relationship with their distressing symptoms, 
rather than mindfulness in everyday life. This was conducted in a group 
format, with pre- and post-treatment data obtained for the first ten 
participants to complete the group, which consisted of six 90 minute 
sessions run on a weekly basis. Each session included two mindfulness 
practices, in which participants were taught mindfulness of the breath, while 
throughout the group the therapist would emphasise the principles of 
Letting Go, Acceptance and Non-judging via guided discovery and teaching 
methods.
The primary outcome measure was the Clinical Outcomes in 
Routine Evaluation (CORE, 1988), for which the mean score for the group 
decreased significantly over the duration of therapy. A 16-item mindfulness 
questionnaire was also administered pre- and post-treatment to determine 
if participant were able to respond mindfully to distressing thoughts/images, 
although in-study changes to the questionnaire precluded statistical 
analysis. However, percentage changes indicated near universal increases 
in mindful responses among participants.
However, as the authors admit, a lack of clear experimental control 
means that one cannot assert that mindfulness practice itself was 
responsible for clinical improvement in this study. Thus, Chadwick and co­
workers attempted to extend the study in a randomised trial, by comparing
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outcomes from participants completing a mindfulness group, with those 
placed on a therapy waiting list (Chadwick, Hughes, Russell, Russell and 
Dagnan, 2009). Measures used to assess outcomes included the Clinical 
Outcomes in Routine Evaluation (CORE, 1988), the Psychiatric Symptom 
Rating Scale (PSYRATS; Haddock, McCarron, Tarrier and Faragher, 
1999), Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire (SMQ; Chadwick et 
al.,2008) and the Beliefs about Voices Questionnaire Revised (BAVQ-r; 
Chadwick, Lees and Birchwood, 2000 -  as cited in Chadwick et al. 2009).
The mindfulness training group consisted of 9 participants who 
attended twice weekly sessions over 5 weeks, with materials provided for 
home practice over a further 5 weeks. The intervention involved a similar 
approach to that described above (Chadwick, Newman-Taylor and Abba, 
2005). However, although the directionality on all pre- and post-treatment 
measures supported greater improvements for the mindfulness group 
versus the control, none of the measured group differences approached 
statistical significance (p=0.05). Secondary analyses of the data for 15 
completers of the mindfulness training alone revealed significant gains for 
these participants with respect to the CORE (total score) and SMQ 
(Thoughts and Images domain). Overall, while there is a clear suggestion 
from the study that mindfulness training can result in measurable clinical 
gains for people with psychosis, group comparisons were notably 
underpowered. Also, almost no demographic variables were reported. 
Clearly, the study was not well controlled and, given the lack of power in 
the analyses, investigation using a more rigorous controlled trial is 
warranted despite the underwhelming results in this case.
24
As further support for the use of mindfulness meditation practice in 
psychosis, a report describing two single case studies was presented by 
Newman-Taylor, Harper and Chadwick (2009). The participants were men 
aged 51 and 63 years respectively, both of whom met diagnostic criteria for 
paranoid schizophrenia with current hallucinations, according to DSM-IV. 
Neither had any previous experience of mindfulness or meditation. Distress 
and believability in relation to the voices were measured using twice weekly 
self-report ratings on a scale of 0-10, and again at 4 or 6-week follow-up. 
Ratings were obtained following sessions and at home, which helped to 
account for possible session effects.
Baseline data were collected over 3 weeks, followed by weekly
hour-long therapy sessions. The intervention began with a discussion on
the rationale behind using mindfulness in response to hearing voices,
followed by guided mindfulness exercises performed in each of the 
sessions. Thus, the therapy solely consisted of guided mindfulness 
practice, with discussion on the participants’ use and experience of it via 
Socratic dialogue. Practise between sessions was encouraged and audio 
recordings were provided. While no immediate changes in self-reported 
data were evident, both distress and believability begin to decrease after 3- 
4 weeks of therapy. For Participant B, this improvement was then 
maintained through the rest of therapy and at 1 month follow-up. 
Improvements for Participant A were less consistent, but still notably 
present at 6 week follow up. Additional follow-up data would have been 
useful to assess the consistency of post-treatment changes. Also, this case 
study relied on self-reported measures which have not been validated. 
Therefore, any inferences made regarding the effectiveness of intervention 
in these two cases would be tentative.
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Finally, in an effort to further investigate psychological processes 
that occur in the learning of mindful responses to psychotic experiences, a 
grounded theory analysis has been carried out (Abba, Chadwick and 
Stevenson, 2008). This was performed with 16 clients with a diagnosis of 
psychosis, who had attended meditation-based mindfulness groups such 
as those described above. The analysis provided a rich description of 
participants’ experiences of the process of learning to relate differently to 
psychotic experience through mindfulness training. The theory generated 
proposed three stages; opening awareness to the experience; allowing it to 
be as it is; accepting oneself with the experience. While this study does not 
inform on the efficacy of mindfulness on treating psychosis as such, it 
provided a rationale for the mechanism by which mindfulness training 
results in therapeutic benefits.
Summary and Conclusions
A rational justification for the use of acceptance and mindfulness 
approaches for the treatment of people with psychosis has been provided 
(Pankey and Hayes, 2003). Several case studies have been reported that 
have demonstrated clinical and personal gains for individuals with 
psychosis having received ACT treatment. Despite the fact that such clients 
have varied in terms of their level of cognitive functioning, age and cultural 
background, personal circumstances and clinical presentation, there is a 
tentative suggestion that ACT could be broadly applicable to a range of 
individuals who experience psychosis. Length of treatment has also widely 
varied, potentially allowing for a degree of freedom and flexibility in this
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approach. Such studies have, though, contained methodological 
weaknesses, for instance a lack of baseline measurements, or reliance on 
self-reported data, and reporting that may also be open to experimenter 
bias.
The two RTCs so far reported in relation to ACT for psychosis also 
contained evident methodological limitations. A recurrent theme through 
many of the studies, however, is an apparent reduction in the believability 
of positive symptoms such as hallucination and delusions. It is probable 
that this is aided in particular by the process of cognitive defusion that ACT 
treatment promotes, as clients become increasingly able to see the 
distressing thoughts “just as thoughts”. This is important as this process 
thus disempowers the psychotic experience, and may allow a reduction in 
the distress that it causes, and freeing the individual to progress towards 
their goals. However, further clinical trials with larger sample sizes are 
required to provide more substantive support for the use of ACT for 
psychosis. The use of a standardised measurement of acceptance in 
further studies would be useful, in order to help establish this process as a 
mechanism for change (Shawyer, Ratcliff, Mackinnon, Farhall, Hayes and 
Copolov, 2007). In fact, Shawyer and co-workers report that they are 
currently working to publish data from a controlled trial of their own using 
ACT for psychosis.
So far, the evidence for mindfulness meditation for psychosis is 
rather less objectively persuasive, even though much of the goals are the 
same. While it is encouraging that mindfulness meditation regimes are well 
tolerated in view of cautionary notes from earlier case studies, no controlled 
studies with sufficient power have been reported. The ACT studies have
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involved individual therapy, while the mindfulness meditation studies have 
mostly involved groups. Clearly, larger and more controlled trials are 
required to establish clinical efficacy for this type of approach.
An important question, which has not been considered in the 
literature to date, is whether or not ACT or Mindfulness training benefit 
psychotic patients over traditional CBT. While Pankey and Hayes (2002) 
attempted to make a theoretical case for why this could be so, their 
assertions are not based on empirical evidence. Again, this is an area for 
future research. Clearly, though, there are inherent difficulties in obtaining 
suitable sample sizes when developing treatments for the seriously 
mentally ill.
To conclude, due to the insufficient quality and quantity of studies 
thus far, it would appear premature to fully recommend ACT or mindfulness 
training for psychosis based purely on the research base. However, the 
evidence thus far indicates that further extensive research is well 
warranted.
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The Task
For this problem based learning (PBL) task, our Personal and 
Professional Learning Discussion Groups (PPLDGs) were asked to 
address the theme ‘Relationship to Change’, on which we were to deliver a 
group presentation.
The Group Process
When the group initially got together to begin ‘unpacking the 
problem’, one of the first things we established was that we all seemed as 
uncertain as each other as to what was actually expected of us in this task.
I know I felt reassured by this at first, with a sense that we were at least “all 
in the same boat”. Unfortunately, I had also just realised that I had not read 
the article we were provided with, which described the general PBL 
rationale and process (Wood, 2003). Clearly this was a bad start on my 
part, and I was wary of being ‘exposed’ early on as someone not very ‘with 
it’, which I have sometimes thought to be the case in the past. I have since 
considered how this exposed feeling that I experienced is also likely to be 
relevant for clients that I see on placement. It must be very exposing for a 
person to trying to reveal their most difficult thoughts and feelings to 
someone, believing that that they could judge you in a negative way, just as 
I had done at the start of the group.
Despite my initial stumbling block, I volunteered to be the Chair for 
the first session while we adopted a rotation on Chair and Scribe roles. If 
I’m honest, there was also some thinking that if I was Chair, then I could 
simply act as the person drawing from the others for ideas, rather than
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trying to find inspiration in myself on how to address the problem. In a way, 
becoming chair in the first session was probably a bit of a ‘safety behaviour’ 
in this sense. It seemed to work out well though, as I was well supported by 
the other group members, and the role of a facilitator/mediator rather than 
the provider of inspiration was probably one that suited my personal skills 
anyhow.
As the group first considered what actual “change” we were to be 
addressing, it was perhaps natural that our initial thoughts were drawn to 
the significant changes we ourselves had recently been in the process of 
going through -  that is, managing to get on to and then starting the Clinical 
Psychology training course. Therefore, we all described to each other how 
we had come to be where we were, and we tried to identify any emerging 
themes with respect to the changes we had all been going through on the 
way. This also served well as a way for us to get to know each other better, 
and this sharing of experiences seemed to help us bond as a group early 
on. We also established guidelines for the group, which helped clarify some 
practical aspects such as confidentiality, goal setting for the sessions, and 
self-monitoring (i.e. for each of us to try not to dominate but ensure 
contribution). I felt this helped in providing a ‘safe place’ for us to be open 
and honest, while establishing a degree of structure and also a level of 
expectancy that we would share. Certainly this helped me appreciate even 
more the importance of helping a client feel as safe in therapy as possible. I 
could see how introducing structure and boundaries into such settings 
provides a degree of predictability and certainty, which in turn promotes a 
sense of security in which open dialogue can be encouraged.
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With respect to our stories, it was interesting to hear in some detail 
the varied routes we all took to getting on the course. Hearing how two of 
the group members had crossed cultural boundaries along the way had 
further enriched this experience for me. Despite such differences, though, 
we were able to identify some common themes. These included changes in 
professional roles, and the adjustment to differing expectations (from 
ourselves and others) that accompany our transitions, e.g. from 
undergraduate, to assistant, to trainee and in the future to qualified clinical 
psychologist. Personal themes included the emotional experiences that 
related to such changes. Practical issues relating to change also arose, 
such as continual change of environment as we moved from place to place 
with a different course/job. This was a factor I could relate well to, having 
moved many times over recent years.
Having discussed these themes, we agreed that the next stage was 
to relate our experiences of change to existing theories or models in the 
psychology literature. We set ourselves a homework task to do some 
research and reading regarding such theories. When feeding back, it 
became apparent that one of the most influential models was Prochaska’s 
Transtheoretical Model (TTM) -  a ‘stages of change’ model which proposes 
that a person progresses through 5 discreet stages when trying to modify 
their behaviour; Precontemplation, Contemplation, Preparation, Action and 
Maintenance (Prochaska and Velicer, 1997). It became clear to me how 
important it might be to consider the stage which a client is currently in 
when operating within this model, in order to tailor interventions accordingly 
and better appreciate where the client was ‘coming from’. However, we 
were also aware of some criticisms that had been made of the model 
(West, 2005), such as the apparently arbitrary nature of the dividing lines
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between the different stages. Furthermore, the model did not seem to fully 
encompass processes that are not always accessible to conscious 
awareness, such as reward and punishment or associative learning.
We also drew on findings from a qualitative study by Heatherton 
and Nicholls (1994) which identified several factors affecting change. One 
such factor was the occurrence of crisis or ‘focal’ events, which clients may 
have experienced before we see them in therapy. These can be particularly 
distressing times for people, but can also prove good vehicles for promoting 
change by raising awareness of a problem and prompting self re- 
evaluation. This study also drew our consideration to the degree of social 
support that a client may or may not have, as well as the importance of an 
attribution of internal control to promote change. Furthermore, the ability to 
create and integrate a new sense of identity was also recognised as an 
important factor.
While these models and theories provided some explanatory and 
descriptive aspects to change, we felt that they did not satisfactorily capture 
the emotional quality of personal change. One of the group members 
presented to us John Fisher’s ‘Process of transition’ curve 
(www.businessballs.com/processofchange.pdf, 2000) -  a diagram
representing how emotions may change/develop through different phases 
of personal transition. We all seemed to be able to well relate to this, and 
we agreed that this was also something that we wanted to include in the 
presentation.
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Presentation
So far, then, we had established the content that we were keen to 
include in our talk, but there remained a lack of direction or structure as to 
how we were going to express our interpretation of the problem in a 
presentation. Certainly I still felt somewhat anxious at that point, as it 
seemed clear that we needed something to provide a sense of focus. Then, 
just when we needed it, the solution seemed to present itself. One of the 
group members had drawn out her background to getting on the training 
course as a ‘journey’ -  an exercise she had previously done with clients 
while working in brain injury rehabilitation. The diagram included key 
thoughts and events along the way, and immediately we saw how this 
‘Journey of Change’ could be used as a focal point for the presentation. We 
therefore used her story as an example by which we could critically discuss 
those key theories and ideas relating to personal change as mentioned 
above. I thought that the group member was being very brave and open in 
allowing her story to be exposed in such a way. However, I really felt a 
strong sense of relief among the group after we had made this decision. 
Addressing change as a journey seemed very appropriate, as it captured 
how change existed as a fluid and dynamic process which was highly 
personal.
All that remained was how to put it all together to provide a cohesive 
presentation. The talk was divided into sections, with discussion around the 
group member’s journey at the core, followed by a look at the Process of 
Transition which would highlight emotional aspects of change. We all 
seemed to find our contributing part without too much of a fuss, and after a 
couple of practices I felt that we were ready.
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On the day of the presentation, I couldn't help but draw 
comparisons with the other groups. I was aware that ours was a bit dry and 
not very lively, while some groups were using engaging role plays to deliver 
their presentation. For me, this added to the performance anxiety that was 
already there. In the end, however, it felt like a bit of an anti-climax, as I had 
none of the difficulties that my anxieties led me to believe that I might have. 
In hindsight, though, I recognised that we had become so caught up with 
the content of the presentation, and ensuring that everyone got involved 
satisfactorily, that we neglected to reflect adequately on the actual process 
of the PBL.
Overall thoughts on the task
Reflecting now on the process overall, it seemed that the anxiety 
that I experienced from the beginning of the PBL exercise appeared to 
decrease as the group’s approach gained structure and coherence. 
Therefore, being able to see the direction in which we were heading helped 
increase predictability and made the task easier to manage.
We came into the task unclear of what the actual goal was, and I 
think that this is somewhat analogous to how clients feel when they begin 
attending psychological therapy -  they may hope that it helps, but are 
unsure how it can do so and what the actual goal is. In the group, we 
worked through the problem collaboratively and identified goals as we went 
along, which again could indicate the effectiveness of this type of approach 
in a therapeutic setting.
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Relating to my Personal Clinical Practice
Given that engendering personal change of some kind is what 
psychological therapy ultimately strives for, the consideration of a person’s 
relationship to change throughout the PBL provided a valuable context for 
clinical placement. Despite the cited limitations of Prochaska’s TTM 
(Prochaska and Velicer, 1997), I have found it useful to consider the 
approximate “stage” that a client may be at during my placement. For 
example, one of the clients I have been seeing referred to a period a few 
years ago when she had begun therapy, but disengaged after a couple of 
sessions, stating that she just was not ready to address difficult issues at 
that time. Now, however, she has stated that she is at a point where she 
recognises that change is necessary for her. Nevertheless, it did take a 
recent crisis event for her to reach that point. Also, there will most likely be 
times when I am the therapist from whom a client disengages as they 
struggle to move into more active phases of change. This, it would seem, is 
one of the frustrating aspects to therapeutic work which every clinical 
psychologist will inevitably have to manage.
In supervision, I have also reflected on the readiness of my clients 
to address particular issues. For example, it may appear that they are more 
reluctant to acknowledge certain problems than others. It has seemed 
important to consider the reasons behind this, while being mindful to allow 
clients to work to towards specific changes in their lives as and when they 
are ready to do so.
The importance of an attribution of internal control has also 
emerged in my clinical work. For instance, one client has described feeling
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“stuck” and a sense of being powerless to make the changes in their life 
that they would like to make. This person has cited a belief that her mental 
health difficulties will always be preventing her from doing so, and has 
suggested that producing change is beyond her control. This mentality can 
have important implications, with greater external locus of control having 
been associated with greater severity of depression (Benassi, Sweeney 
and Dufour, 1987). This has represented a therapeutic challenge, and 
highlighted the need for me to help develop a greater sense of self efficacy 
for this client, and is clearly a factor to continually be aware of in the future.
While my PPLD group considered our own changes in identity as 
we start and progress through our training, it has also become clear how 
crucial such factors are for clients. One of my clients has expressed fear 
over what it might mean for her to address one of her coping behaviours, 
whereby she may overcompensate for feelings of low self worth by always 
addressing other people’s needs, but rarely her own. She described a belief 
that if this were to change, it would not just alter how others would see her, 
but also how she would see herself. In the light of the PBL task, exploring 
such issues relating to identity changes is clearly of importance in order to 
help nurture positive change.
Social support has also presented as an important factor, in view of 
a client whose engagement in therapy has been somewhat erratic in the 
context of a rather chaotic lifestyle. Although she has expressed willingness 
to pursue therapy, she relies on others for transport to the sessions, and 
states that she is not supported by her family at all in her strive for change.
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Clearly, the PBL task raised a number of issues relevant to clinical 
practice, by addressing factors relevant to the change that we are trying to 
facilitate in collaboration with our clients. I have been able to consider these 
issues as they have arisen in my placement. One particular thing that stuck 
with me from my group’s talk was how each person has their own “Journey 
of Change”, which was an important message for me in fostering a person- 
centred approach to therapy.
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This account describes the development of and processes within a 
Personal and Professional Learning Discussion Group. It clarifies how the 
group established a ‘safe place’ early on by setting up clear guidelines, 
while the sharing of personal information had helped promote a socialised 
and relaxed atmosphere. The development of the group through several 
tasks has been outlined. We had clearly developed from an initially anxious 
group of trainees, uncertain of what we were meant to get out of our 
meetings, to a group where members were very comfortable with each 
other, and were able to produce coherent presentations and were 
comfortable with a moderate degree of self disclosure. The PBL provided a 
good example of structured team work, while the cultural genogram 
provided me with an enhanced sense of cultural sensitivity towards my 
clients in clinical practice. Placement discussions provided both 
reassurances and learning opportunities that would have possibly gone 
unmet outside of the group environment. The video recording helped to 
clarify the distinct roles that emerged for individuals throughout the group 
process. My role appeared to develop into a group member who tended to 
monitor what the group was doing, and sometimes direct discussion. 
Further learning points for clinical practice included the consideration of 
power dynamics within group and individual therapy and also team settings.
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INTRODUCTION
Discussion and debate concerning the role of clinical psychology 
within UK healthcare services appear to have arisen periodically throughout 
the profession’s relatively young lifespan. However, in anticipation of 
possible substantial reforms of the NHS, and in the context of extreme 
financial pressures, the issue is as relevant now as it ever has been, if not 
more so. After establishing the context from which current clinical 
psychology practice has developed, this essay will attempt to critically 
consider what aspects of a clinical psychologist’s role may now be 
perceived as distinctive within the NHS. This will include discussion on 
aspects of therapeutic and research-based competences, and the 
responsibilities of training and supervision of non-psychologists. While 
anticipating the future is fraught with difficulties, it will be argued that 
substantially increased leadership drives are likely be an important focus 
for the profession.
Setting the scene for the Clinical Psychology profession
In order to meaningfully discuss the relevant issues regarding the 
current and future contributions of clinical psychology in the NHS, it is 
necessary to consider the background from which the profession has 
emerged. Clearly, this is a relatively young applied science. In the UK, 
applied psychology originally developed prior to the Second World War 
from child services, and then following the War in the assessment of 
returning soldiers (Turpin and Llewelyn, 2009). However, it was following 
the formation of the NHS that clinical psychology really began to take 
shape. Assessment was dominated by cognitive, intelligence and
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personality testing, often supporting psychiatrists. A diploma in clinical 
psychology was first established by Monte Shapiro at the Institute of 
Psychiatry, although psychological interventions and psychotherapy were 
not featured in the curriculum themselves (Shapiro, 1955 -  cited in Turpin 
and Llewelyn, 2010). In the following years, postgraduate clinical 
psychology training courses emerged, and by 1960 there were 500 clinical 
psychologists employed within the NHS, while the BPS began to establish 
formal training requirements. Gradually, the development and delivery of 
model-specific formulations and therapeutic interventions became an 
increasingly significant part of the clinical psychologist’s role within the 
NHS.
The growing presence of psychology as an applied clinical discipline 
prompted a review of psychology services in the Trethowan Report 
(Trethowan, 1977). While recognising the potential of applied psychology 
within the health service, the report observed that a considerable lack of 
workforce supply was preventing such potential from being realised. In fact, 
this lack of available resources to address the overwhelmingly important 
issue of the public’s psychological wellbeing could be seen as one of the 
key factors governing the role of qualified clinical psychologists now and for 
the foreseeable future, as will become clear in this discussion.
Although a degree of expansion through the 1980s followed the 
Trethowan report, this lack of manpower remained, leading to a further 
review by Mowbray (Management Advisory Service, 1989). The MAS 
review determined that provision of psychological services was not the 
unique responsibility of clinical psychologists within the NHS, and that 
psychological interventions could be delivered across a range of levels,
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now known as MAS levels 1 to 3. The first level largely related to staff 
within general healthcare practice operating with a basic awareness of 
psychological principles. The second level related more specifically to 
particular protocol-based methods which are delivered by non­
psychologists taught by qualified psychologists. Level three involved the 
provision of individualised interventions by qualified psychologists. The 
sharing of psychological skills was not a novel idea within UK healthcare, 
and the MAS report merely recommended an expansion of what had 
started on a small scale (Davis and Butcher, 1985). Thus, it is already clear 
that the delivery of specific psychologically informed interventions alone is 
not a distinctive role for clinical psychology.
Over the decade that followed, it appeared that the 
recommendations of the MAS report were slow to be picked up (Mowbray, 
2011). However, the evidence base for the effectiveness of psychological 
therapies had grown rapidly, for example in the use of cognitive behavioural 
therapy for treatment of depression (Butler, Chapman, Foreman and Beck,
2006). Nevertheless, it remained evident that psychological services within 
the NHS were patchy (Layard, 2005). A government commitment to 
expanding the provision of psychological services led to significant 
investment in the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (lAPT) 
initiative (Ghosh, 2009). Since 2007, lAPT services have gradually 
increased in numbers throughout the country, comprising NHS and private 
sector providers. While initially targeting the provision of CBT for adult 
depression and anxiety within the primary care sector, the targeted 
populations and therapeutic approaches are now broadening.
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A further important development has seen a focus on the delivery of 
evidence based practices, resulting in the formation of the NICE guidelines 
(National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, 2004). The 
involvement of people who use services and carers in the development of 
services has also finally begun to take shape.
The current economic and political scene
Recent developments within the NHS have been dominated by 
economic factors. The financial challenges currently facing the NHS are 
considerable and well known. While apparent drives for greater efficiency of 
service delivery are likely to affect the way in which most, if not all, applied 
clinical disciplines operate, this will be a particularly important factor for 
professions whose roles are not clearly established. This is, of course, why 
the current discussion is of such great importance to the profession and its 
future. Furthermore, it remains likely that future restructuring of health 
service commissioning and delivery in the UK will lead to greater 
involvement of the private sector, despite current opposition to such 
changes (Department of Health, 2010). Thus, mental health services within 
the NHS may well be operating in competition with private and voluntary 
service providers on a much greater scale. Therefore, it is paramount that 
clinical psychologists, often seen as costly service providers, can 
demonstrate that they offer the NHS unique abilities which constitute value 
for money.
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DISTINCTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS WITHIN THE NHS
Provision of highly tailored psychological formulation and 
intervention
As the discussion so far has established, the provision of specific 
psychological interventions in themselves clearly cannot be seen as a 
unique contribution of clinical psychologists. However, it is generally 
understood that clinical psychologists will have developed a broad 
knowledge base and competence in a range of therapeutic approaches 
(British Psychological Society, 2007a). Thus, they are expected to be able 
to offer flexibility when working with individuals and with families/groups, 
and have the ability to work in an integrative manner. Therefore, an ability 
to tailor an intervention and draw on a range of models can be considered a 
unique asset of the clinical psychologist, compared with others who may 
offer a narrow psychological intervention. This relates to the MAS level 3 as 
described above, and focuses clinical psychologists on working within NHS 
mental health services which may encounter greater complexity and 
severity of difficulties among clients, such as in personality disorder 
services, psychosis or dual diagnosis. The importance of an integrative 
approach is further highlighted by the fact that, despite numerous 
favourable studies for certain interventions, there is clearly no “one suits all” 
therapy.
Despite the expectations laid out by the BPS, some observers have 
questioned whether such a flexibility of approaches among clinical 
psychologists is as widespread in practice as it may be assumed, or 
whether proficiency in more than one approach can be taken for granted
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(Hassell and Clements, 2011). This may be a fair point, particularly given 
how one particular approach can often dominate within a clinical 
psychology training course as, for example, CBT may sometimes have 
done so. This represents a challenge for the BPS to ensure that trainees 
are indeed “proficient” in more than one approach, and perhaps encourage 
an integrative approach more directly.
Training and supervision
With the numbers of clinical psychologists likely to remain limited, 
further training of non-psychologist healthcare workers on psychological 
approaches is clearly required, if the recommendations of the MAS report 
are to finally be realised. This is another role for which clinical psychologists 
are well placed to perform. This may not be seen necessarily as a 
distinctive contribution as, logically speaking, training for specific 
interventions need only be performed by those with specific expertise, 
rather than the broader knowledge of approaches that the clinical 
psychologist is said to possess. Nevertheless, given the considerable 
expertise in clinical training that many psychologists have developed 
through involvement in clinical psychology training courses, it stands to 
reason that they are well equipped to be at the forefront of non-psychologist 
training on psychologically-informed interventions.
All clinical care within the NHS is to be carried out under appropriate 
supervision, and applied psychology is no different (New Ways of Working, 
2007). Clinical psychologists should be able to offer such supervision for 
non-psychologists fora broad range of approaches (New Ways of Working,
2007). Of course, it will often be the case that such responsibility will be in
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addition to the supervision that clinical psychologists already offer their own 
trainees and professional peers. Given that guidelines/requirements for 
clinical supervision involve 1 hour per week, in addition to further informal 
contact (British Psychological Society, 2003), supervision alone could well 
place considerable demands on the psychologist’s time. Nevertheless, 
there appears to be ample evidence that clinical psychologists can and do 
take on such a role within the NHS. An example can be taken from a 
community service for people with learning disabilities in Surrey, of which I 
am aware, where a clinical psychologist who is accredited in Cognitive 
Analytic Therapy provides guidance and weekly supervision for non­
psychology professionals in the use of CAT with their own clients.
However, one can’t simply assume that clinical supervision of non­
psychologists is adequate and effective. Indeed, much of the research base 
for clinical supervision in general has been criticised on methodological 
grounds (Spence et al., 2001). Particular attention should probably be 
placed on addressing inherent power dynamics in the supervisory 
relationship, which may be particularly complex in the context of cross­
profession supervision, as in the “psychologist — non-psychologist 
scenario. It would seem prudent for further research in this area, which 
would aid development of best practice with regards to supervision of 
therapy work performed by non-psychologists, as guidelines so far appear 
insufficient.
Furthermore, if indeed clinical psychologists are themselves to 
focus on those with complex needs in their individual work, this does pose 
a question on how they are to develop expertise on intervening with mild to 
moderate conditions. For example, I myself, along with many colleagues,
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have found it difficult to obtain such experience on training, due to the local 
lAPT service operating outside of the NHS. This may compromise the 
ability to train and supervise effectively those who would be working directly 
with such cases, if one assumes that an expert in complex cases does not 
necessarily make one an expert in dealing with mild conditions. It is 
suggested that a greater collaborative stance with primary care is ensured 
in the future, to allow trainees to gain such experience.
Consultation work
Given the apparent need for the applied psychologist to promote 
psychological principles within healthcare beyond individual therapy, 
consultancy has also emerged as an important role for clinical 
psychologists in the NHS. The research base on consultation highlights 
several potential aspects of a consultant’s role (Clayton and Bongar, 1994). 
These include direct service to a client (e.g. via an assessment), indirect 
service to a client (e.g. aiding a consultée in the development of a client’s 
treatment plan) and direct services to a consultée (e.g. by providing 
information). In this case, we are considering the latter two, where clinical 
psychologists can consult with individuals, teams and organisations.
In current clinical practice, there is an increasing trend towards 
offering ‘consultation to referrer’, rather than the traditional ‘referral to 
experts’ process. This promotes increased skills of those closest to the 
clients, and provides a way of helping to develop or improve 
psychologically informed practice of other professionals within consultation, 
to the benefit of people who use services. Again, clinical psychologists are 
able to offer distinct contributions in this respect, in that they are able to
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draw on a broad knowledge base and an understanding of diverse 
approaches, which allows them to offer alternative views on particular 
cases or clinical dilemmas in a collaborative process. Well developed 
formulation skills allow this process to occur, despite often limited clinical 
information within a consultation setting.
An awareness of systemic as well as individualised factors also 
places the clinical psychologist in a good position to consult within and 
across teams. This may be especially important in settings where teams 
may have developed rigid views towards a client or towards a particular 
way of working. However, one must be wary of the risk in positioning 
oneself as the “expert” (Lake et al., 2008), which can disrupt the 
consultant-consultee relationships.
Research Skills
Few professionals within mental health service provision receive 
quite as vigorous training in research competencies as clinical 
psychologists. Such advanced skills distinguish clinical psychologists from 
many others within the NHS who provide therapeutic interventions. The 
model of the ‘scientist practitioner’ continues to guide training and practice 
within clinical psychology. As already highlighted, the reliance on the 
evidence base to establish best practice and health policy in the UK has 
increased greatly in the form of NICE guidelines, and thus there is a 
continued onus on clinical psychologists to provide substantial contributions 
towards this in relation to the evaluation of therapeutic interventions. 
Despite this, however, it has been questioned as to whether the NHS has 
capacity to fully support clinical psychologists in providing the time and
54
resources to and enable such contributions to be made (Kennedy and 
Llewelyn, 2001), as many apparently struggle to put their research skills 
into practice regularly.
Neuropsychological assessment
While a range of basic cognitive tests are performed by
psychiatrists, occupational therapists and others professionals within the 
NHS, detailed neuropsychological assessments are almost exclusively 
provided by clinical psychologists. This includes work undertaken in relation 
to IQ assessments, cognitive profiling, dementia assessments and
assessment following brain injury. If anything, such skills are likely to
become increasingly prized, given an aging population in the UK where the 
rates of dementia diagnosis are expected to increase considerably in the 
coming decades. The neuropsychological training that clinical psychologists 
receive also enables them to utilise more readily a biopsychosocial model 
towards their understanding of the difficulties that clients experience. This 
enables a more holistic approach to clinical practice to be achieved 
compared with many other mental health professions such as therapists 
and counsellors.
Alternative to the medical model
On a similar note, another important contribution for clinical
psychology is that it can offer “an authoritative and constructive” alternative 
to the medical model (British Psychological Society, 2007b). Clinical 
psychologists have developed collaborative skills that encourage an 
approach which empowers service users and carers to a greater degree
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than the dominant medicalised discourse. Indeed, service users 
themselves have identified the presence of applied psychologists within 
teams as offering “a helpful counterbalance to the medical model” (British 
Psychological Society, 2007b).
FUTURE FOCUS
It is clear from the above discussion that clinical psychologists do 
indeed occupy a unique position within mental health services. It is also 
apparent that indirect work and the promotion of psychological principles 
and practices for non-psychologists has become an integral part of the 
profession, in addition to the assessment and therapy-based work with 
which it is more commonly identified. It will be important for clinical 
psychologists to continue to develop the above roles in the future, if the 
profession is to help maximise available resources with which to support 
those in need. The majority of this section, however, centres on aspects of 
the profession which are not likely to be considered as distinctive aspects 
of a clinical psychologist’s contribution, but which are likely to be important 
for its future within the modern NHS.
Leadership
Good leadership could be seen as being fundamental to successful 
change. Given the degree of anticipated change that the NHS is likely to 
face in the coming years, this would clearly seem to be one the most 
important areas for clinical psychology to focus its efforts now and in the 
future, in a bid to shape change in line with the profession’s own values. 
Clinical psychologists are already being encouraged to develop and
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implement leadership skills as an important part of their work (British 
Psychological Society, 2007a). However, it would seem that many remain 
uncertain about what this would entail in their day to day work.
A contemporary conceptualisation of leadership emphasises the 
ability for leaders to work collaboratively with others in a way which enables 
them to achieve a mutually valued objective (Kouzes and Posner, 2003), 
and is less concerned directly with occupying positions of power. However, 
many leadership initiatives so far within the NHS have been aimed at senior 
management (NHS Leadership Qualities Framework, 2006). There seems 
not to have been a coherent framework in place for trainees and newly 
qualified clinical psychologists to develop and exercise leadership skills, 
despite requirements that they begin to do so early in their careers (British 
Psychological Society, 2007). Indeed, trainees have reported a “lack of 
preparedness” with respect to adopting leadership roles, reflected in the 
insignificant presence of leadership skills teaching compared with that 
relating to individual therapy (Bullock, Buffham, Coysh and Nienaber, 
2010).
An interesting insight into the ‘Leadership challenges for clinical 
psychologists' was provided by a description of a two day workshop with 
this very title (Hughes, Nicholson and Mansell, 2011). The report outlined 
the uncertainty that the clinical psychologist attendees had with regards to 
particular issues, for example the differences between leadership and 
management. A key process during the workshop was considered to be the 
re-framing that took place among the delegates of viewing leadership more 
as “influence”. In this sense, the psychologist as leader utilises skills such 
as flexibility, responsiveness and the ability to motivate others as a way to
57
provide positive, directional influence within a team or organisational 
setting. These are indeed qualities that clinical psychologists would be 
expected to possess -  it is the setting which may sometimes be different. 
The workshop delegates stated that they had influences within their teams, 
but not the responsibility of resources with which to “back this up” (Hughes, 
Nicholson and Mansell, 2011, p.31). If anything, this highlights the growing 
need for leadership within clinical psychology within the organisation 
framework. Ultimately, though, Hughes, Nicholson and Mansell (2011) 
conclude that “true leadership does not reside in a job or position”. 
Comments by Hassall and Clements (2011) describe a view that the clinical 
psychology profession has failed to assert its own “identity and purpose” 
while becoming immersed within the NHS. If this were true, surely a greater 
development of leadership within the profession would help reverse this 
trend.
Marketing
Aside from the leadership and skills-based aspects of the future 
focus of clinical psychology, it also seems that effective marketing is and 
will be of increasing importance for the profession. Probably few would 
argue that such marketing has not been a strong point of the profession 
historically. This is perhaps not surprising, given that the issue of marketing 
is not likely to be one that is high up on the agenda of those drawn to 
clinical psychology. However, it is all very well discussing the distinctive 
contributions that clinical psychologists can make for the NHS, but it is 
another convincing those that commission services. This will be particularly 
important at an individual service level, given that the NHS may continue to
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become increasingly market orientated and open to competition. 
(Department of Health, 2010).
A marketing exercise has been described which aimed to outline the 
services that psychologists offered within an older adults mental health 
service (Craven-Staines, Hopper and Dexter-Smith, 2011). The document 
they produced highlighted the individual skills and specialisms of the 
psychologists themselves, as well as those of clinical psychologists working 
within older adults mental health in general. Notably, the authors 
emphasised how time-consuming the exercise was. Again, it would be 
important to try and establish the effectiveness of such marketing, given the 
scarcity of time and resources which would be required to implement them.
Effective marketing of clinical psychology is likely also to be of great 
benefit to people who use services and carers themselves. With increased 
choices available in the future, marketing might aid informed decision 
making on their part. Certainly more could be done ‘normalise’ the 
acceptance of help from mental health professionals, and clinical 
psychologists can play a leading role in this respect. Such marketing could 
improve the public’s understanding of psychological services, which may 
help contribute to demystifying mental health in general and reduce 
ongoing stigma.
Therapeutic developments
Clearly, clinical psychologists must continue to play a leading role in 
the further development of therapeutic practice. The expansion of the 
evidence base will continue to be crucial in this respect. Financial
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constraints are likely to lead to increased pressure to develop time-efficient 
individual and group therapies. Despite great expansion of psychological 
services into a host of clinical settings, there remains further scope for an 
increased presence of direct and indirect clinical psychology involvement in 
many areas, particularly within general medicine and physical health 
conditions.
Furthermore, clinical psychologists ought to be at the forefront of 
developing and directing the choice of outcome measures which are used 
to determine payment by results (PBR) (Fairbairn, 2007). This would 
ensure that the work that clinical psychologists perform is recognised 
effectively, while identifying meaningful change for clients.
Clinical Psychology and service user and carer involvement
Surprisingly, there appears to be a dearth of research literature 
exploring service user and carer views on where clinical psychologists 
should focus their future efforts. This is unfortunate, as clinical 
psychologists are well placed to facilitate greater inclusion and involvement 
of carers and services users in these changing times, to ensure their voice 
is not lost among the growing competitive and economical nature of future 
service delivery. Further efforts to achieve this should therefore be 
encouraged.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The above discussion did not intend on outlining all that clinical 
psychologists offer within the NHS, i.e. all the multitude of services that
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they provide across the lifespan within specialist and generic settings. It 
intended to focus on those aspects of clinical psychology work which 
distinguish the role from other professionals who work within NHS mental 
health services. These include the ability to deliver, train others in, 
supervise and consult on a range of psychological approaches and 
interventions, with a breadth of knowledge of psychological concepts that 
can inform many aspects of clinical practice. This is an important 
contribution, given that NICE guidelines recommend a range of approaches 
for many conditions. Additional skills relating to research competencies and 
neuropsychological assessment also mark the profession out from others. It 
is admitted that the evidence for regarding some of the contributions as 
‘distinguished’ is not so cut and dry. Indeed, it may be considered that the 
majority of skills that clinical psychologists possess are not unique in 
themselves. However, it is more so a unique ‘skill mix’ which allows the 
profession to truly stand out. With this, though, runs a risk that clinical 
psychologists could be seen as ‘Jack or Jills of all trades and masters of 
none’, in comparison with other professions that may have narrower and 
more clearly defined job roles. Thus, the importance of effective marketing 
on a personal and professional level becomes highly important.
As a relatively small profession still, clinical psychology lacks the 
numbers and the power to make the desired impact on health care for the 
majority of service users via one to one clinical work alone. Thus further 
development of indirect working will continue to be of great importance in 
the future, as will a stronger leadership presence throughout the NHS, 
without which the profession will most likely fail to reach its potential in the 
UK.
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Personal Reflections
Prior to attempting this essay, I can honestly say that I did not fully 
appreciate the importance of the contribution of clinical psychology outside 
the direct therapy setting. It has forced me to consider the reality that a 
clinical psychologist’s time is not always best spent in direct therapeutic 
work, as the numbers simply don’t and never will add up -  i.e. it will not be 
financially feasible for enough clinical psychologists to be employed to see 
all those that may benefit from individualised psychological therapy. This 
idealistic view will not help NHS services to reach as many people as 
possible, and therefore indirect working via supervision and consultation 
becomes paramount, and constitutes effective use of one’s resources. On a 
practical level, the essay has also helped me consider how I would need to 
market myself for future NHS employment, and the importance of seizing 
leadership opportunities whenever they arise.
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The Task
For this problem based learning (PBL) task, we were presented with 
information regarding a hypothetical case. The scenario related to the care 
proceedings of two young twins (Sally and Sarah Stride), which were 
enacted due to the Local Authority’s perceived risk of emotional abuse and 
neglect of the twins while under the care of their parents (Mr and Mrs 
Stride, Figure 1). The background information to the case outlined that Mrs 
Stride, and possibly Mr Stride, have a mild learning disability, and that Mr 
Stride had physically assaulted his wife during past disagreements. We 
were to consider where and with whom the “problem” associated with the 
case lay. Each group was to give a presentation to demonstrate our 
interpretation of the problem.
The Group Process
The group had been well established in our Personal and 
Professional Learning and Development Group (PPDLG) sessions 
throughout the previous year, such that there was certainly a high degree of 
mutual trust and respect within this group, prior to attempting the task. 
Therefore, although this was the first time that we were to work together on 
a common task since the last PBL 12 months earlier, we were clearly at a 
different starting point as a group compared to then.
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Figure 1 : Genogram for the Stride family
We started working on the task almost immediately following its 
launch. We met twice within the first week, and then regularly thereafter, 
resulting in about seven meetings prior to our final rehearsal of the 
presentation. Much of the driving force for having so many meetings so 
early probably came from one particular group member, and she had 
helpfully booked the rooms in which we met. This person had expressed 
that she preferred to complete tasks as early as she could to help reduce 
anxieties relating to them. However, this did conflict somewhat with my own 
person style of approaching tasks, which tends to be more gradual. At the 
time, I had therefore considered having so many early meetings somewhat 
excessive, and not the most effective use of our time. Although voicing this
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opinion, which had been shared by some of the others in the group, I was 
also happy to continue frequent meetings, but with some negotiation to 
ensure we did not become too weary of our own presentation by the time 
we had to deliver it. Thinking back, the approach we took did allow us much 
more time and space to play with our ideas, and allow our presentation to 
evolve. Therefore, this approach perhaps acted as a positive model for me 
in terms of how I could approach tasks differently in the future.
We decided against assigning a chair or scribe for the PBL 
meetings, which was in-keeping with the ‘collective’ attitude and approach 
that the group had developed over the previous year. Group members 
seemed more comfortable with responsibility being dissolved between us, 
rather than assigning any specific roles as a matter of protocol as outlined 
in the literature (Wood, 2003).
We started the first meeting with a brainstorming session, where we 
each provided our first impressions of the case. This involved a rapid flow 
of ideas between group members, contrasting greatly with the tentative 
approach that the group adopted to the first year PBL task. My own initial 
response to the problem was how complex the situation around the Stride 
family was, and this was an impression that the rest of the group also 
seemed to relate to. In particular, we were all struck by the sheer number 
people involved in the system (see Figure 2). We considered how each 
individual within the system would have their own personal (and group) 
constructs with regards to the situation (Burr, 1995). This itself provided a 
challenge in terms of how we were going to represent the issues.
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Figure 2: A map of the professional network surrounding the Stride 
family.
Once we had agreed on the major themes that we believed had 
emerged from the case description, we spent the rest of the first session 
considering early ideas for our presentation. Some of the group members 
responded more than others to this created aspect of the process, 
providing some possible ideas, while I myself tended to propose ways in 
which such ideas could be “pulled together”. This was in keeping with the 
role that I had developed within the group. We were all keen to attempt to 
demonstrate the complexity of the system of concern. However, it was 
immediately clear that we would have to condense the issues down in order 
to provide a manageable presentation.
The group quickly agreed that we would use some kind of role play 
as the basis for our presentation. We had not done this for the last PBL, 
and we appeared to share a desire to do something different. We drew up
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an initial list of roles the seven members of the group would represent. 
Each person nominated themselves for a role. At first, my role was to act as 
the Guardian of the children, while the Stride family (i.e. Mr and Mrs Stride 
and the twins) were to be represented by one person. However, we then 
considered that it would be important to present the personal views of each 
parent, such that they would be represented individually rather than by one 
person. This was a view that I strongly agreed with, and as the only male in 
the group it seemed appropriate that I adopt the role of Mr Stride (as well 
as one of the twins), while another person represented Mrs Stride.
It is probably noteworthy that the role of the psychologist in the role 
play was not selected until last, and was thus left to the individual who had 
not yet made a selection. I certainly sensed some anxiety amongst us 
around the idea of filling this role, myself included as I too had volunteered 
for another role. This probably reflected an emotional response to the 
daunting task that would appear to face a psychologist operating within 
such a complex system, with whom we identified, even though the person 
assuming the role would merely be acting in a presentation.
Over the following meetings, we gradually condensed the number 
themes that we wanted to focus on. That allowed each of us to develop our 
roles within the presentation, by establishing what we were going to say, 
and how it would be best for the psychologist to tie it all together while 
making theory-practice links. We were all in agreement that Mr and Mrs 
Stride had probably not yet received the appropriate support that would 
enable their parenting of the twins to be “good enough”. We therefore 
sought to ensure that this view came across in the dialogue.
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Having established the themes and roles with much general 
agreement, we were then left to decide exactly how we were to deliver the 
role play itself. We agreed that we would keep PowerPoint slides to a 
minimum. One of the ideas suggested was that each person could provide 
their own perspective with regards to a particular theme, which could be 
represented by a box which would be placed in front of the Stride family. 
Eventually, the boxes, and thus the themes they represented, would be 
seen to be building a ‘wall’ between the Stride family and the other people 
in the system. Some members of the group, myself included, needed some 
convincing of “the wall” idea, partially due to practical considerations. On 
reflection, I was also probably searching for a visual demonstration that 
was more encompassing in how it demonstrated the complexity within the 
system, rather than only one aspect of this in the form of “barriers”. 
Following further negotiation and discussions within the group on our ideas, 
we accepted that the notion of the wall was “good enough” as a suitable 
expression for our ideas, as there was no “perfect way” to represent the 
system in question.
Presentation
The three over-arching themes that we eventually presented in our 
role play consisted of: Domestic Violence and Risk; Learning disability and 
parenting; and Social Exclusion and Poverty. As planned, we each 
prepared boxes which had the sub-themes written on them that related to 
what each person had said. These were placed on a table in front of the 
Stride family (myself and another group member) as the role play 
progressed, eventually resulting in us being excluded from the view of the 
audience.
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The people/groups in the system represented in the final 
presentation included: Mr and Mrs Stride, the twins daughters, Mr Stride’s 
parents, the community mental health team, the Guardian, the Solicitor for 
Mr and Mrs Stride, Social Services and the Psychologist. For each theme, 
we all took it in our turn to have our say, after which the psychologist would 
summarise the key points relating to the theme and provide theory-practice 
links. The group member playing the solicitor was bilingual, and at one 
point she spoke to Mr and Mrs Stride in a foreign language to demonstrate 
some of the barriers to communication and understanding that can occur 
for professionals working with people with a learning disability.
There was a discussion following the presentations with regards to 
the challenges facing social services in dealing with such complex cases. 
Indeed, the person playing the social worker in our group had stated how 
she had felt like “the baddie” in the role play. This made me consider 
objectively the challenges and limitations that exist within other aspects of 
the system in which we operate in our work, and the difficult balancing act 
that social services in particular often have to negotiate. Clearly, an 
awareness of such challenges can inform our approach to working with 
other colleagues or services, and improve the effectiveness of our work 
while managing our own possible frustrations with regards to them.
Reflections on the overall process
As suggested above, the members of the group were clearly more 
confident with each other from the outset, compared with the first PBL task. 
This is understandable, given that the first task took place only shortly after
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we had met at the beginning of training. Nevertheless, it was a clear 
indication of the degree of “safeness” that the group had fostered during the 
last year, which in turn allowed us to be willing to try out different ideas as 
we reached a position of “safe uncertainty” (Mason, 1993) -  i.e. we were 
able to tolerate uncertainty more easily. This afforded us greater creativity 
and risk taking with respect to how the task was approached, as expressed 
by our use of a role play.
When reflecting on the process together, we agreed that we had all 
felt somewhat overwhelmed when initially confronted with the complexity of 
this case, and that much of the group process involved trying to condense 
the issues and distil our ideas to make them more manageable for a 
presentation. I considered that this distilling of problems and ideas might 
often constitute an important role for the clinical psychologist, not just in 
therapeutic practice, but also in terms of consultation work with teams, 
services and a variety of systems. In this way, we can also help teams 
develop a way of viewing difficulties that they face (e.g. with clients), such 
that they are more easily understood and manageable. This is becoming an 
increasingly recognised role for the clinical psychologist (British 
Psychological Society, 2007).
The PBL task had also helped me to further develop skills relating to 
working in teams, as there were evident examples of when compromise 
and negotiating were important processes to allow the group to run 
smoothly and achieve its goals.
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Relating to my personal clinical practice
This PBL exercise was very timely for me personally, as I had just 
started my Learning Disabilities placement as we prepared for the task. 
One of the key differences in this placement compared with my ‘adult’ 
placement had been the degree of work and communication required with 
services and the “wider system” surrounding my clients. Engaging in this 
PBL task provided a very apt backdrop to these placement experiences. 
The PBL also helped demonstrate how important the perceptions that 
others have on the nature of a client’s learning difficulties are (or indeed 
any difficulties), in terms of how successfully clients are supported. This 
has been reinforced by my experience on placement. Related to this, the 
group’s discussions around communicating with people who have learning 
difficulties had also provided me with some useful reflections for my 
placement, in which I too had to consider whether my communication was 
appropriate. Just as the solicitor had assumed that Mr and Mrs Stride had 
understood her in the role play, it could also be easy for us to fall into the 
same trap, especially when such clients may often provide answers that 
they think we are wanting to hear.
Another feature of the PBL was how the scenario highlighted 
difficulties in finding the balance between protecting the rights of people 
with learning disabilities, and ensuring that risks relating to their own 
vulnerability and of children in their care are adequately managed. Although 
we concluded in our group that placing the children in foster care was 
probably not justified at that time (albeit based on limited information), the 
truth is that this balancing act is not as simple as we would like it to be.
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There is evidence which suggests that parents with a learning 
disability are actually at risk of having their parental responsibility 
terminated based on evidence that would not hold up against non-disabled 
parents (Booth, 2003). It is important for a clinical psychologist to be aware 
of and understand such remaining preconceptions within the services with 
which we work, and this PBL helped bring to life such serious issues and 
dilemmas.
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This account described the development of and processes within the 
second year of my Personal and Professional Learning Discussion Group. 
It outlines how the group ‘reformed’ following a change of facilitator who 
allowed us the space to continue our highly collaborative and semi­
structured approach to the meetings. The second year Problem Based 
Learning task provided a good indication of how the group had established 
itself securely in a position of ‘safe uncertainty’, as we were now more 
relaxed and prepared to take risks in our presentation. The ‘check-in’ 
sessions and resulting discussions dominated the content of our group 
through the year, as we strived to ensure that each member was able to 
bring any concerns relating to the course so that we could provide support 
and practical discussion. Issues relating to supervision were common, as 
were discussions about how staff managed stress and anxiety during times 
of change within the NHS. Personal learning points for clinical practice 
included: Development of my own approach as a future supervisor; ideas 
for effective team-working based on how our group had operated; and 
clarifying the leadership roles that we could potentially fulfil in the NHS, 
especially in times of organisational change.
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CLINICAL DOSSIER
80
Overview of Clinical Experience
September 2013
Year 3
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Overview of Clinical Experience 
Year 1: Adult Placement (1 year)
■ Based mainly in a CMHRS, and also in a Specialist Psychology Service.
■ Individual therapy which largely including CBT based interventions 
addressing: Generalised anxiety, recovery from alcoholism, social 
anxiety, OGD, severe depression and self harm, emotional 
dysregulation, trauma from childhood sexual abuse. Experience also 
gained in liaison with social services in the context of a child removed 
from mother’s care (also produced reports for the courts). Clients were 
from a range of socio-economic backgrounds. Extended assessment of 
one client who suffered from trauma due to war during childhood in a 
Middle Eastern country.
■ Co-facilitated CBT based therapy group with a Clinical Psychologist.
■ Developed core CBT skills and also developed use of Mindfulness 
based approaches.
■ Two neuropsychological assessments as part of dementia assessments.
■ Delivered training to CMHRS non-psychology staff regarding CBT 
approaches to Panic Disorder.
■ Developed understanding of psychodynamic processes within therapy 
through use of supervision with psychodynamically trained supervisor.
Year 2: People with Learning Disabilities Placement (6 months)
■ Community Team for people with learning difficulties.
■ Individual work with people with mild to moderate learning disabilities 
regarding: Social skills assessment and development, managing panic
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and anxiety using adapted CBT, assessing and managing risk regarding 
sexual exploitation from others.
■ Consultation work around a person with severe learning and physical 
disabilities regarding bereavement and client’s grief at loss of a friend. 
Further consultation work regarding assessment and management of 
risk and social vulnerability for client with mild learning disability and 
autistic traits.
■ Full functional assessment for client with severe autism who made 
challenging noises.
■ Neuropsychological assessments regarding presence of a learning 
disability, and identification of cognitive strengths and difficulties.
■ Training and consultation for staff at a care home, regarding 
management of dementia in a client with Down’s Syndrome.
■ Professionals meetings attended regarding client at risk of financial 
exploitation, discussions regarding capacity; liaison work with SaLT and 
specialist nurses.
Year 2: Older Persons Mental Health Placement (6 months)
■ Older persons community mental health team.
■ Individual work including: Psychodynamically informed life review 
therapy for person suffering from depressive episode and anxiety; 
integrated systemic and mindfulness based intervention with a person 
suffering from panic and agoraphobia with family relationship difficulties; 
modified CBT interventions for clients with physical health difficulties, 
anxiety and end-of-life fears.
■ Co-facilitated a therapy group at a day hospital for older persons 
following a psychodynamic approach.
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■ Two neuropsychological assessments relating to possible dementia, 
including pre- and post-diagnostic counselling. Systemic work with the 
family of a person on an inpatient ward for people with dementia.
■ Training session to Alzheimer’s Society Carer’s group, for family 
member and carers of a person with dementia regarding the 
management of challenging behaviour.
Year 3: Clinical Health Psychology (Specialist placement) (6 
months)
■ Department of Psychological Medicine based within a large general 
hospital.
■ Individual work including: CBT/Mindfulness based interventions for 
anxiety (Panic Disorder; Health Anxiety) and low mood in relation to 
physical health difficulties; integrative therapy with psychogenic seizures 
and dissociative episodes.
■ Independently facilitated and CBT based “coping with changes in health” 
course for clients with mixed physical health problems with associated 
anxiety and low mood.
■ Co-facilitated a structured ‘living with chronic pain’ course with a clinical 
psychologist and physiotherapist
■ Co-facilitated delivery of level 2 psychological skills training to non­
psychology staff at the general hospital with clinical psychologist.
Year 3: Child and Adolescent Placement (6 months)
■ Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service (community based Tier 3).
■ Assessment of autism, feedback to families and recommendation for 
managing autism related anxiety and social difficulties.
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CBT based interventions for anxiety and low mood.
Teaching session for parents with autism.
Service development with the completion of a leaflet for young people 
who have been admitted to A&E following deliberate self-harm.
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Case Report Titles
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CASE REPORT TITLES
Case Report 1 (May 2011, Year 1):
Assessment and CBT intervention to date in the case of a lady in her 
twenties with long-term depression and anxiety.
Case Report 2 (August 2011, Year 1 ):
CBT-based intervention in the case of a lady in her forties suffering from a 
depressive episode.
Case Report 3 -  Neuropsychological Case Report (April 2012, Year 2):
Psychometric assessment of a young male adult in order to help determine 
the presence of a possible learning disability.
Case Report 4 -  Oral Case Presentation (September 2012, Year 3):
Life Review Therapy with a client in her seventies in a community setting.
Case Report 5 (May 2013, Year 3):
Integrative therapy with a lady in her late twenties suffering from non­
epileptic seizures and dissociative episodes.
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RESEARCH LOG
Years 1-3
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Research Log
1 Formulating and testing hypotheses and research 
questions
X
2 Carrying out a structured literature search using information 
technology and 
literature search tools
X
3 Critically reviewing relevant literature and evaluating 
research methods
X
4 Formulating specific research questions X
5 Writing brief research proposals X
6 Writing detailed research proposals/protocols X
7 Considering issues related to ethical practice in research, 
including issues of
diversity, and structuring plans accordingly
X
8 Obtaining approval from a research ethics committee X
9 Obtaining appropriate supervision for research X
10 Obtaining appropriate collaboration for research X
11 Collecting data from research participants X
12 Choosing appropriate design for research questions X
13 Writing patient information and consent forms X
14 Devising and administering questionnaires X
15 Negotiating access to study participants in applied NHS 
settings
X
16 Setting up a data file X
17 Conducting statistical data analysis using SPSS X
18 Choosing appropriate statistical analyses X
19 Preparing quantitative data for analysis X
20 Choosing appropriate quantitative data analysis X
21 Summarising results in figures and tables X
22 Conducting semi-structured interviews X
23 Transcribing and analysing interview data using qualitative 
methods
X
24 Choosing appropriate qualitative analyses X
25 Interpreting results from quantitative and qualitative data 
analysis
X
26 Presenting research findings in a variety of contexts
27 Producing a written report on a research project X
28 Defending own research decisions and analyses X
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29 Submitting research reports for publication in peer-reviewed 
journals or edited book
30 Applying research findings to clinical practice X
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Abstract of Group Qualitative Project
Four Adults’ Experiences of Live Music: A Qualitative Investigation 
using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis
June 2011
Year 1
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Abstract
Objective
This project was a group project designed to examine adults' lived 
experiences of attending live music events, with respect to the emotional 
and social aspects of the phenomenon, in which current research is limited.
Design
The study used Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) to examine 
the lived music experiences of adults. The researchers were four Trainee 
Clinical Psychologists.
Participants
The participants were four adults aged between 20 and 35. They were 
recruited within friendship groups held by the interviewers and selected 
based on two criteria 1) they must have attended a live music experience 
within the last six months and 2) were aged between 20 and 35.
Results
Analysis of the participant’s interviews using I PA methodology revealed 
three main themes: 1. Personal experience; 2. Shared experiences and 
social identity; 3. Interpersonal experiences.
Conclusions/Implications
Overall it was found that that there were many levels of social interaction 
that take place during live music events. By better understanding the 
intricacies of the lived experiences of live music events, it is possible to 
understand why seeing music live is so important to so many people.
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SERVICE RELATED RESEARCH PROJECT
The Experiences and Views of Carers and People 
Who Use Services on involvement and Feedback in 
a Mental Health Trust in the South-East of England; 
A Qualitative Study
July 2011 
Year 1
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ABSTRACT
Background and Rationale: The involvement of service users and carers in 
the planning and delivery of mental health services is now recognised as a 
necessity for service providers (Thornicroft and Tansella, 2005). However, 
challenges remain in ensuring that feedback and involvement is addressed 
and incorporated into services in a way which is meaningful to the clients 
and carers themselves.
Aim: This study explores the experiences of people who use services and 
carers in a mental health Trust in the South-East of England, with respect 
to how their involvement or feedback has been received.
Method: Two focus groups were conducted, with a total of 3 carers and 7 
people who use services participating. The transcribed data were subjected 
to thematic analysis.
Results: Six major themes emerged: The personal impact of
involvement/feedback; Communication; Genuine acknowledgement and 
validation; Peripheral vs. integral involvement; Financial issues; Variable 
attitudes of staff.
Conclusions: Barriers to involvement, as well as factors which aid it, have 
been identified within the themes described in the study. Acting on such 
findings may help the Trust to ensure that involvement is increasingly 
meaningful to the people who use services and carers.
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INTRODUCTION
For well over a decade, the Department of Health has actively 
promoted the involvement of carers and people who use services in the 
planning and delivery of mental health services (Department of Health, 
1999). Recently the Care Quality Commission (CQC), as the regulator and 
inspectorate of health services in the UK, has further emphasised the 
importance of the involvement of clients and carers in such services (Care 
Quality Commission, 2010).
The rationalisation for such a development has been documented in 
the literature, citing ethical and evidence-based justification (Thornicroft 
and Tansella, 2005). Thus, given its importance, there are now many 
reported studies which have aimed to explore and evaluate aspects of 
involvement in various services. For example, Crawford et al (2003) 
conducted a postal survey of service providers and groups of people who 
use services throughout Greater London, to determine ways in which 
involvement was carried out, and factors which may assist or obstruct this 
process. The service providers and people who use services were in 
agreement with regards to “the central role that the attitude of managers 
and staff play in determining the impact that users have” (Crawford et al., 
2003, p.413). The groups of people who use services considered staff 
resistance as a major obstacle to involvement.
Thus, it is already clear that significant challenges remain with 
respect to involvement. Not least, services are challenged to ensure that 
feedback and involvement are facilitated and addressed in a genuine way 
which is meaningful to the carers and people who use services themselves.
98
The inherent power differentials in psychiatric services have been identified 
as one major barrier to this (Diamond et al, 2005), with some authors 
claiming that meaningful involvement is impossible without genuine efforts 
to address such power imbalances (Chamberlin, 2005). This point is taken 
further by Stickley (2006), who argues from a critical realist perspective that 
attempts by people who use services to climb such hierarchies within the 
system, as is current practice, are futile. Thus, further evaluation of 
services, to assess the degree to which such barriers remain, is justified.
The aim of this project was to determine current perceptions from 
carers and people who use services on how their feedback and service 
involvement has been addressed from their experiences within a mental 
health Trust in the south-east of England. The study also aimed to gather 
the opinions of clients and carers on how they would like feedback to be 
used and responded to. It was anticipated that the information provided 
would help evaluate the Trust’s current effectiveness and determine factors 
which encourage meaningful service user involvement, as well as 
perceived barriers to it. Staff views on involvement of people who use 
services have been explored in complimentary research project carried out 
by a colleague.
Focus groups have been successfully employed in previous reports 
aiming to explore experiences of involvement of people who use services 
(Hoole and Morgan, 2010). They can produce insights and data with high 
face validity that would otherwise be less accessible without the group 
interaction (Morgan, 1997), and was thus considered the method of choice 
for this study. Ethical approval was deemed unnecessary for this study as it 
was a service evaluation.
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METHOD
Two focus groups of approximately 40 minutes each were held prior 
to two different, monthly meetings for people who use services and carers, 
which take place within a Trust in the south east of England. The reason for 
tagging the focus groups on to pre-existing meetings was to maximise 
participation, such that clients who attended the meetings could also attend 
the focus group without having to make an extra journey. Lunch was 
provided for both groups as an added incentive.
Participants
The first of the pre-existing meetings that the focus groups 
preceded was a small group for people who use services only, which was 
typically attended by three to five people. The second focus group ran prior 
to the Trust facilitated Forum of Carers and People who Use Service 
(FoCUS), which had a typical attendance of twelve to twenty carers and 
people who use services. In order to recruit volunteers, I attended these 
meetings in the month before the focus groups took place to outline the 
project and promote participation, and spoke directly to 18 attendees. 
Leaflets were also distributed and posted on the notice board at the local 
Adult Community Mental Health Service.
Female Male Carer
Person who 
uses services
Group 1 2 1 0 3
Group2 4 3 3 4
Total 6 4 3 7
Table 1: Characteristics of focus group participants.
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All those that participated were White British with respect to their 
ethnicity, reflecting the demographics of the service area. The composition 
of the two groups varied (Table 1), as did the level of contribution to 
discussion from individual participants. Individual ages were not obtained, 
but participants were all approximately between 35 and 65 years of age. All 
participants were either individuals or carers of individuals who had 
experience of receiving adult mental health services from the Trust.
Focus group protocol
Participants provided informed consent to be digitally recorded 
during the groups (see Appendix A). In the interests of confidentiality, all 
participants were assigned false names for the purpose of the study to 
ensure anonymity. A leaflet with information from the Trust’s website 
regarding their complaints procedures was also made available.
A schedule for the group was devised to provide focus to the 
discussions in a semi-structured approach (see Appendix B). Questions 
asked for examples of feed back/involvement, and the most helpful and 
unhelpful way that these examples were responded to.
Data Analysis
Thematic analysis of the transcribed data was performed following 
the approach outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006). Thus, following the 
initial coding process, the different codes were collated according to 
emerging themes (Appendix 0). An inductive approach to analysis was 
adopted, as the objective was not to fit the data within a theory-driven, pre­
existing coding frame. Thematic mapping was used to help organise the 
emerging themes into broader themes.
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RESULTS
The first focus group involved three participants who were all people 
who use services. However, only two such people contributed to discussion 
for the most part, with both such participants having been involved in 
services for many years, while the third participant was less willing to 
contribute. The second focus group eventually consisted of seven 
participants (four people who use services; three carers), although the flow 
of discussion was sometimes disrupted as people arrived throughout the 
first half of the group.
The analysis revealed six major themes that emerged from the 
groups: The personal impact of involvement/feedback; Communication; 
Genuine acknowledgement and validation; Peripheral vs. integral 
involvement; Financial issues; Variable attitudes of staff. Although this is 
quite a large number of themes to have derived from two focus groups, this 
perhaps highlights the complexity of involvement in mental health services. 
The themes, including the subthemes from which they are composed, are 
presented in a finalised thematic map (Appendix D).
The Personal Impact of Involvement/Feedback
This theme encapsulated the personal impact described by the carer or 
service user, with respect to how their involvement or feedback was viewed 
or responded to. This included both positive and negative effects on the 
individual, depending on the nature of the response. For example, Jane, a 
service user, had expressed a sense of heightened motivation when her 
involvement had been well received in the past:
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Jane: “....that i/i/as the experience, it was really, really positive, and I 
was very much motivated and very Involved.”
However, the same participant described the demotivating process when 
she believed the response to feedback was not effective:
Jane: “I’ve actually started pulling right back. Because what’s the 
point In giving time to actually try and make things better for people, 
when you know that.....very few Issues actually get properly resolved 
and written offend actually dealt with.”
Jane elaborated further to imply that she has actually felt demeaned by the 
response to feedback on some occasions, adding that 7 often feel 
sometimes like a second class citizen when I try to bring things up.”
Conversely, Sandra, who was a carer, emphasised further positive 
effects of her involvement, suggesting a sense of personal reward and 
empowerment, even if her influence is limited:
Sandra: “And for me, the Involvement I do gives me a great deal of 
satisfaction, and although I can see lots of things wrong with the 
Trust, through the Involvement I’ve got, I also find that 1...although It 
may not be a..a fantastic Influence, I do have an Influence.”
In summary, it appears that positive experiences of involvement 
bestowed a sense of motivation, satisfaction, empowerment and reward. 
Meanwhile, negative experiences, at least in the case of a person who uses 
services, can be demotivating and demeaning. Clearly, the personal impact 
that the response by staff and the Trust has on carers and people who use
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services should always be a consideration of those facilitating 
involvement/feedback.
Communication
This theme also constituted positive and negative subthemes -  relating 
to effective and inadequate communication respectively. In fact, as Sandra 
professed: “It’s the biggest bug-bear that any of us have, Is 
communication.” W\ih respect to negative experiences, on occasions such 
communication was said to be wholly absent as a carer suggested:
Victoria: “But anyway It transpired that they hadn’t done a thing for 
her, and they hadn’t even bothered to tell me, that’s the worst of It, 
this, this lack of communication. ”
On other occasions, the response to feedback was said not to have been 
relayed in a way meaningful to the people who use services:
Jane: “....most of the answers you get back are often very woolly...”.
Nonetheless, examples of effective communication were also evident:
Sandra: Well just by. Just by the demeanour, and by the fact that they 
were quiet, they listened...”
Evidently, the emergence of this theme emphasises how effective 
communication is paramount in facilitating meaningful involvement.
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Genuine Acknowledgement and Validation
Participants described a sense that the Trust was reluctant to openly 
acknowledge negative feedback. As one person commented in reference to 
the Trust’s monthly newspaper:
Bill: “I was just saying that there is never anything negative in this.’’
Bill then added “well let’s get people’s negative stories so we can do 
something about it”. Jane also suggested that “...they only wanted to hear 
positive things...”, while adding that “...if the Trust wants proper service user 
involvement, they have to be open to positive and negative.”
It was proposed that a desire to uphold a positive image of the Trust was a 
barrier to this open acknowledgment:
Bill: “The corporate staff...doctor any unfortunate feedback that they 
get, because they’re concerned about the image of the Trust, and 
that’s part of their job description to do that.”
It would seem difficult for carers and people who use services to feel 
validated with regards to their experiences in view of a lack of open 
acknowledgement. As Barry reported, even if his feedback is 
acknowledged, the response from staff may still fail to validate the 
perspective of the person who uses services:
Barry: “Well, I...I...been many times with them and they say yes we’ve 
heard you, but we’re not going to listen to you.”
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However, there was also an example of acknowledgement contributing to a 
positive experience of involvement:
Sandra: “...they acknowledged what you had to say, if they didn’t 
understand they came back and said to you what do you mean by 
this, and how did that help, and things like that...”
Clearly, though, it would be hard to envisage involvement as being 
meaningful to clients and carers, without a consistent level of such 
acknowledgement and validation in response to feedback.
Variable attitudes of staff
A consistent theme throughout the two focus groups related to the role 
of individual staff, and how attitudes of such staff varied in terms of their 
approach to involvement/feedback. Jane referred to certain senior staff 
being positive about this process:
Jane: “....the consultants here at [the CMHT] were very keen on 
service user involvement... ”
However, she later referred to a less positive experience, saying that “It 
started falling apart because, um, staff often didn’t actually come to it.” She 
added that “It depends on staff, very much depends on staff’.
When reflecting on some of the difficulties she experiences with 
involvement, Sandra considered them to be due to the attitude of particular 
individuals:
Sandra: “...but to be perfectly honest that’s personalities rather 
than....it’s not the Trust itself, it’s the personalities within it.”
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A further distinction was made by Bill:
Bill: “And unfortunately, um, whereas the clinical staff who would love 
to, you know, get involved in more feedback, um, you’ve got these 
corporate staff who are actually running the show, as it were.”
This appeared to suggest less of a “them and us” distinction between the 
people who use services and the clinical staff than with the corporate staff, 
who have less engagement with people who use services and carers 
outside the involvement setting. This represents a challenge for the service, 
by which this barrier could be addressed.
Peripheral vs. integrated involvement
This theme emerged from perceptions of how central their 
involvement has been to decision making and service provision. Jane 
observed that, in the past incarnations of the current mental health trust 
“...service user involvement was very much integrated within the services”. 
However, her current belief now was that “service user involvement has 
become negligible, and it’s only lip-service”. Bill also suggested that 
“involvement has just become a tick-box exercise”, implying that user 
involvement is peripheral to service operations.
Comments also referred to the existence of top-down rather than 
bottom-up processes with respect to decision making, whereby “They don’t 
actually involve us in the design o f the services. It’s....they make a design, 
they hand it down to us and say ‘what do you think’?” (Bill). Further such 
comments included “they just take it and take it and take it, and then just do 
their own thing” (Jane).
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From a carer’s perspective, there was also an implication that the carer 
is sometimes marginalised with respect to their involvement with the 
provision of service:
Nancy: “...and the big problem is because of this whiff of the user 
here, the carer there, and never the twain shall meet, you get this 
situation where in the end... because Victoria then goes all round the 
houses, and she shouldn’t have had to do that...”
A further subtheme relates to the existence of power imbalances. Barry 
refers to circumstances by which it is presumed that his opinions are less 
important than those of ‘the professionals’:
Barry: Well, my needs matter, but the only trouble is that they say, I 
know better than you...so...my worst bit is better than your best 
bits...you’re a non-entity, everything has to do what the professionals 
say not what the patient wants.
Financial issues
It is perhaps unsurprising that in the current economic climate, financial 
limitations to involvement and feedback response were evident in the 
discussions. Some participants suggested that service-related decisions 
are centred around financial considerations, rather than client feedback:
Bill:...“in my experience over the last...since ’96, it’s quite obvious 
that changes in the services are budgetary driven”.
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Meanwhile, another person acknowledged that financial constraints 
affected the running of their local service user group:
Sandra: What we’d like, to be honest what we’d like we know they 
can’t do. They can’t fund it.
The other views expressed in this theme broadly related to these two 
factors -  the lack of finances or the prioritising of financial considerations 
over acting on client feedback.
DISCUSSION
The focus groups provided rich information with regards to the 
experiences of people who use services and carer’s on feedback and 
involvement in the Trust. Discussion of the emerging themes has provided 
insight into factors which may help foster meaningful involvement, including 
effective communication, acknowledgement and validation of experiences, 
and a possible need to address consistency of staff response and the 
manner in which involvement is integrated into service design.
The findings on variability of staff response were consistent with the 
report by Crawford et al. (2003), and further highlighted how central the role 
of staff (and perceptions of them) can be in facilitating involvement of 
carers and people who use services. The study also appeared to support 
the suggestion by Chamberlain (2004), which implied that involvement will 
remain on the periphery of service design and delivery unless power 
imbalances are fully acknowledged and addressed.
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However, one must be cautious over drawing general conclusions 
from this study. Only a limited number of participants were involved, and 
even then discussion was often dominated by an even smaller number of 
individuals, despite efforts to make the groups more inclusive. Furthermore, 
the views expressed only reflected those of one particular ethnicity and of 
predominantly middle-age.
A major challenge during the groups was, as anticipated, keeping 
discussion focused on experience of and views on involvement or 
feedback, rather than critiques of the actual services themselves. For 
myself, much of the sessions involved a balancing act between 
acknowledging the participants criticisms of services, and tactfully 
refocusing them on the aims of the group. However, this did reveal clear 
strength of feelings with regards to the services that they received.
Further exploration of views regarding the Patient Advice and 
Liaison Service, as well as advocacy services, would have been useful, as 
these were only discussed fleetingly by the participants. Also lacking was a 
discussion around how positive feedback is received by the Trust. 
Ultimately, although this study has provided some useful insights which the 
Trust can use to further develop service user and carer involvement, a 
larger scale exploration may also be of future benefit.
Feedback to staff, people who use services and carers
The outcome of this research project was presented at a meeting 
for people who use services and carers on 12*^  September 2011. Feedback 
to the staff at the local Community Mental Health Team for working age 
adults was also presented shortly afterwoods.
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A -  Information Sheet
Informed Consent to Participate
Thank you very much for attending this discussion group. This group 
is part of a project aiming to determine current perceptions of how 
involvement and feedback from carers and people who use services 
has been addressed, from their experiences within SABP Trust. The 
study also aims to gather opinions on how they would like their 
feedback to be used and responded to.
It is expected that all participants and the group facilitator will treat 
everything that is said in the group as confidential.
So that the major themes and issues arising from such discussion 
can be accurately determined, it is common for such discussion 
groups to be recorded. Only the facilitator will listen to the recording, 
which will be securely stored. The participants will be anonymised 
(given false names) during any written aspects of the study to 
preserve confidentiality.
To give your consent for the recording of the discussion, please sign 
below:
For any further information, please contact the group facilitator: 
[Details provided].
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Appendix B -  Focus Group Schedule
GROUP SCHEDULE
Begin by outlining purpose of discussion -  which is for carers and people
who use service to discuss their experience of how their feedback and
involvement in services has been attended to by Mental Health Services in
the Trust
Involvement/feedback can mean any time that you have raised a point 
about the service you have received (PALS, advocacy, etc), or have been 
involved in any groups/individually which convey the points of view of 
carers or people who use services to the service providers
- Outline the guidelines for the group with respect to everyone getting a 
chance to speak, respecting other people's views, etc. ...I will be available 
after the group if any participant would like to speak to me later
- Confidentiality, assurance of anonymity and obtain consent for the 
discussion to be recorded so that it can be looked at thoroughly
Introductions -  Everyone to give their name, and identify whether they 
are a carer or service user (to provide information on representation).
Questions:
- What example of feedback or service involvement?
How was it addressed or received?
What aspects of the service's response/approach were most useful?
- What might help improve how feedback/involvement is addressed?
What were the positive aspects of how your X was received?
- What could have been done differently?
To read statements from the Trust Vision and Values, and ask for views on 
each.
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Appendix C -  Collated Themes
Focus Group 1 Participants: 'Bill', ‘Jane’ and ‘Gail’.
Focus Group 2 Participants: ‘Nancy, ‘Andrew’, ‘Beryl’, ‘Sandra’, ‘Bill’, 
‘Victoria’, ‘Barry’.
Extract
FG = Focus Group
Initial codes Sub-themes
...is that in my experience 
over the last....since ’96, it 
quite obvious that 
changes in the services 
are budgetary driven (Bill, 
FG1)
Service changes 
determined by budgets 
(rather than patient care 
or interests)
The point is you could 
tolerate it if you thought 
you were going to get 
better services, but it’s 
quite obvious that they’ve 
reduced the number of 
beds, so what we’re 
talking about is another 
policy which is budgetary 
driven....(Bill, FG1)
Financial considerations 
over service user 
considerations
Decisions based on 
finances not 
feedback
Because actually, it 
shouldn’t matter about the 
high stuff, it’s how that 
person’s experience on
that particular ward.....
not how much money 
they’ve got to spend on 
the next tv or whatever. 
Those things are a 
financial thing and they 
should be secondary, to 
how a person is actually 
dealt with on the ward. 
(Jane, FG1)
Service user experience 
important
Service user experience 
priority over finances
What we’d like, to be 
honest what we’d like we 
know they can’t do. They 
can’t fund it. (Sandra, 
FG2)
Involvement limited by 
funding
Financial limits to 
involvement
Erm....we haven’t raised it 
per ce, but we have 
discussed it in other 
discussions, it’s been 
discussed as a need for 
us, to make sure that we 
continue to finance it, and 
they don’t have the
Have made Trust aware 
of financial need
Financial limitations in 
response to feedback 
and requests
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money at the moment so 
they can’t. (Sandra, FG2)
Yeah, before we entered 
into [the Trust], we were 
[a different Trust], and 
service user involvement 
was very much integrated 
within the services. (Jane, 
FG1)
Service user 
involvement was more 
integrated into the 
service in the past nteg ration of 
involvement with 
services
...we did interviews, we 
were involved in every 
meeting that the trust 
had, and there was 
always a service user on 
the interview panels, on 
interview panels, there 
was always a service 
user in the meetings 
(Jane, FG1)
nvolvement was 
widespread and 
consistent
...they just take it and 
take it and take it, and 
then just do their own 
thing. It’s like 
consultations, we had a 
huge consultation about 
Charlton Ward closing, 
there were loads of 
people there, and there 
was...put up a good 
argument as to why, you 
know, and basically we 
knew it was a forgone 
conclusion, they’d already 
made the decision (Jane, 
FG1)
Feedback received but 
not included in decision 
making.
Put up an argument for 
something, but decision 
already made.
Involvement as 
peripheral to 
decision making
...the consultants here at 
[the CMHT] were very 
keen on service user 
involvement, very keen 
on hearing about services 
and how people 
experience them. (Jane, 
FG1)
Senior clinicians 
promoted involvement
Jane: 1 often fee 
sometimes like a second 
class citizen when 1 try to 
bring things up.
Facilitator: What, when 
you try to bring things up 
in...
Inconsistent staff
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Jane: To the staff. 
Facilitator: So, in face to 
face, or in a group, or 
both.
Jane: It depends on staff, 
very much depends on 
staff.
How involvement is 
received depends on 
individual staff involved
response
Well, it’s very much, as 
‘Sandra’ said, it depends 
what individual you’re 
dealing with. Some are 
very helpful, and some 
are less..[inaudible] (Bill, 
FG2)
Response varies with 
staff
FG2, Sandra: Well, we’ve 
had some support from 
certain staff members 
Beryl: Yeah,
Sandra: But not from the 
Trust as a whole. It was 
individuals not the Trust.
Support of involvement 
on an individual staff 
basis.
Doesn’t feel the Trust as 
a whole is supportive, 
only individual staff
It started falling apart 
because, um, staff often 
didn’t actually come to it. 
So it was mainly service 
users and maybe 
occupational therapy or 
something. The 
managers and the staff 
who could put...actually 
change the things 
stopped coming. (Jane, 
FG1)
Lack of engagement 
with staff in feedback
Example of managers 
not showing interest in 
service use involvement
There are occasions 
where it can take months, 
and maybe not even 
happen at all, and you 
have to keep repeating 
the questions. Erm...but 
to be perfectly honest 
that’s personalities rather 
than....it’s not the Trust 
itself, it’s the personalities 
within it. (Sandra, FG2)
Personalities rather than 
coherent or consistent 
approach from the trust.
And unfortunately, um, 
whereas the clinical staff 
who would love to, you 
know, get involved in 
more feedback, um, 
you’ve got these 
corporate staff who are 
actually running the show, 
as it were. (Bill, FG1)
Distinction between 
attitudes of clinical and 
corporate staff
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What the issue is that 
clinical staff are always 
keen to get feedback. The 
corporate staff, the 
people who are 
concerned with the image 
of the trust, doctor any 
unfortunate feedback that 
they get, because they’re 
concerned about the 
image of the trust, and 
that’s part of their job 
description to do that. 
And unfortunately, um, 
whereas the clinical staff 
who would love to, you 
know, get involved in 
more feedback, um, 
you’ve got these 
corporate staff who are 
actually running the show, 
as it were. (Bill, FG1)
Distinction between 
attitudes of clinical and 
corporate staff
Clinical
corporate staff
vs
they literally don’t do what 
they say they are going to 
do. And if they don’t do 
what they say they’re 
going to do, they don’t 
give you any faith in the 
fact they want to listen. 
(Sandra, FG2)_________
Staff not following up on 
feedback as agreed
you were always given 
the respect. If you had 
something to say, it was 
always welcomed... 
(Jane, FG1)___________
1.Given respect in the 
past
2. Receptive to her 
opinions
....that was the
experience, it was really 
really positive, and I was 
very much motivated and 
very involved. (Jane,
FG1)_________________
Motivated by how her 
involvement was
received
Positive impact
The staff on the ward, at 
Ashford, was really keen 
on having service users 
input into the whole thing, 
we helped to change the 
whole philosophy on 
Charlton ward, and 
Charlton ward became a 
place where people 
wanted to go to. (Jane,
Bringing about change 
empowerment
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FG1)
FG2: And for me, the 
involvement 1 do gives me 
a great deal of 
satisfaction, and although 
1 can see lots of things 
wrong with the Trust, 
through the involvement 
I’ve got, 1 also find that 
1...although it may not be 
a..a fantastic influence, 1 
do have an influence. 
(Sandra, FG2).
Having an influence 
gives satisfaction
Positive impact 
Empowerment
It’s....there’s lots of 
different ways of being 
involved, and we’re lucky, 
the one’s that we’ve 
chosen to do have been 
rewarding. (Sandra, FG2)
Involvement as 
personally rewarding
Positive experience
Well, we get praised for it 
but that’s it (laughs). 
(Sandra, FG2)
Praise Positive impact
1 have a very positive 
outlook on involvement 
and on feedback. 
(Sandra, FG2)
Positive about 
experiences
I’ve actually started 
pulling right back. 
Because what’s the point 
in giving time to actually 
try and make things better 
for people, when you 
know that, actually, it just 
being put on a...like the 
FoCUS meeting. The 
minutes just gets longer 
and longer....very few 
issues actually get 
properly resolved and 
written off and actually 
dealt with. (Jane, FG1)
Demotivated by lack of 
progress on feedback
Negative impact
...she made me feel my 
input was not necessary, 
she made feel like it 
wasn’t really wanted... 
(Jane, FG1)
Demeaned, or 
invalidated by staff 
response to feedback
Negative impact
1 often feel sometimes like 
a second class citizen 
when 1 try to bring things 
up. (Jane, FG1)
Demeaned by response 
to feedback
Negative impact
So what’s the point of 
having a consultation?
Disrespect Disrespect
119
And treating us as though 
we’re stupid. Because in 
actual fact, service users 
aren’t stupid. (Jane, FG1)
went to a meeting a few 
years ago, at the 
inpatient unit]. I came 
over here, and I was 
going with other staff, I 
was going to be the only 
service use there, and 
there was going to be 
staff there as well. I came 
through the door, and I 
said to them I’m a service 
user. I’ve come to such 
and such a meeting. And 
they showed me to the 
ounge of the ACU. When 
all the staff came in, they 
took them to an office. 
And then when they were 
ready they came and got 
me. (Jane, FG1)________
Not treated as an equal Disrespect
and that’s one of the 
problems, is what people 
do at corporate level 
doesn’t actually relay, and 
mirror the experience that 
the everyday person on 
the bottom has. You
know, you can put
anything in place, but if 
it’s not actually being 
done, it’s not going to be 
a positive outcome.
(Jane, FG1)
Response does not 
relate to service user 
experience/not 
meaningful to service 
users
Trust’s response 
not meaningful to 
service users
Jane: Partnership
People?
Bill: Oh, this... I was just 
saying that there is never 
anything negative in this 
It’s completely run by 
ignorant....
Negative feedback not 
publicised or openly 
acknowledged
Lack of open 
acknowledgement
Yeah...there’s very little 
clinical stuff in here. If it 
was a clinical lead in the 
trust they’d be saying -  
well let’s get people’s 
negative stories so we
People’s negative
feedback not reflected in 
publication
Differing perceptions o 
different staff
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can do something about 
it, you see, there’s a 
different attitude there, 
you know. (Bill, FG1)
...and they only wanted to 
hear positive things, they 
didn’t really want to hear 
negative stuff. And that’s 
the problem, is that if 
they, if the trust want 
proper service user 
involvement, they have to 
be open to positive and 
negative. (Jane, FG1)
Staff not wanting to 
address negative
Recognising importance 
of a balanced approach 
to feedback
The corporate staff, the 
people who are 
concerned with the image 
of the trust, doctor any 
unfortunate feedback that 
they get, because they’re 
concerned about the 
image of the trust, and 
that’s part of their job 
description to do that. 
(Bill, FG1)
Feedback altered or 
doctored to present as 
more positive
Acknowledging 
negative feedback 
vs maintaining 
positive image
Well, l...l...been many 
times with them and they 
say yes we’ve heard you, 
but we’re not going to 
listen to you. (Barry, FG2)
Acknowledged but not 
validated
Well just by, just by the 
demeanour, and by the 
fact that they were quiet, 
they listened, they 
acknowledged what you 
had to say, if they didn’t 
understand they came 
back and said to you what 
do you mean by this, and 
how did that help, and 
things like that, so you’re 
actually...it felt like...it was 
low key, like you were 
able to put your say over. 
(Sandra, FG2)
Acknowledgement
But to me a patient’s 
experience on an 
inpatient ward for a ward 
steering group should 
actually be their priority 
concern. Because 
actually, it shouldn’t 
matter about the high
Hearing and acting on 
Service user feedback 
not a priority
Person’s experiences 
important.
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stuff, it’s how that 
person’s experience on
that particular ward.....
not how much money 
they’ve got to spend on 
the next tv or whatever. 
Those things are a 
financial thing and they 
should be secondary, to 
how a person is actually 
dealt with on the ward. 
(Jane, FG1)
they just take it and take it 
and take it, and then just 
do their own thing. It’s like 
consultations, we had a 
huge consultation about 
Charlton Ward closing, 
there were loads of 
people there, and there 
was...put up a good 
argument as to why, you 
know, and basically we 
knew it was a forgone 
conclusion, they’d already 
made the decision. So 
what’s the point of having 
a consultation? And 
treating us as though 
we’re stupid. Because in 
actual fact, service users 
aren’t stupid. (Jane, FG1)
Decisions made before 
service users consulted
Top down approach 
to services
Insulting that feedback 
not take into account
Now, there’s supposed to 
be a culture of 
involvement, this comes 
right from government 
that there’s supposed to 
be a genuine meaningful 
culture of involvement, 
but we never get a 
chance to speak to the 
commissioners, there’s 
the commissioners who 
are doing the redesigning. 
(Bill, FG1)_____________
National recognition for 
meaningful involvement
Not enough direct 
contact with the 
‘decision makers’
Top down approach 
to services
Bill: But they’ve handed 
down redesigns, without 
even us being involved. 
Jane:They do
consultations
Decisions made before 
service user consultation
Not involved in initial 
process____________ of
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Bill: They do but they’ve 
already done their plan 
before they do the 
consultation.
Jane: They give you three 
options, so they don’t 
actually want to look at 
any other options, 
because those three are 
the three that they’ve 
come up with.__________
And it’s not, it’s 
actually...they make up a 
service and you’ve got to 
fit into that, rather than 
the service fitting around 
you. (Jane, FG1)
design/service
development
Top down rather than 
bottom up approach
you see you’ve got to 
understand the way these 
corporate minds work, 
first of all you think oh, 
they’re ok, there’s no kind 
of hidden agenda, but 
there is a hidden agenda, 
and the hidden agenda is 
this: is that they want 
service user and 
involvement groups to be 
within the Trust for one 
reason, so they can 
control them, so they can 
control what’s recorded or 
what’s said. Now that 
means that most of the 
genuine feedback is 
really...um, is lost, is lost. 
(Bill, FG1)_____________
Suspicion of a hidden 
agenda
Trust wanting to control 
involvement
There was one service 
that was actually built 
around the patient, and 
that was the um, the 
[names a ward] Ward 24 
hour access service. Now 
that was totally tailored to 
the person who was using 
it. And basically it was a 
thing which helped so 
many people that I know 
in [named region] to move 
forward, me included. It 
was actually tailored from 
me... (Jane, FG1)_______
Building services around 
patient experience and 
feedback -example
Person centred 
approach
...it is all enshrined in Peripheral
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policies, law, and good
practice, and the big 
problem is because of 
this whiff of the... the user 
here, the carer there, and 
never the twain shall 
meet, you get this
situation where in the end 
because Victoria then
goes all round the 
houses, she shouldn’t 
have had to do
that...(Nancy, FG2)______
Carer involvement not 
facilitated
involvement
I actually. I’m going to put 
my neck on the line, 
because I always do; 
since they gained and 
were going after 
foundation status, service 
user involvement has 
become negligible, and 
it’s only lip-service. (Jane, 
FG1)_________________
Response to
involvement not genuine 
-  negligible
Peripheral
involvement
Now, the service users 
find that really, it’s, 
involvement has just 
become a tick-box 
exercise, no more than 
that... (Bill, FG1)________
Involvement as a 
box exercise’.
'tick- Peripheral
involvement
you see you’ve got to 
understand the way these 
corporate minds work, 
first of all you think oh, 
they’re ok, there’s no kind 
of hidden agenda, but 
there is a hidden agenda, 
and the hidden agenda is 
this: is that they want 
service user and 
involvement groups to be 
within the Trust for one 
reason, so they can 
control them, so they can 
control what’s recorded or 
what’s said. Now that 
means that most of the 
genuine feedback is 
really...um, is lost, is lost. 
(Bill, FG1)
Peripheral
involvement
Trust wanting to control 
involvement
Barry: Well I have, but the 
trouble is is they say the 
rules are such that it’ll Takes time to get
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take you years to get it 
through, even as you 
know my whole history 
practically of psychiatry 
treatment has been 
absolute rubbish and they 
always talk rubbish to me, 
and when I found out 
they’re telling me lies, 
then they say well that’s 
not the point, the point is 
that their lies are better 
than your truth, they know 
what they’re doing so let 
them get on with it, 
whatever they do. (Barry, 
FG2)
Nancy: Can you get an 
example of one incident? 
Barry: Well saying that 
I’ve done things which I 
haven’t, I can prove that I 
haven’t, but they say 
we’re not interested even 
if you prove black is not 
white, if we want to say it 
is, our word says it is then 
you are not going to say 
it’s not.
Facilitator: So the
feedback you’ve given on 
the treatment you
received
Barry: Yeah, they just say 
it’s not your...it’s...that’s 
nothing to do with 
that...that’s your own
problem, we’ve got to say 
what we’ve got to say and 
that’s it, finished. 
Facilitator: So, are there 
times when you feel your 
feedback has been
responded to positively... 
Barry: Ignored, ignored.... 
Facilitator: Are there any 
times it had been
responded to in a positive
way or...?
Barry: No, it’s only when I 
complained to the 
manager, even that 
wasn’t....he himself said 
well I prefer their ideas to 
yours actually and I said
negative
through?
feedback
What the staff say is 
what is important, not 
the client’s opinion
Not listened to or 
acknowledged
The ‘professional’s’ view 
is the overriding factor
Ignoring the clients 
opinion
Power imbalance 
and differentials
Ignoring the client’s 
voice
acknowledgement
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well you’re supposed to 
be on my side, and he 
said well that’s not the 
point.
1 didn’t actually find out it 
closed until it had actually 
closed, but 1 actually feel 
that I’m quite, someone 
with their finger on the 
pulse. (Jane, FG1)
Not informed of planned 
changes to service
Poor
communication
It’s very much 
communication. It’s the 
biggest bug-bear that any 
of us have, is 
communication. (Sandra, 
FG2)
Communication is a 
problem
Poor
communication
they’ll all go off on their 
working groups, 
beavering around trying 
to give answers, but most 
of the answers you get 
back are often very 
woolly... (Jane, FG1)
Unclear response to 
feedback
... But, er, anyway it 
transpired that they hadn’t 
done a thing for her, and 
they hadn’t even bothered 
to tell me, that’s the worst 
of it, this, this lack of 
communication. You ask 
them to do something and 
they don’t even have the 
courtesy to get back to 
you to tell you that they 
couldn’t do it. (Victoria, 
FG2)
Lack of communication
Part 4: They talk over 
you, they literally don’t do 
what they say they are 
going to do. And if they 
don’t do what they say 
they’re going to do, they 
don’t give you any faith in 
the fact they want to 
listen. (Sandra, FG2)
Not listening
Not doing what is agreed
We’re actually told ‘we 
will get back to you with 
that’, and they don’t. 
(Sandra, FG2)
Not doing what they say 
they will.
People do listen to what 1 Being listened to
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say. (Sandra, FG2)
Effective
communication
Well just by, just by the 
demeanour, and by the 
fact that they were quiet, 
they listened, they 
acknowledged what you 
had to say, if they didn’t 
understand they came 
back and said to you what 
do you mean by this, and 
how did that help, and 
things like that... (Sandra, 
FG2)
1. Being listened to
2. Active listening
The more involved I’ve 
become, the more I’ve 
been listened to, so....and 
the more direct the 
feedback is. (Sandra, 
FG2)
Involvement as a way of
improving
communication
Miscellaneous
...very few issues actually 
get properly resolved and 
written off and actually 
dealt with. (Jane)
Action often not 
appeared to be taken on 
feedback
...but like all businesses, 
things don’t happen 
overnight. So sometimes 
we expect, well, we want 
response and feedback 
straight away, but that’s 
not the way the trust 
works, it’s very slow at 
doing things. (Sandra)
Carer and user 
expectations may be 
unrealistic
Expectations of the 
Trust
It has to think about 
money, it has to think 
about staffing levels, and 
stuff. So although what 
we want might be the 
ideal, being able to afford 
it....might not happen. 
(Sandra)
Other priorities of the 
Trust
Wanting an ideal
Quite often it’s not what 
people want to hear. But 1 
get the feedback straight 
away, or very quickly 
afterwoods, erm....l not 
saying that always 
happens. There are 
occasions where it can 
take months, and maybe 
not even happen at all.
Response may not be 
want the clients and 
carers want
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and you have to keep 
repeating the questions. 
(Sandra)______________
Now, again the whole 
term service user, 'Mary' 
doesn't actually receive
any  If “Brian” is
asked who he is, he’d say 
I’m a human being. So.... 
But the thing is, the whole 
term service user is a 
misnomer, because my 
sister is a patient under 
the GP practice, that’s 
where she gets her care 
from. (Nancy) _____
‘Service user’ as 
problematic label
Labelling
Because basically, we 
could all sit down and 
write that. It looks 
fantastic it looks as 
though we’ve got a super- 
duper service and 
everyone cares about 
everybody else, and, you 
know. But if you really 
look into the fine tune and 
go through each of those
values It actually
doesn’t...it’s on a bit of 
paper, it doesn’t actually 
come into practice on the 
actual ground. (Jane)
Reference to Trust’s 
‘Vision and Values’
Trust values not lived up 
to
It’s like, when I go to a 
meeting, and I give up my 
time, because it’s all done 
voluntary, I expect the 
person to be listening to 
me, and accept that I 
have knowledge and I 
have experience and that 
my experience and 
knowledge might be 
totally different to the 
person next to me, 
because they’re a 
different person, so their 
expectations would be 
different. So you’d be 
hearing different things 
from a different person. 
But my knowledge and
Service users making 
selfless contributions
Each experience is 
individual/special but 
equally important
Mixture of equally
important
experiences
Importance of getting 
feedback and involving a 
range of clients
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experience is just as 
important as everybody 
else’s, and even 
somebody who can just 
about talk, or just 
about...they have most 
likely got experience that 
they need to put into the 
pot. (Jane)_____________
...this is an example of 
making complaints...it 
doesn’t matter who you 
make a complaint to, you 
know it’s closing ranks, so 
I did make a complaint 
about this, and it never 
got anywhere because 
the fact is that..this whole 
muddle of...this strange 
idea that...of advocates 
who don’t know anything 
about the patient, and 
who just give advice, and 
the whole advocacy 
situation I think is very 
worrying, because that 
idea is that the person is 
separated from, really 
even from the 
professionals, and indeed 
their carers, and are 
er...listened to for what 
they want, but not what’s 
in their best interests, 
because this is what a 
carer does. (Nancy)_____
Complaint did not lead to 
satisfactory outcome
Conflict between
advocates role and 
carer’s role
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Appendix D -  Thematic Map
Positive
impact
Personal impact of
feedback/involveme
nt
Negative
impact
Influence and 
empowerment
Inconsistent Variable attitudes Clinical vs.
staff of staff corporate
response
I staff
Financial limits Financial Decisions based on
to involvement priorities finances not
feedback
Poor
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ABSTRACT
The sense of agency (SoA) refers to the subjective experience of 
controlling one’s own actions and resultant effects. Recent research has 
indicated possible underlying SoA abnormalities in people with Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder (OCD), although these findings are inconsistent. This 
study attempted to clarify the nature of SoA alterations for people with 
subclinical checking tendencies compared with non-checking individuals. 
This was achieved by measuring both explicit and implicit aspects of the 
SoA in two separate tasks. In a ‘Judgement of Agency’ task, participants 
first engaged in a learning phase in which associations between actions 
(button press) and effect (tone type) were established. In the subsequent 
testing phase, the degree by which the tone following the action matched 
participants’ learned expectations was varied. Participants provided SoA 
ratings for each trial. The checking group (n = 20) recorded significantly 
higher agency judgements than the non-checking group (n = 22), indicating 
a greater explicit sense of agency. The second task required participants to 
make time estimates for their actions and resultant effects, which provided 
a measurement for the subjective temporal compression of the interval 
between an action and effect. This phenomenon is known as ‘Intentional 
Binding’, and is recognised as an implicit measure of SoA. This intentional 
binding effect was greater for the checking group (n = 22) compared with 
the non-checking group (n = 23). Together, these findings indicate that 
subclinical checkers experience greater explicit and implicit SoA compared 
with non-checking individuals. The findings are discussed in relation to 
previously described cognitive features of OCD such as intolerance of 
uncertainty, inflated sense of responsibility, and feelings of incompleteness. 
Potential implications for clinical practice are explored.
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INTRODUCTION
Cognitive models of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) have 
often focussed on the role of dysfunctional beliefs or neurocognitive 
abnormalities. However, such models alone often fail to satisfactorily 
incorporate the phenomenological aspects of obsessive compulsive 
symptoms, and the consideration of additional cognitive constructs may be 
required to provide more robust accounts of the motivational mechanisms 
for such a heterogeneous disorder. Recent research has indicated that a 
disturbance in the ‘sense of agency’, which is the sense of being in control 
of one’s own actions and resultant effects, may play a crucial role in 
motivational processes involved in OCD. The limited evidence to date, 
though, has appeared somewhat inconsistent, and this study aimed to 
provide further clarity on the nature of the sense of agency in OCD. The 
first part of this introduction provides an outline of some of the current 
conceptualisations of OCD, including a brief survey of the major cognitive 
and neuropsychological explanatory theories. The background theory 
regarding the sense of agency is then briefly reviewed, and the current 
literature relating OCD to agency is critically discussed. This will then lead 
to an explanation of the aims and rationale relating to the approach 
undertaken in this study, in which two experimental paradigms are used to 
explore aspects of the sense of agency in people with subclinical 
compulsive checking tendencies.
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OCD: Background and current explanatory approaches 
Definitions and core features of OCD
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder is an anxiety disorder which is 
often chronic in nature and frequently disabling. OCD is estimated to have 
a lifetime prevalence of approximately 1.6% (Kessler et al., 2005), and has 
been estimated to affect as many as 50 million people worldwide (Sasson 
et al., 1997). Furthermore, OCD was named as one of the top ten causes 
worldwide o f ‘years lived with illness-related disability’ in 1996, according to 
the World Health Organisation (Murray and Lopez, 1996). Clearly, 
therefore, research into furthering our understanding of OCD and 
developing increasingly effective interventions is very well justified.
As the name suggests, OCD is defined by the presence of recurrent 
obsessions and/or compulsions that interfere substantially with daily 
functioning (American Psychiatric Association, APA, 2000). Obsessions are 
considered to be “persistent ideas, thoughts, impulses, or images that are 
experienced as intrusive and inappropriate and cause marked anxiety or 
distress” (APA, 2000, p. 457). The nature of such obsessions may vary 
widely and can include, for example, repeated thoughts about 
contamination, doubts about having turned off the gas and causing a fire a 
fire as a result, or thoughts of causing harm to others. Compulsions are 
behaviours which are ritualistic or repetitive in nature, are generally in 
response to obsessive thoughts, and which serve to prevent or reduce 
anxiety or distress (e.g. washing or checking). A functional link between 
obsessions and compulsions is typically present, although the presence of 
either obsessions or compulsions alone is sufficient to make a diagnosis
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according to Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorder-IV 
criteria (APA, 2000).
The course of the disorder is often chronic, although the severity 
and impact of symptoms typically tends to wax and wane over time. In fact, 
research evidence has suggested that obsessive compulsive (OC) 
tendencies appear to exist along a continuum within the general population 
(Apter et al., 1996). Accordingly, those with almost non-existent OC 
tendencies may occupy one end of the spectrum, while people with multiple 
symptoms and/or severe impairment may present at the other end, at a 
given time. In fact, there appears to have been a healthy debate regarding 
the positioning of OCD within the forthcoming DSM-5, and whether OCD 
ought to be included within a new category of Obsessive Compulsive 
Spectrum Disorders (e.g. Phillips et al., 2010). Importantly, OCD often co­
exists with major depressive disorder or other anxiety disorders (Torres et 
al., 2006). Such co-morbidity needs to be considered during the planning 
and delivery of treatment, as well as in research relating to OCD.
OCD Subtypes
A complicating factor in understanding OCD lies in the varied nature 
of its presentation. Although classified as a single disorder in the DSM-IV, 
there is a high degree of heterogeneity within OCD with respect to 
symptomology, probably more so than any other anxiety disorder. As many 
as six OCD symptom subtypes have been proposed (Foa et al., 2002). 
These include Checking, Washing, Ordering, Obsessing, Hoarding and 
Neutralising. Compulsive hoarding has, however, been shown to exist often 
as a syndrome separate from OCD, although for many individuals hoarding 
can still be considered as a symptom of their OCD (Pertusa et al., 2008).
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Some evidence has suggested that the most common OCD symptom is 
characterised by compulsive checking, which may occur in over 50% of 
those with an OCD diagnosis (Henderson & Pollard, 1988; Rasmussen & 
Eisen, 1988), with a further 15% of the general population demonstrating 
sub-clinical checking tendencies (Stein et al., 1997). However, most people 
with OCD tend to have multiple obsessions and compulsions which cut 
across the aforementioned subtypes (Skoog and Skoog, 1999), although 
this does not preclude the possibility that different factors may be 
responsible for the development of specific symptoms. Research has also 
revealed that subtypes of OCD which are not restricted to symptomology 
may also exist, for example in relation to the presence of certain cognitive 
biases, as discussed below. Despite the apparent heterogeneity of OCD, 
though, much research continues to study individuals with obsessive 
compulsive symptoms as a homogenous group, with fewer studies centring 
on specific subtypes.
Interventions
Given the prevalence and functional impact of OCD, the importance 
of developing effective interventions has been all too apparent. According 
to the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (2005), the current 
recommended treatment for OCD includes Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
(CBT) and/or medication (Selective Serotonin Re uptake Inhibitors (SSRIs), 
or clomipramine). While therapeutic intervention has developed over the 
years, in line with the developments in cognitive models described below, 
behavioural approaches such as Exposure Response Prevention (ERR) 
remain a key aspect of treatment. It is believed that repeated, prolonged 
exposure to feared thoughts and situations will provide the individual with 
information that disconfirms mistaken associations and evaluations held by
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clients, and thereby promotes habituation of a new ‘stimulus -  no response’ 
association (Foa and Kozak, 1986). Such exposure is typically gradual, with 
the patient working through a hierarchy from low-feared to highly feared 
situations.
Many controlled studies have assessed the efficacy of ERP, with 
varied but generally positive results. In a review of 12 outcome studies, Foa 
and Kozak (1996) concluded that 83% of patients displayed 
symptomalogical improvements with ERP. However, actual recovery rates 
tend to be notably smaller, and average symptom reduction rates have 
been shown to range from 48-59% (Kozak and Coles, 2005). High drop-out 
rates are also reported (Stanley and Turner, 1995). ERP is now typically 
integrated with cognitive approaches, which centre on the restructuring of 
cognitions and metacognitions that are believed to contribute to the 
disorder (see below). However, the evidence for whether cognitive methods 
actually enhance therapeutic outcomes compared with ERP alone is mixed 
(Whittal et al., 2005). Regarding the efficacy of medication, approximately 
50% of patients with OCD have reportedly failed to respond to SSRI 
treatment (Greist et al., 1995). Clearly, there is an apparent need for an 
improved understanding of OCD, in order to contribute towards the 
development of further effective therapies.
Cognitive, behavioural, and neuropsychological models of OCD
Given the severe impact of OCD and a drive to develop successful 
treatments, there has been substantial research aimed towards improving 
our understanding of OCD over many years. Several theories derived from 
behavioural, cognitive and neuropsychological approaches have been
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proposed. This section briefly reviews some of the influential explanatory 
approaches to OCD, with consideration of some of the challenges that they 
have faced.
Cognitive and behaviourai modeis
Cognitive and behavioural approaches have often dominated 
clinical research on OCD. Behavioural models of OCD considered that 
obsessional fears were developed via classical conditioning, and 
maintained by operant conditioning (Rachman and Hodgson, 1980). For 
example, an obsessional fear of contamination from washrooms may be 
said to have arisen from a situation in which a person became ill (the 
unconditioned stimulus) after visiting an “unsanitised” public lavatory 
(conditioned stimulus). Such fears were purportedly maintained by the 
reinforcing, anxiety-reducing behaviours such as avoidance of public toilets 
or compulsive washing (negative reinforcement). This led to the use of 
treatments which centred on exposure therapy, and which developed into 
ERP as described above.
Despite the effectiveness of interventions based on behavioural 
theories, it became apparent that such models alone did not fully account 
for several features of the disorder. Gradually, cognitive factors were 
increasingly believed to play an important role in the aetiology of OCD, with 
particular emphasis being placed on certain dysfunctional beliefs and 
maladaptive appraisals. Salkovkis (1985) described a cognitive-behavioural 
model in which obsessions are conceptualised as ‘normal’ intrusive 
thoughts, which most people may experience regularly, but the OGD 
sufferer misinterprets these cognitions as an indication of an increased risk 
of actual threat or danger. This is believed to result in increased distress
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and anxiety in such individuals, who then engage in actions which serve to 
neutralise their anxieties temporarily, but which also reinforce a further 
increased sense that such behaviours are required in order to prevent the 
feared outcome from happening.
In order to further elucidate dysfunctional beliefs that may contribute 
towards OCD, leading OCD researchers established an Obsessive 
Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG). Studies performed by 
this group led to reports of several such beliefs, which clustered into three 
factors: a. Inflated sense of responsibility and overestimation of threat; b. 
Perfectionism and intolerance for uncertainty; c. Over-importance and over­
control of thoughts. However, these factors were highly intercorrelated with 
each other (OCCWG, 2005). This raises questions of possible higher order 
cognitive vulnerabilities that may account for such high intercorrelations, 
and further studies are thus required to delineate what may constitute these 
predisposing factors.
While such belief domains have been shown to have a high degree 
of association with OC (Obsessive Compulsive) symptoms (Taylor et al., 
2002), further research has suggested that a sizable subgroup of people 
with OCD do not display high levels of the above dysfunctional beliefs. For 
example, Taylor et al. (2006) asked 244 patients with a diagnosis of OCD 
to complete self-reported measures of dysfunctional beliefs in three 
domains: Responsibility/Threat, Perfectionism/Certainty and
Importance/Control of thoughts. A cluster analysis revealed two distinct 
groups: low vs high belief scores. The ‘low belief cluster scored 
significantly lower than the high belief cluster on all three dysfunctional 
belief domains, while checking scores were not significantly different
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between clusters. The OCD low-belief group differed little from control 
participants on the belief measures. Furthermore, cognitive theories of 
OCD which centre predominantly on the role of dysfunctional beliefs have 
also been criticised for not sufficiently addressing the motivational basis of 
the disorder (O’Kearney, 2001). For instance, it has been suggested that 
merely having such beliefs does not provide a causal explanation of why 
the individual is necessarily motivated to then repeatedly perform related 
obsessive-compulsive actions. Thus, it may be argued that the relationship 
between such beliefs and the expression of OC symptoms could be further 
developed. While responses to such criticisms have been put forward 
(Salkovskis and Freeston, 2001), there appears to be sufficient grounds to 
suggest that dysfunctional beliefs alone do not fully account for the 
development and maintenance of OCD, and the diversity present within the 
disorder.
In order to address the above concerns, researchers have explored 
other cognitive constructs which may play a role in OCD. Several authors 
have noted that people with OCD often report a sense that “something is 
just not quite right” with regards to an action they may have performed or 
with the environment. These experiences have been referred to by various 
terms, although they are often described as “feelings of incompleteness” 
and “not just right experiences” (NJREs). As an example of the contexts in 
which they are believed to arise, we can consider an individual who has 
already checked the gas once or twice, but has a sense that something is 
still “not quite right”, or that they are not completely satisfied by the actions 
they had so far performed, and they may therefore check again. A number 
of studies exploring such phenomena have now been reported. Such 
experiences are considered by some to be important motivational factors
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which underlie OC tendencies. Summerfeldt (2004) has conceptualised 
NJREs as a possible dysregulation in the use of emotional and sensory 
feedback to guide behaviour. Ecker and Conner (2008) have proposed a 
possible link between harm avoidance cognitions and feelings of 
incompleteness in relation to the respective initiation and maintenance of 
OC checking behaviour. These NJREs have been conceptualised as 
indicating a “lack of stop signal” (Zor et al., 2011), which one typically 
experiences when having completed a goal-directed action or task. Thus, it 
has been proposed that the repeated actions of compulsive checking may 
reflect a reduced ability to achieve a sense of task completion (Zor et al., 
2011). However, the mechanisms by which such a deficit might arise have 
yet to be fully formulated.
In summary, certain cognitive distortions and maladaptive beliefs 
have been strongly implicated in the development and maintenance of OC 
symptoms. A substantial number of individuals do not report these beliefs, 
though, suggesting that additional factors may be important. The presence 
of feelings of incompleteness has been identified as a further vulnerability 
for OCD, although further research which incorporates the 
phenomenological aspects of OC symptoms remains justified in attempts to 
continue to develop our understand of the disorder.
Neuropsychological features of OCD
In addition to the explanatory models of OCD described above, 
considerable research has focussed on elucidating neurocognitive and 
neuropsychological features. While some studies have indicated that 
memory deficits may play a role (Sher, Mann and Frost, 1984), others have 
suggested otherwise (e.g. Boone, Ananth, and Philpott, 1991). A more
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reliable finding is a reduced confidence in memory for people with OCD. 
(Tolin et al., 2001). However, people suffering traumatic brain injury or 
severe depression may also describe low memory confidence, although 
generally this does not lead to OC symptoms. Abnormalities in aspects of 
executive functioning and attention have also been described (Olley, Malhi, 
and Sachdev, 2007), although again such findings have not always been 
consistent, and comparisons between studies suffer from large differences 
in methodology.
Complementary to the cognitive and neurocognitive research, a 
number of imaging studies have been reported in an effort to determine 
corresponding biological irregularities associated with OCD. The 
orbitofrontal-striatal circuit has been shown to be hyperactive in people with 
OCD compared with controls in several studies (e.g. Nordahl et al., 1989; 
Rauch et al., 1994), although some studies have not found such features 
(e.g. Perani et al., 1995). Hyperactivity among OCD patients has also been 
reported in other brain regions, such as the supplementary motor area 
(Yiicel et al., 2007), a frontal region which contributes to the control of 
movements and actions. Again, varied findings may be compounded by 
methodological differences (Menzies et al., 2008). With regards to the 
neurochemistry of OCD, serotonin dysregulation has long been implicated. 
However, as noted above, a large number of people with OCD do not 
respond to SSRI medication. There is now increased evidence to suggest 
that hyperactive dopamine pathways may also have major involvement in 
the genesis and maintenance of OCD (Denys, Zohar and Westenberg, 
2004). However, the ways in which such neurochemical features relate to 
actual OC symptoms continues to be debated.
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Summary
Despite a great deal of prior research, many unanswered questions 
remain regarding the genesis and maintenance of OCD. The disorder 
appears to present as a complex and heterogeneous condition from which 
a large number of sufferers may not significantly improve following current 
psychological or pharmacological treatments. The behavioural, cognitive 
and neuropsychological factors as described above may well all contribute 
towards an understanding of certain aspects of OCD, although their related 
research findings have sometimes lacked consistency. Furthermore, 
current approaches have struggled to integrate these various factors to 
help provide satisfactory explanations with regards to the occurrence of 
differing OCD subtypes, both with respect to symptomology and cognitive 
styles. Clearly, further studies which develop our understanding of OCD are 
therefore warranted, and it is hoped that such developments could lead to 
improvements in the delivery of tailored interventions.
While the above research has considered aspects of OCD relating 
to relevant beliefs, emotions, memory/executive processes, etc, few studies 
have centred on the experiential aspects of compulsive behaviours 
themselves. That is, the nature of how people with OCD experience their 
own actions has often been neglected, although notions of incompleteness 
have begun to explore this. An increased understanding of the experiential 
aspects of obsessions and compulsions may provide additional insight into 
the motivational mechanisms of the disorder. A fundamental aspect of the 
phenomenology of action is known as the sense of agency, which has 
recently been implicated with obsessive compulsive tendencies, and is the 
focus of the current study. It is to this aspect of experience, and recent
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studies relating the phenomenon to OCD, that the focus of this introduction 
now turns.
The Sense of Agency and OCD
In everyday life, we experience ourselves as having the capacity to 
effect change in the external world through our own goal-directed actions. 
The Sense of Agency (SoA) refers particularly to this phenomenon -  it is 
the subjective experience of initiating and controlling one’s actions and 
through them influencing outward events. For example, if I intend to turn off 
a light, and do so by reaching towards the light switch and pressing it in 
order to bring about the desired outcome, I have a sense of agency over 
having performed the action myself, and that the light going off was caused 
by my action. The SoA is therefore the aspect of experience which 
integrates the intentions, motor performance and perceived outcomes in 
relation to the actions that one performs. Given that this is an inherently 
fundamental aspect of human experience, it is rather surprising that 
research studies regarding the SoA had been somewhat lacking until the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. However, it has now emerged as a productive 
area of research within the cognitive and clinical neurosciences (David, 
Newen and Vogeley, 2008). Furthermore, research studies have implicated 
a disturbance in the SoA in a range of clinical groups, including people with 
OCD. This is still very much an emerging area of research, though, and it 
will be apparent from the discussion below that further studies are well 
justified. Therefore, in this section I will first outline the key concepts 
relating to SoA. I will then evaluate the studies that have so far been 
reported which relate the SoA to obsessive-compulsive tendencies, while 
establishing the current need for further research in this area.
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Theoretical underpinnings of the SoA
Several explanatory theories regarding the SoA have been 
developed in recent years. Despite much endeavour, though, theorists and 
researchers continue to debate the mechanisms by which the SoA arises, 
as the complexity of the phenomenon seems to have become increasingly 
apparent. An early influential approach towards explaining the SoA 
advocated a ‘predictive’ mechanism based on sensorimotor processes, 
which has become known as the “Comparator Model” (Blakemore, Wolpert 
and Frith, 2002). This view was developed from computational models of 
motor performance, which posit that our motor control and motor behaviour 
are optimised via a central monitoring system. This system is believed to 
utilise internal forward models developed from learned associations, which 
enable us to predict the sensory consequences of our motor commands. 
That is, when we perform a particular action, we expect particular sensory 
outcomes from that action. According to the Comparator Model, when there 
is there is agreement between the predicted and actual sensory outcomes 
from actions that we perform, we are said to experience a sense of agency 
as a result (Blakemore, Wolpert and Frith, 2002). For instance, if I intend to 
turn off the light, internal predictions resulting from motor commands for my 
finger to press the switch will involve expectations that the switch will move, 
and the light will then go off as a result. If sensory feedback corresponds 
with such predictions (i.e. the switch moves and the light goes off), then I 
will have a sense that my action fulfilled related intentions, and thus give a 
sense that my action had an effect in the world (i.e. a sense of agency). If 
the light goes off without my pressing the switch, or if the switch fails to 
move when I press it as I would expect, I would then attribute these
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perceived outcomes externally (i.e. that someone else switched off the 
light, or that the switch was broken).
Indeed, there is compelling evidence to support the view that the 
degree of self-agency is influenced by the extent of congruency between 
predicted and perceived sensory outcomes following actions, and several 
experimental studies have demonstrated this. An example is that reported 
by Sato and Yasuda (2005), in which participants learnt to expect a 
particular tone (high pitch vs. low pitch tone) immediately after pressing a 
particular button (right vs. left button) over a series of learning trials. In the 
second part of the experiment, participants were asked to press the left or 
right button at their own pace, and again they would hear a tone. However, 
the pitch and the time delay of the tone following the key press were 
programmed to vary randomly, such that the tone either matched or did not 
match what the participants had learnt in the learning phase. Participants 
were told that the tones could either be caused by themselves or by the 
experimenter, and for each trial they were asked to rate how much they 
believed that they had caused the tone which followed their button press. 
The results showed that the self-agency ratings decreased in line with an 
increase in time delay for the tone following their button press, and ratings 
were lower when the pitch of the tone did not match the button press as 
expected from the priming trials. Thus, the experiment provided support for 
the view that the strength of the sense of agency derives from a 
“comparison” between predicted and actual sensory outcomes.
Although the above account of the SoA remains influential, some 
researchers have downplayed the predictive aspects of self agency based 
on motor commands, and emphasised the importance of retrospective
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cognitive processes. Such an approach posits that a sense of agency can 
be retrospectively inferred from the sensory consequences of an action, 
independent of prior motor commands. For example, a study by Wegner 
and Wheatley (1999) showed that priming participants with words 
consistent with an observed action outcome increased their sense of 
causing the outcome, even if they had not actually made the movement to 
bring about the effect. The observed outcome was in fact caused by a 
confederate, although it would seem that the word primes served to provide 
participants with a sense of intention and control over an action-effect 
process even for movements that they did not actually make. It has thus 
been suggested that the experience of control may arise from a process in 
which causal relations between intentions, actions and perceived effects 
are inferred retrospectively.
Attempts have been made to reconcile the “predictive” vs. 
“retrospective” debate. As such, the comparator model is increasingly being 
viewed as providing an important, but only partial explanation for the SoA 
(David, Newen and Vogely, 2008). Furthermore, recent conceptual 
developments have led to increased acceptance that there are likely to be 
multiple aspects of the sense of agency (Gallagher, 2012). A useful 
framework has been described by Synofeik and colleagues, who have 
proposed that we experience a basic level “Feeling of Agency”, as well as a 
more conceptual level “Judgement of Agency” (Synofzik, Vosgerau and 
Newen, 2008a). They suggest that the Feeling of Agency is a non- 
conceptual experience which is largely (but not exclusively) determined by 
low level sensorimotor processes as described by the comparator model. 
The experience of a Feeling of Agency is thus seen as a pre-reflective 
process in which agency is not attributed as such, but experienced
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implicitly, and it is this level of agency which is typically more prevalent in 
everyday activity. For example, when turning off the light switch I would not 
normally reflect upon the sensorimotor aspects of performing the task, or 
even whether the perceived outcome matched my expectations (assuming 
the light goes out when I perform the action). However, my sensorimotor 
system implicitly registers the sensory consequences of the action-outcome 
event as self-caused, via a pre-conceptual comparator mechanism, and 
further rationalisation processes need not be invoked. I thus have an 
implicit awareness of my role in an action-effect process.
On the other hand, the Judgement of Agency (JoA) refers to an 
explicit self-attribution of control over actions and their effects. It has been 
suggested that judgements of agency are more likely to occur in situations 
which are more agency-ambiguous, more emotionally loaded (Synofzik, 
Vosgerau and Newen, 2008b), or simply when the individual actively 
introspects the intentions and experiences that he/she has while performing 
an action (Parcherie, 2007). In such instances, higher level cognitive 
processes are believed to be more active than for the feeling of agency. 
Thus, although judgements of agency may still be strongly dependent upon 
the output of the sensorimotor comparator, further factors relating to 
background beliefs, social contexts and prior intentions will also modulate 
the agency experience.
To summarise, it is apparent from prior research that the SoA is a 
complex phenomenon, and that the experience of self-agency may be 
determined by both low level sensorimotor and higher level conceptual 
cues. The respective influence of such cues appears to be situation 
specific, although in typical everyday actions it is likely that low level cues
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are sufficient to produce a feeling of agency for healthy individuals. It 
should be noted that, while a distinction has been made between implicit 
feelings and explicit judgements of agency, the majority of studies on the 
SoA have only measured explicit agency judgements, where the degree of 
control is reported by participants. An example is the Sato and Yasuda 
(2005) experiment described above. Nevertheless, some implicit measures 
relating the SoA have been obtained, and an influential approach is now 
described below.
Sense of agency and intentional binding
Clearly, measurements of explicit and therefore reflective 
judgements of agency are more easily achieved, using self-reported data, 
than implicit measures. However, some experimental designs have been 
developed in order to obtain implicit measures of agency. Haggard and co­
workers have extensively utilised a paradigm that they developed, which is 
believed to indirectly measure the strength of association between a 
person’s action and the perceived outcome. Briefly, when an individual 
performs a voluntary action that is followed by a perceived outcome or 
effect, such as an auditory or visual event, they perceive the time interval 
between their action and the onset of the effect to be shorter than it actually 
is (Haggard, Clark, and Kalogeras, 2002). Thus, individuals perceive a 
temporal compression between their actions and resultant effects. This was 
demonstrated by Haggard and colleagues in a series of experiments, in 
which participants judged the time of a voluntary action (pressing a button) 
and the time of an auditory effect of their action (a tone) within separate 
experimental blocks. Typically individuals tended to perceive the time of 
their action more closely to that of the subsequent tone, relative to baseline
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conditions where there was no tone. Similarly, estimates of the time for the 
tone shifted towards that of the preceding action that caused it, relative to a 
baseline condition involving only tones. This process is said to relate to the 
subjective experience of healthy individuals to perceive their actions and 
the resulting effects as bound together across time (a temporal 
compression), and that this ‘action-effect binding’ or ‘intentional binding’ 
therefore provides an implicit measure of the sense of agency (Moore and 
Obhi, 2012). This has been shown to be specific for voluntary actions, as 
temporal binding between action and outcome was reversed when an 
involuntary movement, induced by transmagnetic brain stimulation, 
preceded the effect (Haggard et al., 2002).
Further studies by Haggard and co-workers have demonstrated an 
association of intentional binding with predictive sensorimotor comparator 
mechanisms (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2003), relating the binding 
phenomenon to low level agency experiences. However, higher level 
cognitive processes have also been shown to influence intentional binding. 
It has been demonstrated that binding effects are stronger when 
participants are told that they produced an effect, such as a tone, compared 
with when they are led to believe that the tone was caused by someone 
else, even though they had in fact always caused the tone by their own 
button press (Desantis, Roussel and Raszak, 2011). This suggested that 
notions of personal responsibility regarding the outcomes of one’s actions 
contribute towards the SoA, even when the action-outcome procedure is 
the same. Intentional binding has also been displayed for experiments in 
which visual stimuli are caused by voluntary actions (typically a button 
press or joystick movement). In a small scale study (only 10 participants in 
the analysis), Moretto, Walsh and Haggard (2011) used such an approach
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in an experiment which revealed stronger intentional binding relating to 
moral rather than non-moral scenarios. This suggests that the SoA could 
well be influenced by factors relating to moral dilemmas or beliefs relating 
to responsibility.
Recent studies have explored the neural correlates of intentional 
binding. An imaging study has reported increased IB to be positively 
associated with activity in the supplementary motor area (SMA), implying 
that this region may play a role in implicit self-agency experiences (Kuhn, 
Brass and Haggard, 2013). Furthermore, a greater IB effect has been 
associated with increased dopamine activity, in a study comparing patients 
with Parkinson’s disease who were either on or off dopamine medication 
(Moore et al., 2010). Of relevance to this study, elevated SMA and 
dopaminergic activity have also both been reported in people with OCD, as 
noted above.
In summary, intentional binding (IB) has been demonstrated to be a 
robust measure of an individual’s implicit association between their action 
and outcomes. Studies which have explored the IB effect have shown that 
this phenomenon to be related to both low-level sensorimotor and high- 
level conceptual processes. The robust nature of intentional binding 
measurement provides a sound case for IB to be explored with regards to 
the SoA and obsessive compulsive symptoms.
The SoA in psychosis and depression
Given the pervasive nature of the sense of agency within everyday 
experiences, it would be expected that disturbance in the SoA could have a
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profound impact on psychological functioning. Alterations in the sense of 
agency have now been implicated in several clinical conditions. In 
particular, disturbance in the SoA has often been associated with people 
with schizophrenia and psychotic symptoms, who are known to sometimes 
report unusual experiences of their own actions. For example, people with 
symptoms of passivity phenomena or thought insertion may be seen to 
have a reduced sense of agency over their own actions and thoughts. 
However, some studies have actually demonstrated increased SoA in 
relation to psychotic symptoms in certain tasks (Hauser et al., 2011). It has 
been suggested that such discrepancies may relate to the type of agency 
being measured in respective tasks.
Depression has long been linked with feelings of helplessness and 
perceived loss of control (Peterson and Seligman, 1984), and it has been 
suggested that a reduced sense of agency may contribute to this. A study 
by Obhi, Swiderski, and Farquhar (2012) found that intentional binding was 
weaker after people were asked to recall a depressing event, compared 
with baseline conditions. The authors even suggest that this implicit 
measure of the SoA could possibly be used in clinical settings, in order to 
assess changes in the sense of agency pre- and post-treatment.
Sense of agency and OCD
A potential relationship between obsessive-compulsive tendencies 
and the sense of agency is an intriguing one, which has begun to generate 
some interest among OCD researchers. However, to date the literature has 
produced some apparently conflicting results, warranting further detailed 
consideration.
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As suggested above, the experience of control over one’s actions is 
an important aspect of the sense of agency, and reports of people with 
OCD experiencing a lack of control over actions and thoughts have been 
described previously (e.g. McFall and Wollersheim, 1979). Furthermore, the 
inflated sense of responsibility described in the cognitive literature of OCD 
implies that people with OCD may conversely require an increased need for 
control. Moulding et al. (2008) investigated such ideas by using a scenario- 
based paradigm to compare the levels of ‘desire for control’ and ‘sense of 
control’ across three groups: OCD-checking group (n=16), non-OCD 
anxiety disorders group (n=17) and a community control group (n=27). 
They manipulated a vignette to vary the degree of threat (low vs. high) and 
personal responsibility (low vs. high) in four corresponding scenarios 
relating to a dripping tap. The threat varied depending on whether the 
dripping tap could lead to a flood. Questions relating to appraisals of 
control, threat and responsibility were completed following each scenario. 
Overall, the OCD group showed significantly higher levels of self-reported 
responsibility, threat and desire for control, and lower levels of sense of 
control than the community control group. The levels of threat and desire 
for control were also higher in the OC checking group compared with the 
anxiety disorder group, although ratings for sense of control and 
responsibility were not significantly different between these groups. The 
authors concluded that a greater discrepancy between high ‘desire for 
control’ and low ‘sense of control’ in people with OCD may contribute 
towards an increased need for such people to engage in repetitive actions, 
especially in high responsibility and high threat situations. However, using a 
vignette-based manipulation to judge feelings of control over actions and 
outcomes is inherently problematic. As described above, the mechanisms 
involved in action intentions and sensorimotor performance during an
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actual task are paramount to providing a sense of agency, and it is unlikely 
that the control estimates derived from a vignette would adequately relate 
to the SoA itself.
As one would expect, measures relating to control and agency over 
actions are typically obtained from experimental paradigms. Control 
appraisals relating to specific actions have been investigated in a study by 
Reuven-Magril, Dar and Liberman (2008). The authors used an ‘illusion of 
control’ paradigm, in which people with an OCD diagnosis and a non- 
clinical control group rated their sense of control during a computerised 
task in which they were asked to attempt to control a pre-programmed 
sequence of presented stimuli (Reuven-Magril, Dar and Liberman, 2008). In 
this task, participants were presented with different pictures of either 
distorted faces (aversive stimuli) or household items (neutral stimuli), and 
were told that they should try to shorten the length of stimuli presentation 
by finding the correct combination of five presses on two computer keys. In 
reality, however, their key presses had no effect, as the programme 
automatically increased presentation time for the first two minutes of the 
task, and then gradually decreased the stimuli presentation for the following 
two minutes. This created an illusion of control in the second part of the 
task. Participants were asked to estimate how much control they had over 
the stimuli presentation time on three occasions during the experiment 
(after 30 seconds, 2 min and 3.5 min respectively). Overall, control 
estimates decreased between the first and second rating, but increased 
greatly by the third estimate, in line with an ‘illusion of control’ effect. 
Importantly, the OCD participants gave significantly higher estimates of 
control than the non-clinical sample, even after controlling for depression.
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While this study appeared to demonstrate an increased sense of 
control for people with OCD, the authors considered that such findings 
related to a striving amongst such individuals to attain a sense of control, in 
response to anxiety relating to events that they do not feel they have 
sufficient control over. It was suggested that this sense of control is then 
achieved by engaging in local tasks (e.g. checking the gas) as a substitute 
for the higher order goals which aim to prevent feared situations (e.g. 
preventing a fire). They admit, however, that the direction of a causal 
relationship is not established in the experiment. Although the authors used 
a measure for depression and found that this did not influence the results, 
anxiety levels were not measured or reported, and therefore it was not 
determined whether such findings would have remained if controlling for 
anxiety. Also, the OCD sample were treated as a homogenous group, and 
the differing symptoms ratings were not reported, making it difficult to know 
whether the effects that they determined were due to a greater 
predominance of certain OCD symptoms in the sample.
An ‘illusion of agency’ task was also report by Belayachi and Van 
der Linden (2010), in order to investigate self-agency in relation to 
subclinical OC tendencies in a student population sample. Participants 
used a likert scale to rate how much they believed that their actions 
(pressing a button) had caused a moving square on a computer screen to 
stop in a particular position, as opposed to whether it had been stopped by 
the computer programme. Subliminal priming was randomly employed in 
half of the trials, regarding the position of the square, in order to enhance 
the participants’ sense that they had caused the square to stop in those 
trials, when in fact the position was predetermined throughout the task. 
Overall, the participants reported higher self-agency ratings in the primed
161
trials compared with the non-primed trials, and analysis revealed a weak 
negative correlation between checking symptoms and agency ratings, while 
other OC symptoms were not correlated. The authors then formed two 
groups from the data, in order to compare those in the upper quartile and 
lower quartile of checking symptom scores respectively. While there were 
no group differences for agency ratings on the non-primed trials, the 
checking group’s ratings were significantly lower on the priming trials 
compared with the non-checking group, having controlled for depression. 
According to the authors, these findings suggested that people with 
checking tendencies were less able to grasp the correspondence between 
the actual outcomes of their actions and expected outcomes, believing this 
to imply a reduced ‘feeling of agency’. This appeared to contrast with the 
Reuven-Magril et al. (2008) study above. The authors postulated that this 
discrepancy could be due to the differing nature of the experimental tasks. 
They state that, unlike the task reported by Reuven-Magril et al. (2008), 
their experiment would correspond with predominantly lower order, pre- 
reflective agency mechanisms, due to the use of subliminal priming. 
However, their agency measures still relied on subjective judgements of 
control, so it is unclear if this claim is fully justified. Furthermore, Belayachi 
and van der Linden (2010) did not account for anxiety levels or attentional 
focus, which could both be confounding factors for a task relying on 
subliminal priming. It was not reported as to whether the people with 
checking tendencies had noticed the subliminal priming stimuli more or less 
than the non-checking group, and thus it remains unclear if there was an 
equal susceptibility to the priming process.
All the studies so far discussed which relate feelings of control and 
agency to OCD used self-reported measures or estimates only. They
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therefore relied on judgements of agency, as participants were required to 
consciously consider their degree of control/agency, irrespective of the task 
involved. A recent experiment by Gentsch, Schutz-Bosbach, Endrass and 
Kathmann (2012) used both self-reported measures and Event Related 
Potential (ERR) recordings to explore SoA in people with a diagnosis of 
OCD (n=18) and a non-clinical control group. The experiment included 
three tasks. In one task (the Motor-Effect task), participants pressed one of 
two buttons which triggered the appearance of a blue or red square in 
blocked trials of high contingency (in which the colour of the square in 75% 
of trials matched a particular button press) and low contingency (colour- 
button matches for only 25% of trials). They were asked to judge the causal 
relationship between their button press and the visual outcome after each 
trial, by using an analogue scale from 0  (no relation) to 1 0 0  (perfect 
relation). In a ‘motor only’ task, the participants pressed the buttons but did 
not see any squares, while in a control task they passively observed the 
appearance of the coloured squares without pressing any button. EEG 
recordings were made throughout, in order to measure the degree of 
suppression of the N1 component of the event-related potential (ERR). The 
N1 suppression is believed to occur during the experience of self­
generated, as opposed to passively observed, visual and auditory stimuli, 
and is related to an inhibitory process based on motor predictions following 
voluntary action (Gentsch and Schütz-Bosbach, 2011). The OCD group 
displayed significantly less N1 suppression during actively generated 
feedback compared with the control participants. This led the authors to 
conclude that people with OCD “fail to predict and suppress the sensory 
consequences of their own actions” (Gentsch et al., 2012, p. 652). 
Furthermore, there was a trend for the OCD patients to give numerically 
higher agency ratings compared with controls, although this difference only
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approached significance. However, correlation analysis did not reveal 
significant associations between the N1 suppression and agency 
judgements, which leads to a query as to whether the ERP measures 
obtained were directly relevant to potential aberration in the SoA in people 
with OCD. Interestingly, though, the agency judgements obtained in the 
task were correlated with self reported measures of ‘Not Just Right 
Experiences’.
Summary
The sense of agency is a fundamental aspect of human experience, 
in which we relate our own actions to the outside world in a cause-effect 
relationship. The feelings of control over the actions we make, and the 
effects they produce, are central to a sense of ourselves as purposeful 
beings. Nevertheless, this is not an experience we normally dwell upon, 
and there are both reflective and pre-reflective aspects to this experience. 
Processes relating to sensorimotor integration are believed to provide an 
implicit ‘feeling’ of motor control and agency during our actions. This 
sensorimotor integration may also interact with higher cognitive processes 
relating to prior beliefs of control and responsibility, influencing reflective 
‘judgements of agency’. Experimental research has explored both feelings 
and judgements of agency, and a limited number of studies have indicated 
disturbance in the SoA within OCD. While some studies have suggested 
, that people with OCD may experience a reduced sense of control over their 
actions (Moulding et al., 2008), or a reduced feeling of agency (Belayachi 
and Van der Linden, 2010), other reports have indicated heightened 
estimates of control over the effects of their action when compared with 
people without OC tendencies (Reuven-Magril et al., 2008; Gentsch et al.,
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2012). Clearly, further research is warranted in order to establish more 
clearly the nature of a potentially altered SoA for people with OCD, and 
how this may relate to other known features of the disorder. It is hoped that 
this could then lead to improvements with regards to therapeutic 
interventions, which take into account further potential motivational aspects 
of the OC symptoms.
Rationale for the present study
This research aimed to clarify some of the existing queries within 
the literature regarding disturbance in the sense of agency as a feature of 
OCD. It seemed necessary to distinguish between explicit and implicit 
measurements of agency in the current study, as it may well be that the 
different experiments reported to date have depended upon differing 
aspects of self-agency. Furthermore, given the heterogeneity of OCD, it 
also seemed prudent to focus on a specific symptom subtype, as the 
strength of certain agency experiences may well differ depending on OCD 
subgroups. For this study, we decided to focus on checking symptoms. 
This is reported as the most frequently experienced symptom, and self­
agency regarding checking tendencies has already received some specific 
attention (as described above), allowing for some direct comparisons. This 
study, however, was to be the first to explore both explicit and implicit 
aspects of the SoA in relation to checking tendencies. It was decided that 
the agency measures should be obtained from separate tasks, to ensure 
that the process of acquiring explicit agency judgements from participants 
did not alter their implicit experience of agency.
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Given that there are already several established experimental 
protocols for measuring explicit or implicit aspects of the SoA reported in 
the literature, it seemed prudent to simply adapt such experiments for our 
purpose. Furthermore, it was decided that benign stimuli would be 
employed for this initial study, rather than OC related stimuli, in order to first 
ascertain whether underlying disturbances in the SoA exist which are not 
dependent on specific threat-related beliefs. For these reasons, we chose 
to employ the experiment reported by Sato and Yasuda (2005) as 
described above, which would provide explicit ‘judgement of agency' 
measures. This is a computerised task, in which participants engaged in an 
initial learning phase where pressing a particular button (Left vs. Right) 
immediately caused a specific tone (High pitch vs. Low pitch). In the 
experimental phase, participants were told that either their button press or 
the computer programme could cause the tone which they hear following 
their action. For each trial, participants provided ratings for how strongly 
they believed they had caused the tone. The time delay and matching of 
the tones (tone congruency) were randomly varied in the degree to which 
they matched the participants’ expectations based on the learning phase, 
although the button press always triggered the tone.
Given the findings of the study described by Belayachi and Van der 
Linden (2010), in which positive priming produced lower agency ratings in 
subclinical checking individuals compared with a non-checking group, we 
predicted that our checking group would rate lower than the non-checking 
group for trials which best matched the expected outcomes (i.e. congruent 
tones with a short delay). Also, these trials would be expected to have the 
strongest association with low-level sensorimotor process, given the 
reasoning that a high match between predicted and observed outcomes
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demands less need for higher-level reasoning (Synofzik et al., 2008b). As 
the study by Gentsch et al. (2012) has suggested a deficit in such 
processes for people with OCD, the prediction that the checking 
participants would rate comparatively lower on these trials is further 
justified. However, we also predicted that the checking participants may 
provide higher agency ratings than the non-checking individuals for the 
trials which least matched the expected outcomes (i.e. incongruent tones 
with long delay), as they strive to preserve their sense of agency and 
control in the face of unexpected outcomes. Whether the checking group 
would provide higher agency ratings overall would depend on the balance 
between these two contrasting effects and was therefore difficult to predict. 
However, the predictions given were somewhat tentative, in view of the 
criticisms of the studies as described above.
In order to obtain measures of agency which did not rely on explicit 
agency judgements, the intentional binding paradigm, as described above, 
was employed in a second experiment. As greater cortical dopamine 
activity has been associated with increased intentional binding (Moore et 
al., 2010), and dopamine hyperactivity is frequently related to OCD (Denys, 
Zohar and Westenberg, 2004), it was predicted that the checking group 
would display greater action effect binding than the non-checking 
participants. Auditory stimuli were used for the intentional binding 
experiment, as time estimates relating to auditory stimuli are generally 
more robust in comparison to visual stimuli.
The inherent difficulties in recruiting sufficient numbers of 
participants with OCD and checking symptoms to attend the University was 
considered, in view of the need to obtain adequate statistical power. Thus,
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to enable timely recruitment, two groups of University based participants 
were created from the results of pre-screening questionnaires: those with 
subclinical checking symptoms as determined by the Obsessive 
Compulsive Inventory -  Revised (OCI-R, Foa et al., 2002), and those with 
low scores for checking and also other OC symptoms. The use of non- 
clinical populations within research on OCD is a common practice. As 
outlined above, it is understood that non-clinical populations may 
experience similar OC tendencies to clinical populations, albeit with lesser 
frequency and reduced distress and impact on functioning, in line with a 
dimensional view of OC symptomology. Thus, research findings from such 
subclinical populations are generally extrapolated for those with an OCD 
diagnosis.
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METHOD
Participants
All participants in this study were students or staff members of the 
University of Surrey. They were recruited via email and also a University 
based research participation website. Interested volunteers were first 
required to complete an online screening questionnaire, and eligible 
participants were then asked to attend the School of Psychology to take 
part in the experiment. The online questionnaire took 5-10 minutes to 
complete and included items regarding obsessive compulsive symptoms 
(OCI-R, Foa et al., 2002), anxiety and depression (Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale -  HADS, Zigmund and Snaith, 1983), and other selection 
criteria (see below). Incentives were provided in order to encourage 
participation. A prize draw for a £50 Amazon voucher was offered as 
incentive to complete the online questionnaire, while participants were paid 
£10 for completing the experiment at the School of Psychology.
Inclusion criteria for both groups included no current or past history 
of substance misuse/dependence, psychosis, bipolar disorder, severe head 
injury or neurological mental disorder. Good English language skills were 
also expected. Participants were required to score <11 on the respective 
anxiety and depression subscales of the HADS. The subclinical checking 
group were required to score >4 on the Checking Subscale of the OCI-R. 
This cut-off was based on previous studies on clinical populations, in which 
the mean Checking score for an OCD group was approximately five (e.g. 
Foa et al., 2002). Participants also needed to confirm the presence of 
checking tendencies in the clinical interview. With regards to the non-
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checking group, participants were invited to attend if they scored < 2  on the 
Checking subscale of the OCI-R. Such participants were also required to 
score <3 on the majority of other subscales, and score <14 on their OCI-R 
Total score. This was to ensure that none of the non-checking participants 
reported any other prominent OC features.
The presence/absence of clinical diagnoses was confirmed by 
clinical interview (Mini International Neuropsychiatrie Interview, see below). 
The disorders that were assessed using this tool included major depressive 
episodes, manic or hypermanic episodes, panic disorder, social phobia, 
posttraumatic stress disorder, substance dependence, psychotic disorders, 
generalised anxiety disorder, and OCD. Current depressive episode and/or 
the present use of antidepressant medication resulted in exclusion. Current 
anxiety disorder not related to OCD would also lead to exclusion from either 
group.
The online eligibility questionnaire was completed by 596 people, 
and 5 9  participants who had fulfilled the initial screening criteria completed 
the experiment at the School of Psychology. A total of 14 participants were 
subsequently excluded from the study for the following reasons: Fulfilling 
the criteria for current depression or hypermanic episode as determined by 
the MINI (n=3): poor English language skills (n=4); having denied checking 
tendencies during interview (n=4); described checking only in relation to 
ordering tendencies (e.g. checking that their books were in the right order 
on the shelf) (n=2); not obeying task instructions (n=1). Thus, the final 
experimental groups consisted of 22 checking participants and 23 non­
checking participants. Both groups had a mean age of 21 years old.
170
With regards to the JoA task, an a priori sample size calculation 
revealed that a total sample size of 72 (36 participants per group) was 
recommended to detect a medium effect size, and to obtain a power of 
80% at a significance level of p = 0.05, for between-factor comparisons in a 
mixed AN OVA. For the IB task, the predicted sample size from the a priori 
power analysis was 64 participants per group for a medium effect size. 
Although these sample size calculations provided greater numbers than the 
final participant group sizes in the study, it should be noted that a large 
effect size was reported in the related experiment described by Reuven- 
Magril, Dar and Liberman (2008), where control estimates were obtained 
from an OCD group and control group of 22 participants each. Furthermore, 
medium to large effect sizes have been reported in other related studies 
(e.g. Belayachi and Van der Linden, 2010; Moulding et al., 2008), with 
group sizes of no more than 28 participants. Thus, the participant numbers 
in the current study remained justified based on the prior literature, with the 
realistic possibility of obtaining medium to large effect sizes.
Materials
OC Measures
The Obsessive Compulsive Inventory Revised (OCI-R) is an 18 item 
questionnaire that uses a five-point Likert Scale, and provides six 
subscales of OCD symptoms: “Washing”, “Obsessing”, “Ordering”, 
“Checking”, Hoarding” and “Neutralising”. This has been shown to be a 
valid measure for both clinical and non-clinical populations (Foa et al., 
2002; Hupped et al., 2007). In an OCD sample, the OCI-R was found to 
have adequate internal consistency for most subscales (Cronbach's Alpha 
scores: obsessing = .8 8 ; washing = .69; checking = .87; ordering = .89;
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hoarding = .93; total scale = .84), while the neutralising subscale displayed 
modest reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .57) (Hupped et al., 2007). This 
questionnaire was administered as pad of the online screening 
assessment.
Depression and Anxiety Measures
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) was used as an 
online self-repoded measure of anxiety and depression. The HADS has 
been shown to display acceptable validity and internal reliability. The 
depression scale of the HADS correlates adequately with the Beck 
Depression Inventory (Bjelland et al., 2002). The HADS provides measures 
for how the person has been feeling “over the past week”. If there was a 
delay of more than two weeks between completing the online questionnaire 
and attending the experiment, or if the questionnaire was completed during 
an exam period, the padicipant was asked to complete the HADS again at 
the end of the experiment. In practice, this was only required on three 
occasions.
Clinical Interview - Diagnostic Measures:
Clinical diagnoses were assessed using the Mini International 
Neuropsychiatrie Interview (MINI; Sheehan et al., 1998). The MINI is a 
relatively brief, structured diagnostic interview for DSM-IV disorders, which 
takes approximately 2 0  minutes to administer fully, although only the 
sections that were required for this study’s selection criteria were used. It is 
considered to be a time-efficient and valid alternative to the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV disorders (SCID-I) (Sheehan et al., 1997). If 
padicipants were found to reach the threshold for diagnosis of a current 
anxiety or depressive disorder (except OCD), they were subsequently
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excluded from the study. This had resulted in the exclusion of three 
participants due to the presence of an affective disorder, all of whom had 
received support from the Centre for Wellbeing at the University of Surrey. 
None of the subclinical checking participants fulfilled a diagnosis of OCD.
Estimates of Intellectual Functioning and Language Ability:
As this study was initially designed with the possibility of including 
an OCD diagnosis group and community controls, the National Adult 
Reading Test (NART: Nelson and Willison, 1991) was also included to 
provide estimates of general ability within groups. The NART was retained 
to preserve experimental consistency, even though only University students 
and staff members were eventually used. However, it could not be used as 
a reliable estimate of intellectual ability, as English was not the first 
language for some of the participants. Nevertheless, a NART score of 
below 1 0  in conjunction with the judgement of the experimenter was used 
to exclude participants based on a lack of English language skills.
Procedure
Overall procedure
The experiments were conducted on an individual basis. After 
obtaining informed consent, the MINI was first administered before 
participants completed the judgement of agency (JoA) task. They were then 
allowed a break for a few minutes, after which the NART was administered 
followed by the Intentional Binding task. All participants were then fully 
debriefed. As both tasks involve a button press followed by a tone, the JoA 
task was performed first. This was necessary in order to limit potential 
confounding effects on the learning phase of that task if it was performed
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after the Intentional Binding task, as the latter did not depend on a learned 
association between button press and the pitch of the tone.
Experiment 1 : Judgement of Agency Task
The experimental design followed that reported by Sato and Yasuda 
(2005), although some adaptations were made to the procedure during 
piloting of the experiment. This computerised task was programmed in 
Presentation Version 16. Participants were seated in front of a computer 
monitor and keyboard with headphones provided. The ‘V button on the left 
side of the keyboard was labelled “L”, and the 7’ key on the right side was 
labelled “R”. The experiment consisted of two phases -  a learning phase 
and an experimental phase. In the first part of the task (the learning phase), 
participants performed 300 learning trials in order to establish the 
relationship between an action (button press) and an effect (tone). 
Participants were instructed to press the left button with their left index 
finger or right button with their right index finger one at a time, repeatedly. 
Each button press immediately produced a particular tone (600 Hz or 1000 
Hz) for 200 ms. For example, the left button press always resulted in the 
presentation of a 600 Hz tone, and the right button produced a 1000 Hz 
tone, or vice versa (see Figure 1). The button-tone assignment was 
counterbalanced across participants. They were told to press the buttons at 
their own pace, but to try and use each button roughly equally as often and 
press them in a random order, while paying attention to the resulting tones.
In the second part of the task (the experimental phase), participants 
were asked to press a button within a few seconds after a cross 
disappeared from the screen. They were informed that they would again 
hear a tone aftenwards, but were told that this time the tone could be
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produced by themselves or by the computer programme instead. Thus, for 
each trial participants were faced with a black cross 1 cm in diameter in the 
middle of a white screen, which disappeared after 4 seconds, leaving the 
screen blank. Participants then pressed the left or right buttons within a few 
seconds. The resulting tones were randomly varied with respect to whether 
or not the pitch of the tone was associated with the button as assigned in 
the learning trial (congruent vs incongruent tone), and by time delay 
between response and tone onset (delay = 0, 400, 800 or 1200 ms). These 
8  experimental conditions consisted of 1 0  trials each, resulting in a total of 
80 trials. At the end of each experimental trial, participants were asked to 
rate how much they agreed with the statement “I was the one who 
produced the tone”, from 0  (totally disagree) to 1 0 0  (totally agree), using a 
visual analogue scale that they manipulated using the computer mouse. In 
fact, the tone was always triggered by the participant’s button press, but the 
different conditions varied the degree to which the consequence of this 
action matched their expectations derived from the learning phase. The 
mean rating scores for each of the conditions, as well as the mean score 
for all ratings, were used as the dependent variables. The task lasted 
approximately 25 minutes.
Immediately after the task, participants were asked three questions 
in order to determine whether they could consciously recall which tone 
matched which button in the learning phase, and to indicate which factors 
influenced their decisions over whether they or the computer had caused 
the tone to occur (i.e. the congruence of the pitch, the time delay or both).
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Figure 1. Trial structures for the Judgement o f Agency task. A  total o f 300 learning trials 
were completed, in which participants pressed the left and right buttons in their own time. 
After each button press, the participants heard a tone (600 or 1000 Hz) which was 
matched to a particular button throughout the learning phase. In the experimental phase, 
participants pressed a button within a few seconds o f a cross disappearing from the 
screen. They again heard a tone which varied in terms o f delay and congruency w ith the 
learning phase (10 trials per condition). For each trial, participants rated how much they 
agreed w ith the statement “ 1 was the one who produced the tone”  in the experimental 
phase.
Experiment 2: Intentional Binding Task
The procedure for this task was based on that described by Moore 
et a!., (2010). In the task, participants sat in front of a computer screen 
displaying a clock face (7 cm in diameter) with a single hand. The clock 
was marked with the conventional intervals (e.g. 5, 10, 15, etc, through to 
60). The rotation of the clock hand was initiated by the experimenter and, 
beginning from 0, the hand rotated at one revolution every 2560 ms. There 
were four blocks in the task; two agency conditions and two baseline 
conditions (see Figure 2). In the Action-Effect conditions, the participants 
pressed the left mouse button with their right index finger at a random 
moment of their own volition, after the clock was started by the 
experimenter. The button press caused a brief tone (1000 Hz, 75 ms
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duration) 250 ms after the action, and the clock hand continued to rotate for 
a random length of time (between 1500 ms and 2500 ms) after the button 
was pressed. Participants then gave a time estimate for where the rotating 
clock hand had been, either when they pressed the button (Action 
condition) or when they heard the tone (Effect condition), as demonstrated 
in Figure 2. Estimates were reported verbally and recorded by the 
experimenter. The conditions were presented in blocks, such that the 
participants always estimated either the action times only, or the tone times 
only. In addition, two baseline conditions were included. In the baseline 
action condition, participants pressed the button at a moment of their 
choosing as before. However, the button press did not result in a tone, and 
they simply judged the time of their button press. In a baseline tone 
condition, participants were instructed not to press any button, but instead 
wait for a tone which was generated by the computer at a random time 
(relative to the rotation of the clock hand). Here the participants provided an 
estimate for the time of the tone onset. Thus, there were a total of four 
conditions in the Intentional Binding task, and each condition was 
preserved in a block. The four blocks were presented in randomised order, 
and each block consisted of 20 trials. For all estimates, participants were 
instructed to be as accurate as they could, and not to only to provide 
responses that were multiples of five according to the numbers displayed. 
This task took approximately 20 minutes. As dependent variables, the 
mean error between estimated and actual times was calculated for each 
condition.
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Figure 2. Trial structures for the Intentional Binding task (based on Moore et al., 2010). 
Participants were faced with a clock consisting of a rotating hand. In the two baseline 
conditions, participants either pressed the button (action only baseline) or listened for a tone 
without needing to press the button (effect only baseline). They then gave their respective 
time estimates for button press or tone. In the two Action-Effect conditions, participants 
pressed a button that produced a tone. They then gave estimates either for the button press 
or for the tone, depending on the respective experimental block.
Data Analysis 
Judgement of Agency task
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was employed to compare the mean 
rating scores for each condition within and between the groups for the JoA 
task. Outliers were considered as an overall mean ratings score per 
participant being three standard deviations from the mean. Independent t- 
tests compared the ratings for the two groups for each condition. Paired t- 
tests were also performed to assess the difference in ratings due to 
increased delay (e.g. difference between 0ms and 400 ms congruent delay) 
for each group.
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Intentional Binding task
The mean errors in time judgement per participant were calculated 
for each condition, by comparing the estimated times of the action (button 
press) or tone with the actual times. An estimate was considered an outlier 
if it differed by at least three standard deviations from the mean for the 
respective condition. As individuals may often vary considerably in their 
biases on time-estimation tasks, it is necessary to remove such biases prior 
to group comparisons. Thus, for each participant the mean judgement 
errors in the two baseline conditions were subtracted from the mean 
judgement errors in the two respective experimental conditions. Therefore, 
the “Action binding” equates to the shift between the mean errors of the 
action baseline condition and the action agency condition, while the “Effect 
binding” results from the shift between the tone baseline condition and the 
tone agency condition. These respective shifts then provide the measure 
for the overall intentional binding for each participant.
For both tasks. Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) was used to determine 
the effect of controlling for depression and anxiety on the agency variables. 
Gender effects were also assessed using ANCOVA and post hoc analyses 
were justified, as these effects have previously been under-reported in 
sense of agency research. Kendall’s tau correlation analyses were 
employed to explore the relationships between the two tasks for all 
participants, and between the agency variable and clinical scores for the 
subclinical checking group.
Ethical considerations
This project received a favourable ethical opinion from the 
University of Surrey Ethics Committee (Reference: EC/2012/27/FAHS). If
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participants indicated distress or had met diagnostic criteria according to 
the MINI, they were to be provided with contact details of the Centre for 
Wellbeing at the University, if they were not already receiving such support. 
A plan was in place to discuss any participants that caused such concern 
with the research supervisor, although in practice this was not required. 
Further contact information relating to OCD was provided in the debriefing 
sheet.
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RESULTS
Demographic and clinical characteristics
The demographic and clinical data for both the subclinical checking 
and the non-checking groups are presented in Table 1. The groups did not 
differ with respect to age, gender or handedness. Compared with the non­
checking group, the subclinical checking group displayed a reduced 
performance on the MART which approached significance. However, this 
may partly be due to a higher (although non-significant) proportion of 
participants on the checking group for whom English was their second 
language. The mean OCI-R Checking score for the checking group was 7.3 
(SD = 1.80). This value was somewhat higher than the mean score for a 
student subclinical checking group (M = 5.7; SD = 1.70) previously 
described by Belayachi and Van der Linden (2010), although the remaining 
OCI-R scores were comparable to their study. Given the strict selection 
criteria, the non-checking participants’ checking score (M = 0.43; SD = 0.5) 
was below the levels previously reported for a typical non-anxious control 
sample across the OCI-R scales (c.f. Foa et al., 2002; M = 2.91; SD = 
2.56). Of note, the checking group scored significantly higher on the MADS 
anxiety and depression scales, as well as all other OCI-R subscales and 
the OCI-R total score. This is in keeping with the well documented 
association between anxiety, depression and OCD (Torres et al., 2006). 
The clinical characteristics were compared using nonparametric tests, as 
the variance of the two groups for all the clinical scores did not meet an 
equality of variance test, with the exception of the MADS Anxiety scores, 
and also because each subscale of the OCI-R is composed of only three 
items.
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Table 1. Demographic and Clinical Characteristic for the checking and non­
checking groups presented as mean values (standard deviations).
Demographic and clinical Non-checking Checking Test p valuedata (n = 23) (n = 22) Statistic
Age (mean, SD) 21.1 (3.8) 20.7(3.8) 0.45f 0.66
Percent female 78% (18 female) 82% (18 
female)
0.09” 0.77
MART Score 28.1 (6.2) 24.3 (6.7) 1.98^ 0.054
English as second language 22% (5/23) 32% (7/22) 0.58” 0.45
Proportion right-handed 21/23 20/22 - -
Clinical Characteristic (mean, SD)
OCI-R Checking 0.43 (0.5) 7.3 (1.8) < 0 .0 0 f <0.001
OCI-R Hoarding 0.96(1.1) 4.2 (2.6) 81.5= <0.001
OCI-R Ordering 0.7 (0.9) 5.7 (2.9) 20.0= <0.001
OCI-R Neutralising 0.3 (0.6) 3.0 (2.5) 79.5= <0.001
OCI-R Washing 0.3 (0.6) 2.6 (3.0) 111.5= <0.001
OCI-R Obsessing 0.7 (0.9) 3.9 (2.5) 61.5= <0.001
OCI-R Total 3.4 (2.8) 26.6 (9.9) <0.001 = <0.001
HADS Anxiety 3.4 (2.1) 7.3 (2.2) 6.00® <0.001
HADS Depression 1.4 (1.8) 3.9 (2.7) 91.0= <0.001
OCI-R, Obsessive Compulsive Inventory Revised; HADS, Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale.
^Independent samples t-test; '’Pearson Chi-square; ^Mann Whitney U test.
Judgement of Agency Task
Exclusion of participants and normaiity checks
Of the 22 checking participants, the data for two participants were 
excluded from analysis for this task, as the Total Mean Agency rating for 
the task was three standard deviations above the mean for the checking 
group for one participant, and another participant predominantly pressed 
only the left button during the experimental trials. A non-checking 
participant was also excluded from the analysis as they reported an 
incorrect button-tone relationship from the learning trials after the task, and 
had apparently mixed up the action-tone association, resulting in
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erroneous agency ratings (i.e. rating highly for incongruent tones). All 
remaining checking participants (n = 2 0 ) and non-checking participants (n = 
2 2 ) reported a correct relationship between the left and right buttons and 
the resulting tones from the learning phase, and used both the buttons 
approximately equally throughout the task. The exclusions did not produce 
notable effects on the demographic and clinical characteristics of the 
groups described in Table 1 (i.e. all reported p values were unaffected). 
The data for each of the judgement of agency variables met conditions for 
normality (Kurtosis values <1.96), except for the Congruent 0 ms delay 
condition, which was expected to be negatively skewed.
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Figure 3. .ludgement o f Agency task: Mean agency ratings for each o f the time delay 
and tone congruency conditions for the non-checking group (solid line) and checking 
group (dashed line). NonCheckCon = Non-checking group congruent tone; 
NonCheckInc = Non-checking group incongruent tone; CheckCon = Checking group 
congruent tone; Checkinc = Checking group incongruent tone.
Agency Judgements
A mixed 2 x 4 x 2  ANOVA with the within-participant factors tone 
congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and tone delay (0, 400, 800 vs. 
1 2 0 0  ms) was computed, for which the mean agency ratings are displayed 
in Figure 3. Huynh-Feldt corrections were applied to correct for sphericity
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violations. For post-hoc comparisons, paired sample and independent t- 
tests were conducted and Bonferroni corrections applied where necessary.
The ANOVA revealed a main effect of tone congruency, F(1, 40) = 
26.25, p < 0.001, and a main effect of tone delay F(3, 56.74) = 65.59, p < 
0.001. Post-hoc paired f-tests revealed that the participants’ ratings 
significantly decreased for each increase in tone delay (all f(41) >4.1, all p 
< 0 .001).
The interaction between congruency and delay was also significant, 
F(3, 105.84) = 3.83, p = 0.015. To explore this interaction in more detail, 
congruency effects (e.g. the difference in ratings between congruent and 
incongruent tones) were calculated for each of the different delay 
conditions. These congruency effects seem to decrease with increasing 
tone-delay (see Table 2). When comparing these congruency effects using 
post-hoc comparisons (paired f-tests), the only significant difference from 
this analysis was the comparison between the congruency effects for the 
400ms delay and the 1200 ms delay, f(42) = 2.88, p = 0.006; corrected 
Bonferroni p value = 0.008). Overall, the results show that the participants’ 
agency ratings were decreased for incongruent tones compared to 
congruent tones and decreased with increasing tone delay. In addition, the 
congruency effect reduced with increasing tone delay, which was only 
significant for the 400 ms to 1200 ms comparison. In short, participants 
were less likely to attribute agency to themselves as the mismatch between 
actual and expected outcomes increased.
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Table 2. Paired t-tests for post hoc analysis of the effect of congruency on agency 
ratings (all participants). Corrected significance level p = 0.0125 (Bonferroni 
correction).
Comparison of conditions (Paired t-test)
Mean
difference
(S.D.)
t p value
Congruent 0ms vs. Incongruent 0ms delay 26.82 (31.55) 5.51 P<0.001
Congruent 400ms vs. Incongruent 400ms delay 24.31 (30.39) 5.18 P<0.001
Congruent 800ms vs. Incongruent 800ms delay 21.07 (28.44) 4.80 P<0.001
Congruent 1200ms vs. Incongruent 1200ms 
delay 18.71 (29.79) 4.07
p<
0.001
The primary focus of this task was evidently to explore differences 
between the checking and non-checking groups with respect to their 
agency ratings. Crucially, the ANOVA revealed a main effect for group, 
F(1,40) = 5.64, p = 0.022, 77^  = 0.12, displaying a medium to large effect 
size. Thus, significantly higher agency ratings (Total Agency Ratings) were 
provided by the subclinical checking group (M = 49.51, SD = 8.23), 
compared with the non-checking group (M = 42.69, SD = 10.19). However, 
there were no significant interactions of Congruency x Group, F(1, 40) = 
0.04, p = 0.84, or Delay x Group, F(1.42, 56.74) = 0.52, p = 0.54.
Control of the Covariates Anxiety and Depression 
The effect of anxiety and depression as confounding variables was 
also explored. Analysis of Covariance with the covariate depression 
revealed that the HADS depression scores were not significantly related to 
Total Agency Ratings, F(1,39) = 0.07, p = 0.79, although controlling for 
depression led to the group difference only approaching significance levels.
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F(1,39) = 3.34, p = 0.07, with a medium effect size retained = 0.079). 
The Analysis of Covariance with the covariate anxiety showed that the 
HADS anxiety scores were also not significantly related to Total Agency 
Ratings, F(1,39) = 0.04, p = 0.84. When controlling for the covariate anxiety 
though, the main effect of group was not significant anymore, F(1,39) = 
2.53, p = 0.12. Again, the medium effect size was retained (pp = 0.061).
Gender effects
The gender ratios for the two groups (82% females in the checking 
group; 78% females in the non-checking group) were approximately equal 
for this experiment, and thus gender effects cannot explain the group 
differences reported. Nevertheless, it was considered worthwhile to explore 
any possible influence of gender on the agency ratings, although the large 
gender imbalance over the whole sample (8  men vs. 34 women) needs to 
be considered when interpreting the analysis. In order to assess gender 
effects, gender was included as a between-subjects factor in an additional 
mixed ANOVA. There were no interactions of Delay x Gender, F(1.52, 
57.74) = 1.90, p = 0.17, or Group x Gender, F(1, 38), 0.10, p = 0.75. 
However, significant interactions were present for both Congruency x 
Gender, F(1, 38) = 5.67, p = 0.02, and Congruency x Delay x Gender, 
F(2.83, 107.66) = 3.19, p = 0.03. The analysis also revealed a main effect 
of Gender F(1, 38) = 11.63, p = 0.002. To explore these gender effects 
further, independent post-hoc f-tests were performed with gender as the 
grouping variable (Table 4). After applying Bonferroni corrections (corrected 
p value = 0.006), significant differences were found in the incongruent 0 , 
400 and 1200 ms conditions, showing that the male participants’ agency 
ratings were lower than the females. None of the congruent conditions
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revealed any gender differences in ratings. This suggested that the male 
participants tended to rate lower than females for incongruent but not 
congruent tone conditions. None of the clinical characteristics differed by 
gender. As noted, caution must be applied to any interpretation of the 
above gender effects, given the gender imbalance and the low number of 
male participants.
Table 4. Judgement of Agency task; Independent f-tests exploring group differences by 
gender.
Condition
Mean Ratings for 
men (SD) 
n = 8
Mean ratings 
for women (SD) 
n = 34
t statistic p value
Congruent Odelay 82.76 (19.98) 84.72 (13.95) 0.33 0.74
Congruent 400delay 60.03 (24.79) 64.29 (17.82) 0.56 0.58
Congruent SOOdelay 46.29 (36.05) 44.73 (24.12) 0.15 0.88
Congruent 1200delay 45.99 (35.57) 34.08 (24.01) 1.15 0.26
Incongruent Odelay 27.19(30.30) 64.66 (28.95) 3.27 0.002*
Incongruent 400 delay 16.32(16.60) 44.54 (21.06) 3.53 0.001*
Incongruent BOOdelay 12.34 (7.18) 26.69 (16.24) 2.43 0.02
Incongruent 1200delay 5.40 (4.50) 20.52 (13.97) 5.26^ <0.001*^
‘Significant at the corrected significance level of p = 0.006 (Bonferroni correction)
^Equality of variance not assumed.
Intentional Binding Task
In accord with prior studies (e.g. Moore et al., 2010), intentional 
binding effects were observed. Both groups demonstrated a positive shift in 
time estimates for their action towards the resultant tone (Action Binding) 
and a negative shift in estimates for the tone towards the prior action (Tone
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or Effect Binding). The Action Binding and Tone Binding shifts are 
represented in Figure 4 by the shifts in the blue and red boxes respectively. 
The non-checking group displayed a Total Intentional Binding (Total IB) of 
100 ms (S.D. = 56.68) which compared closely with a Total IB of 93 ms 
(S.D. = 83) for a community control group reported in a study by Moore et 
al. (2010). The Total IB for the checking group was 141 ms (S.D. = 77.10).
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Figure 4. The intentional binding effect for the Non-Checking group (n = 23) and 
Checking group (n = 22) (figure based on Moore et al., 2010). The block arrows represent 
the mean binding shifts (milliseconds) w ith respect to the relevant baselines (dashed 
lines), and are represented approximately to scale. Standard deviations are in brackets.
Group comparisons of the intentional binding effects were 
performed. Independent f-tests revealed that the Total Intentional Binding 
(Total IB) was significantly greater for the checking group (n = 22) 
compared to the non-checking group (n = 23), f(43) = 2.02, p = 0.049, with 
a medium effect size (Cohen’s d = 0.61) (see Figure 5). In addition, the 
enhanced Action Binding shift in the checking group {M = 54.25; SD = 
40.59) compared to the non-checking group {M = 32.84; SD = 33.44) 
approached significance, f(43) = 1.94, p = 0.06, whereas the numerically 
increased Tone Binding shift for the checking group {M = -86.86; SD =
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71.76) compared with the non-checking group (M = -67.63; SD = 66.80) 
was not significant, f(43) = 0.93, p = 0.36, (Cohen’s d = 0.22). This 
suggests that the group difference in the overall binding effect was 
predominantly due to the enhanced action binding shift in the checking 
group.
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Figure 5. Total Intentional Binding for the subclinical checking and non-checking groups
Control of the Covariates Anxiety and Depression 
To explore the effects of anxiety and depression. Analysis of 
Covariance was performed on the Total IB scores. The ANCOVA with the 
covariate anxiety revealed that the HADS anxiety scores were not related 
to Total IB, F(1,42) = 0.28, p = 0.60. However, the Total IB difference 
between groups no longer reached significance, and only showed a 
borderline significant effect, F(1, 43) = 3.36, p = 0.07). However, 
depression scores had a stronger influence on binding as shown by the 
ANCOVA with the covariate depression. The HADS depression scores 
were significantly related to Total IB, Ff1,42) = 4.32, p = 0.04, and 
controlling for the covariate depression resulted in a non-significant group 
difference in Total IB scores, F(1, 42) = 0.67, p = 0.42). To explore this 
effect further, a median split was conducted for HADS depression score 
(Median = 2.0), to form a ‘high depression’ group (Depression > 2, n = 15,
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M = 5.67, SD = 2.13) and a ‘low depression’ group (n = 30, M = 1.03, SD = 
0.85). Comparing these two groups using an independent t-test revealed 
that the Total IB for the ‘low depression’ group {M = 102.64, SD = 66.39) 
was significantly lower than the ‘high depression’ group {M = 155.82, SD = 
64.38), f(43) = 2.56, p = 0.014), when including all participants.
Gender effects on binding
As for the Judgement of Agency task, gender effects were again 
assessed with regards to intentional binding. When gender was included as 
a factor along with checking group type in a two-way Analysis of Variance, 
the main effect for group type on Total Intentional Binding was not 
significant, F(1, 41) = 1.14, p = 0.29. There was a significant main effect of 
gender, F(1, 41) = 5.95, p = 0.019, although there was no interaction 
between group and gender, F(1, 41) = 0.81, p = 0.38. To explore the 
gender effects further, independent f-tests were performed with gender as 
the grouping variable. Male participants {n = 9) demonstrated reduced Total 
Binding, f(43) = 2.38, p = 0.022, and reduced Tone Binding, f(43) = 2.52, p 
= 0.016, compared with female participants {n = 36). However, the Action 
Binding scores did not differ between gender groups, f(43) = 0.16, p = 0.87. 
However, the above gender effects must again be treated with much 
caution, given the high imbalance of the male/female ratio in the gender 
factor.
Correlation analyses
The relationship between the Agency Ratings in the JoA task, the 
Total IB, and Clinical Characteristics was assessed using correlation 
analyses. Given the small data set, Kendall’s tau correlations were used to
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assess relationships between the task variables, the OCI-R subscales and 
the HADS anxiety and depression scores for the checking participants.
The Mean Agency Ratings from the JoA task, including the ratings 
from the individual conditions and also the Total Mean Agency Ratings, 
were not correlated with any of the OCI-R subscales or the total OCI-R 
score for the checking participants. However, some measures of the IB task 
were significantly correlated with the OCI-R scores. More specifically, the 
OCI-R Washing scale was positively correlated with the size of the Total IB 
shift, r(20) = 0.39, p = 0.018, and with the size of the Action shift, r(20) = 
0.41, p = 0.011. Total IB was also positively correlated with the HADS 
depression scores, r(20) = 0.32, p = 0.047.
Importantly, the correlation analysis across tasks, i.e. comparing the 
Mean Total Agency Ratings of the Judgement of Agency task and the Total 
IB of the Intentional Binding task for all participants who were included in 
both tasks (checking group: n=20; non-checking group: n=22) revealed that 
these measures were significantly positively correlated, r(44) = 0.32, p = 
0.003, indicating that the explicit and implicit measures of the sense of 
agency in the respective tasks are positively related.
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DISCUSSION
An understanding of the reported abnormalities in how people with 
OCD experience control over their actions and related outcomes could help 
greatly towards an improved understanding of maintenance mechanisms 
and the motivational aspects involved in certain compulsive behaviours. 
However, the limited prior research in this area has yielded seemingly 
inconsistent findings. This study attempted to help clarify the nature of 
underlying disturbances in how people with OC tendencies experience a 
sense of agency, compared with those without such tendencies. In order to 
achieve this, and in view of the multifactorial nature of the SoA, two 
experiments were utilised which enabled both explicit and implicit measures 
of the SoA to be obtained respectively. This approach sought to determine 
whether agency processing for subclinical checking participants was 
altered in relation to one or both of these types of measurements compared 
with a non-checking group, and whether the two types of agency 
experiences were related. The results of these tasks are discussed below, 
with due consideration of how the outcomes of the study relate to existing 
theory and research in the SoA and OCD, as well as possible implications 
for future clinical practice.
Judgement of Agency
The Judgement of Agency task obtained self-reported agency 
ratings from participants for experimental trials where the observed effect 
(tone) which followed their action (button press) was varied with regards to 
how much it matched expected outcomes based on prior learning trials. 
Participants were falsely led to believe that the tone could be produced by 
themselves or the computer instead (their button press always produced
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the tone), and they had to judge whether or not they had caused the tone. 
In line with an initial hypothesis, the general trend in agency judgements 
which was reported in a similar experiment by Sato and Yasudo (2005) has 
been successfully replicated. As such, the participants’ self-agency ratings 
altered according to the degree with which the predicted effect matched the 
actual outcome following their actions, in terms of both tone congruency 
and time delay. Thus, a greater mismatch between expected and actual 
outcomes was associated with reduced SoA for both groups.
Crucially, it was found that, overall, the subclinical checking 
participants rated their actions as more likely to have caused the tone, 
therefore displaying a greater “judgement of agency” than the non-checking 
participants with all conditions taken together. This finding was in accord 
with the trend reported by Gentsch et al. (2012), in which OCD patients 
recorded numerically higher agency ratings, compared to controls, in a JoA 
task which used visual rather than auditory effect stimuli. Contrary to further 
predictions, the ratings between groups in the current task did not 
significantly differ with regards to tone congruency or delay. Nevertheless, 
the finding that people with compulsive checking tendencies experienced 
greater self-agency than non-checking participants could have major 
implications for our understanding of the motivational aspects of 
compulsive behaviour. Therefore, it is important to consider the possible 
basis for this group difference in an effort to rationalise which agency cues 
may contribute to comparatively greater SoA in people with checking 
tendencies, and this is attempted in the following passages.
Speculations can be made regarding the group difference in agency 
ratings in view of previously described features of OCD and current
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conceptualisations of the SoA. As discussed earlier, recent theories 
consider that judgements of agency may be determined by a variety of 
cues. In the JoA task, it is assumed that sensorimotor cues would play a 
role in determining the degree of self-agency attribution, as determined by 
the low-level cognitive processes involved in the comparison between 
actual and predicted sensory effects following an action. It is possible that 
people with checking tendencies may have a dysfunction regarding the 
mechanisms dependent upon this comparator process, and that this may 
have contributed towards a greater tendency to self-attribute. However, it 
has been suggested by Synofzik et al. (2009) that the output of the 
comparator most likely plays its greatest role in agency judgements within 
unambiguous circumstances where outcomes are well matched with 
prediction. The 0 ms delay conditions in this task would be prime examples 
of such a situation, and the agency ratings for these conditions were 
virtually equivalent between groups. Thus, it is unclear if sensorimotor 
predictive models can reliably account for the observed group difference, 
as we might then have expected a larger group discrepancy in such 
conditions.
Aside from the sensorimotor systems relating to the comparator, 
other sensory-based mechanisms could also have contributed to the 
reported group difference, such as sensory-affective processes. Feelings of 
incompleteness have frequently been associated with OCD, and have been 
conceptualised as being derived from a sensory-affective dysfunction 
(Summerfeldt, 2004). Such feelings of incompleteness have been related to 
obsessive compulsive features in a student sample (Coles, Heimberg, Frost 
and Steketee, 2005). Thus, it could be speculated that, in the current study, 
possible increased levels of sensory-based feelings of incompleteness for
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the subclinical checking participants could have contributed towards a drive 
to strengthen the mental association between actions and sensory 
outcomes during the task. Thus, perhaps it is the enhanced SoA that is 
derived through performing an action that modifies feelings of 
incompleteness in people with checking compulsions. This possibility is 
supported by the Gentsch et al. (2012) study, in which the task-based 
agency judgements for the OCD group were positively correlated with a 
measure of feelings of incompleteness. Of note, the agency measures were 
not related to harm avoidance. Therefore, there is some suggestion from 
such findings that higher agency judgements may be related to some OCD 
subgroups more so than others (i.e. less so for those with whom harm 
avoidance factors predominate). However, it must be borne in mind that the 
correlations in the Gentsch et al. (2012) study were based on a small 
sample of OCD participants (n = 16). Thus, such interpretations must be 
treated with caution. Furthermore, such correlations do not allow inference 
of causal direction, although it is much more difficult to rationalise a reverse 
process, in which a greater SoA would lead somehow to increased feeling 
of completeness. Nevertheless, further research exploring the relationship 
between feelings of incompleteness and agency judgements, particularly 
with regards to OC related situations, are required.
In addition to the sensory-based cues discussed above, it is 
important to note that agency judgements are also likely to be influenced by 
higher level cognitive processes, such as personal or moral beliefs, 
contextual factors and prior intentions (Synofzik, Vosgerau and Lindner, 
2009). Such cues could also relate to the apparent difference in agency 
ratings. As to the nature of such cues, and how they may differ between 
checking and non-checking participants, we can only speculate in light of
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what we understand from prior literature. For instance, it has been reported 
that thoughts and beliefs regarding perfectionism and intolerance of 
uncertainty are particularly prevalent for people with OCD who have 
checking compulsions, compared with people with OCD without such 
symptoms and non-OCD controls (Tolin et al., 2003). The current task 
presented participants with the possibility that the computer could have 
caused the tone instead of themselves, and this dilemma alone could 
potentially have tapped into cognitions relating to intolerance of uncertainty 
within the subclinical checking participants. We may speculate that a 
potentially greater intolerance of uncertainty during task performance may 
have prompted such individuals to assume a greater sense of control over 
their actions and observed effects, compared to the non-checking group. 
This could be seen as an attempt to restore a degree of certainty, and thus 
counter the uncomfortable feelings associated with uncertainty. This 
possibility is supported by a study described by Moulding and Kyrios
(2007), which found that higher levels of perfectionism/intolerance of 
uncertainty were associated with a greater desire for control over events. In 
contrast to the current study, however, the authors have also described 
lower levels of self-reported sense of control in OCD participants, 
compared with controls, based on a hypothetical scenario (Moulding et al., 
2008). This discrepancy would appear to highlight the importance of using 
real action-effect situations to obtain measures regarding the SoA, and it is 
proposed that the ‘sense of control’ measures used by Moulding et al.
(2008) most likely describe the participants’ general beliefs about the ability 
to control events, rather than their experience of control during action. 
Thus, individuals with OCD may well have general beliefs about having a 
lack of control. However, a high desire for control, associated with an 
intolerance of uncertainty, may contribute towards a compensatory
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mechanism which enhances a sense that they are in control of external 
events through their actions while they engage in the action itself -  i.e. an 
enhanced judgement of agency. The experience of strengthened SoA as 
such actions are performed may provide positive and reinforcing affect, 
which could motivate further continued action in a process which 
temporarily quells anxiety relating to perceived threat.
As noted, these are only tentative proposals, and clearly future 
studies on the SoA in relation to OCD will need to consider the inclusion of 
questionnaires which measure relevant beliefs domains and feelings of 
incompleteness, which could help to investigate such links further. 
Nevertheless, the above findings do also correspond with those reported by 
Reuven-Magril, et al. (2008) in their “illusion of control” task. They 
described increased ratings for OCD participants, compared with controls, 
in their ability to control the outcomes of a pre-programmed effect which 
followed their action. The authors also proposed a compensatory 
mechanism by which people with OCD engage in compulsive behaviours, 
during which a sense of control derived from performing an action serves to 
counter underlying cognitions regarding an anxiety-provoking perceived 
lack of control. It is more difficult, however, to reconcile the findings of the 
current JoA task with the findings reported by Belayachi and Van der 
Linden (2010), in which subclinical checking participants gave significantly 
lower agency ratings than non-checking individuals in trials for which 
participants were primed for expected outcomes. The authors interpreted 
their findings as suggestive of a reduced “feeling of agency” in the 
subclinical checking participants, despite the fact that the agency ratings 
were derived from explicit judgements of their action causing an effect. The 
discrepancy may well be due to the different tasks measuring somewhat
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different constructs. The divergence in results could be due to confounding 
variables in the Belayachi and Van der Linden (2010) experiment. In 
particular, it is possible that the subclinical checking participants were less 
susceptible to the subliminal priming than the non-checking individuals, 
perhaps due to attentional factors as noted earlier. Further research on 
subliminal priming effects in OCD would be required to investigate this 
possibility. In the current task, however, a check was performed 
subsequent to the experiment, to ensure that participants had correctly 
identified the relationship between action and outcome in the learning trials, 
and they were excluded if they had not achieved this.
Clearly, it was important to assess possible confounding factors in 
the current study. Although neither the anxiety nor depression scores were 
associated with the Total Agency Ratings, it must be noted that controlling 
for such variables led to a non-significant trend for greater agency ratings in 
the subclinical checking group. A medium effect size for the group 
difference was retained, though, and it is possible that a larger sample size 
would have provided adequate power by which significant group 
differences could have remained even when controlling for such variables. 
Nevertheless, it would clearly be beneficial for further research to include 
additional control groups with non-checking individuals who have 
comparable anxiety and depression levels as those with checking 
tendencies, as the groups differed in this respect in the current study. The 
study thus further demonstrates the association between OC symptoms 
and levels of anxiety and depression, even in non-clinical individuals. This 
also highlights the challenges in disseminating the relative contributions of 
factors which are specific to OCD, factors which relate more so to co-
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morbid conditions (particularly depression and other anxiety disorders), and 
those which are important for both.
That the agency ratings did not correlate with the OCI-R Checking 
subscale of the subclinical checking participants is perhaps not surprising, 
given the nature of the checking scores which characterised the checking 
group. As the inclusion criteria required that the participants for this group 
scored 5 or greater on the OCI-R Checking subscale, and only three 
participants had scores greater than 9 (maximum score = 12) given the 
subclinical nature of the group, a narrow band of checking scores resulted 
with variability limited as a result. Those with very high checking scores 
may have been ruled out from the study due to high scores on the HADS 
measures. Together with the low sample sizes, such reasons could explain 
why correlations between checking scores and agency ratings were not 
detected. It must be acknowledged, though, that the presence of checking 
symptoms may not actually have been a decisive factor regarding the 
group difference in total agency ratings, given that the groups also differed 
regarding each of the other OCD symptoms measured in the OCI-R. Thus, 
an apparent increased tendency to experience a sense of self-agency may 
not relate only to those with checking symptoms.
Finally, gender effects were found in the JoA task, in which men 
provided lower ratings than women, and this also warrants further 
exploration as gender differences remain an under-investigated area within 
SoA research. Interestingly, the illusion of agency task previously reported 
by both Belayachi and Van der Linden (2010) and Aart, Custer and Wegner 
(2005) also found a gender effect, in which women, but not men, showed 
significant increases in agency ratings due to a priming effect. However,
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given the low numbers of male participants in the current study, it could be 
merely coincidental that some of these men happened to have 
comparatively low self-agency, providing a sample which is not necessarily 
representative of men in general.
To summarise, the results from the JoA task suggest that people 
with subclinical checking tendencies experience a greater explicit SoA, at 
least in certain circumstances, than non-checking individuals. This finding is 
in accord with the reports of Gentsch et al. (2012) and Reuven-Magril et al.
(2008), but counters the suggestions of reduced agency in OCD as 
considered by Belayachi and Van der Linden (2010). Prior beliefs and 
cognitive style, such as an intolerance of uncertainty and perfectionism, as 
well as sensory-related feelings of incompleteness, may motivate a search 
for conscious control which is achieved in action, and which corresponds to 
a greater or preserved SoA. It remains possible that an abnormality in the 
processing of sensorimotor signals could also have accounted for the group 
difference, although this was not supported by the results. It could be that 
people with checking tendencies may not have a ‘deficit’ in this respect, as 
Gentsch et al. (2012) propose, but instead rely less on sensorimotor 
‘feelings of agency’ and more on belief-related cues than others. The 
findings are particularly interesting, given that the greater agency ratings 
were related only to benign effects (i.e. a tone), suggesting that 
comparatively increased SoA is an underlying vulnerability in people with 
OC symptoms. One might postulate that a judgement of agency task which 
incorporates visual or auditory stimuli that is associated with OCD-relevant 
fears could lead to an even more apparent difference in agency ratings 
between checking and non-checking participants than the current task, as 
beliefs relating to threat are triggered more strongly. The current
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experiment was only part of a preliminary study, though, and it is 
recommended that a future project exploring agency judgements in OCD or 
compulsive checking does include OCD-relevant stimuli. This would help to 
further explore the relationship between agency judgements, beliefs and 
OCD.
Intentional Binding
In an effort to determine whether the SoA is also altered at the 
implicit level for people with checking tendencies, an intentional binding 
experiment was performed. As noted earlier, intentional binding is a well 
reported phenomenon in which a temporal compression between voluntary 
actions and perceived effects is experienced, in a process believed to 
provide an implicit measure relating to SoA. In accordance with 
expectations, both groups displayed action and effect binding, and thus 
overall intentional binding. The direction of our hypothesised group 
difference for this task related to a previous intentional binding study, in 
which a greater IB effect was implicated with increased dopaminergic 
activity (Moore et al., 2010). As people with OCD have previously been 
shown to display cortical dopamine hyperactivity, it was postulated that 
individuals with subclinical checking tendencies would thus display larger IB 
than non-checking participants, and indeed this was found to be the case. 
This again suggests a greater SoA for individuals with checking tendencies, 
as with the Judgement of Agency task. Although the extent of the group 
difference varied between action binding and tone binding, the focus of the 
study is on the total linkage between action and effect, and hence the 
overall intentional binding effect (Total IB).
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Importantly, the Total IB values were positively associated with the 
Total Agency Ratings from the JoA task. This indicates a particular 
relationship between the temporal compression experienced during a 
voluntary action-effect process and explicit judgements made about an 
action-effect relationship, supporting the outcome of a prior study which 
also measured IB and explicit agency ratings (Ebert and Wegner, 2010). 
Interestingly, this relationship seemed stronger in contexts where the 
effects did not match expectations in the judgement of agency task, with a 
positive association present between Total IB and the Incongruent 800 ms 
and 1200 ms delays, but which was not detected in other conditions. 
However, caution must be applied when considering weak correlations in 
such small sample sizes.
To interpret the group difference in intentional binding, it would 
again be useful to consider the prior intentional binding studies noted 
earlier, keeping in mind that IB is believed to derive from both sensiromotor 
comparator effects, as well as higher-level, top down processes. Regarding 
belief-driven effects on IB, Desantis, Roussel and Waszak (2011) reported 
an experiment demonstrating that participants who were led to believe that 
they will cause the tone following their button press resulted in a stronger IB 
effect, compared with conditions in which they were told they had not 
caused the tone within an otherwise identical situation. This was despite 
the fact that they had always caused the tone via their button press, 
demonstrating the importance of prior beliefs about causality in relation to 
the intentional binding effect. Furthermore, a study by Moretto, Walsh and 
Haggard (2011) explored the influence of moral responsibility on intentional 
binding, using visual rather than auditory effects which included pictures 
that depicted either moral outcomes (e.g. one or more person’s death) or
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economic outcomes (e.g. the loss of one or more factory items). Intentional 
binding was found to be stronger for moral effects, and also more 
enhanced in relation to more severe effects (e.g. the deaths of several 
people as opposed to one person). Thus, a greater sense of causality and 
moral responsibility appear to be powerful mediators of intentional binding. 
Given that inflated responsibility has been consistently implicated in OCD, 
and in compulsive checking in particular (Rachman, 2002), we could 
postulate that this belief domain could have contributed towards the greater 
IB effect for the subclinical checking participants observed in the current 
study. It is possible that individuals with a higher sense of responsibility 
have a greater desire to control the outcomes of their actions, as supported 
by Moulding et al. (2008). This in turn may lead such people to 
automatically and implicitly strengthen an association between their actions 
and effects. A compulsive act may therefore provide people with OCD with 
an enhanced, implicit sense of control over an event, akin to the 
mechanism suggested with regards to explicit agency judgements. 
However, these are currently very tentative suggestions, and further 
research measuring intentional binding in OCD would ideally include 
measures regarding beliefs on personal responsibility. Nevertheless, it is an 
intriguing notion to consider that an inflated sense of responsibility could 
contribute to an enhanced sense of agency during an action performed by 
an individual with checking tendencies. This process may well afford such 
people the sense of power sought in relation to their responsibility beliefs, 
and would further provide a phenomenological dimension to an 
understanding of how compulsive checking is maintained.
As well as top down process, where IB is driven by higher level 
process, prior research has also demonstrated the importance of the
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predictive, sensorimotor comparator mechanisms towards the IB effect 
(Tsakiris and Haggard, 2003). Thus, it remains possible that the greater IB 
for the subclinical checking group, and hence greater implicit SoA, resulted 
from such low-level processes. However, the current lack of prior research 
relating these specific processes to OCD limits the extent to which 
meaningful speculations can be made at this point. To date, only one other 
study has included an indirect or implicit measure of the SoA in relation to 
OCD, which is that reported by Gentsch et al. (2012). During their agency 
task, they measured the suppression of the N1 component of the ERP, 
which is typically observed during the experience of self-generated rather 
than passively observed stimuli, and is believed to relate to sensorimotor 
aspects of the sense of agency. This N1 suppression for self-generated 
visual feedback was observed in control participants, but significantly less 
so in people with OCD during a judgement of agency task. The authors 
interpreted this as evidence of “a deviance in building internal forward 
models of the motor control system” (Gentsch et al., 2012, p.657), in people 
with OCD. However, the N1 suppression measurements were not 
correlated with the explicit agency ratings obtained from the same tasks, 
which are assumed to depend much on the same predictive mechanisms. 
This contrasts with the current study, where total IB and the total mean 
agency judgements from separate tasks were positively related. Thus, it is 
unclear whether the lack of N1 suppression in people with OCD is in fact 
directly related to abnormal experiences of agency. Furthermore, the N1 
measures were not correlated with measures of Feelings of 
Incompleteness, or any other clinical characteristics assessed by the 
authors, unlike the agency judgements derived from the task. Clearly, the 
nature of the relationship between low-level and higher-level cognitive
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aspects of the SoA in general requires further exploration, as well as in 
relation to OCD specifically.
To summarise, the intentional binding experiment in this study has 
indicated an increased level of implicit sense of agency in people with 
compulsive checking tendencies, compared with a group of non-checking 
individuals. Although it remains unclear as to the relative contribution of 
difference cues towards this group difference, it is easier to make a case for 
a possible influence of higher-level cues such as responsibility beliefs, 
based on prior research. Nevertheless, deviance in the use of sensorimotor 
cues remains a possible factor. Furthermore, it must be considered that 
other factors could have contributed to the observed group difference in IB, 
as discussed below.
With regards to moderating effects on IB in this task, the positive 
correlation between overall IB and the HADS depression scores was rather 
surprising, together with the moderating effect that controlling for 
depression had on the group difference. This could indicate that increased 
levels of depression were associated with a greater sense of agency. 
However, depression has typically been related to a reduced sense of 
control over the outcomes of one's actions (Peterson and Seligman, 1984). 
In particular, intentional binding has itself been shown to be reduced in 
healthy individuals after they were asked to write about a depressing 
episode from their lives just before the IB task, compared with control 
conditions where participants either wrote about the previous day or wrote 
nothing at all (Obhi et al., 2012). This seemed to imply that activating 
depressed memories can negatively influence the SoA. Although traits 
measures of depression were obtained, and found not to relate to IB, the
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study by Obhi et al. (2012) would have benefitted from a measure of state 
depression immediately before or after the IB task. This would have 
allowed the possible demonstration of a more apparent manipulation of 
mood within the study, as it remains unclear if other factors could have 
resulted in the reduced IB for the depressed memory condition (e.g. 
increased cognitive load in the depressed memory condition). In any case, 
it is again apparent that future studies relating to the SoA in obsessive 
compulsive individuals would ideally include a depression control group for 
further comparisons, and in order to validate the current findings. Clearly, 
given the high co-morbidity of depression and OCD, it will be important to 
delineate the relative effects of the two conditions on intentional binding in 
future research. As regards the moderating effects of anxiety, the HADS 
anxiety scores were not related to Total IB, but controlling for this variable 
still resulted in a group difference which only approached significance. 
Again, further research exploring the relationship between anxiety and 
intentional binding, as separate from factors relating to OC, is well justified.
Akin to the JoA task, the Total IB scores were not correlated with 
checking symptoms in the subclinical checking group. The Total IB did 
display a weak positive relationship with the Washing scores, though. 
However, only five out of twenty two individuals scored above 5 on the 
Washing subscale, while as many as twelve people scored only 1 or 0. 
Therefore, any interpretations of this relationship should be made with 
caution, as such a finding could well be due to high IB scores for only a 
particular few participants, and therefore not generalisable.
Much like the JoA task, the gender effect on binding is difficult to 
rationalise. The influences of gender are not well reported in the intentional
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binding literature, although the intentional binding experiment reported by 
Ebert and Wegner (2010) did not detect any gender effects. The finding in 
the current study could, again, be due to the undue influence of a limited 
number of male participants within the small sample size.
In summary, this was the first study to explore intentional binding in 
relation to OC tendencies. The findings supported the hypothesis that a 
subclinical checking group would display greater binding than non-checking 
participants, suggesting that such people experience a stronger association 
between their actions and observed outcomes. However, these results 
were modified by depression scores, somewhat surprisingly, and therefore 
the conclusions must be treated with caution until further research can 
establish group differences that are independent of ratings on mood. If we 
assume that greater intentional binding in checking individuals is not 
dependent upon levels of depression, we may postulate that beliefs relating 
to inflated responsibility could explain this elevation in implicit sense of 
agency for such people, based on prior research. Low-level processes may 
also contribute to these findings, although future research is needed to 
explore this in more detail.
Limitations of the study
There are several limitations to the current study which have not yet 
been mentioned, but ought to be acknowledged. Firstly, the experiment 
was not carried out ‘blind’, as the experimenter was always aware of which 
group a particular participant belonged, leaving the outcomes open to the 
possible influence of experimenter bias. An effort was made, however, to 
highly standardise the protocol, including answers to common questions
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from the participants. Furthermore, there is often an inherent problem with 
reduced ecological validity in such studies, which take place in what has 
been referred to as the “experimental quarantine”, where individuals act 
outside the typical social context (Richardson, Hoover and Ghane, 2008). 
This could have particular implications for agency research, in which the 
presence or absence of an “other” is of importance with regards to how and 
when self-agency is experienced. Thus, an assumption is made throughout 
that the experimental findings are likely correspond to “everyday living”, 
which may not be the case. Additionally, it should be noted that alternative 
explanations for the above results, relating to potentiai confounding factors, 
remain a possibility. For instance, self presentation tendencies or social 
desirability could have potentially exerted a stronger influence on agency 
judgement, especially in ambiguous conditions, for the subclinical checking 
participants.
Having used a sample of students with subclinical checking 
tendencies in this study, there remains a possibility that people with a 
diagnosis of OCD, perhaps with higher scores on various other GO 
symptom dimensions, could well respond to the above sense of agency 
tasks somewhat differently. However, there are some benefits of using 
subclinical populations, as this allows for greater control over selection 
criteria, due to more availability of participants, and the relevance of their 
use in OCD research is well documented. Furthermore, the impact of 
certain potential confounding factors such as medication can be eliminated. 
Nevertheless, extension of the above findings to clinical samples will be 
important for future studies.
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Given that the groups were smaller than the a priori sample size 
calculations recommended, both experiments were undermined by limited 
statistical power, which could have resulted in a Type II error in the 
analyses. However, with particular regard to the JoA task, it is possible that 
the experimental design itself, and the various conditions within it, may not 
have been sensitive to the different determinants of self-agency 
judgements, given that there were no group interactions present. On the 
whole, though, the task was sufficiently sensitive to reveal the overall 
increased SoA experienced by the subclinical checking participants.
Clearly, further research is required with larger sample sizes, and
potentially more OCD-relevant stimuli as discussed below, in order to
develop these preliminary findings.. Furthermore, the inclusion of
questionnaires regarding cognitive distortions implicated in OCD, for 
example the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire-44 (OBQ-44, OCCWG, 
2005), may well have enhanced the current study. However, it is important 
to consider that this was a preliminary investigation, in which the priority 
was to obtain and compare separate tasks which measured explicit and 
implicit aspects of agency respectively, and to clarify whether people with 
subclinical OC tendencies have a greater or lesser SoA regarding their 
actions, following disparate reports in the literature, and this was achieved.
Future research
Given that this is a new field of research, there is much that remains 
to be studied which could build upon the findings reported herein, and 
many such possibilities have already been suggested. Briefly, it is advised 
that future studies focus on either one of the experimental paradigms 
reported in the current study, as both have demonstrated proof of principle
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with regards to differences in the sense of agency in compulsive checking, 
albeit to a limited degree. A more focussed project would allow the 
inclusion of further questionnaire measures and a more sophisticated 
experiment without resulting in an experience which was unreasonably 
lengthy for the research participant. In particular, it is advised that visual as 
opposed to auditory stimuli are subsequently explored, which would 
facilitate the inclusion of scenarios and action-outcomes that are relevant to 
checking compulsions. For instance, pressing a left or right button could 
‘lock’ a hypothetical door (door appears closed) or unlock the door (door 
appears open) in a possible judgement of agency task. For an intentional 
binding experiment, a similar manipulation of responsibility could be 
performed to that described by Moretto, Walsh and Haggard (2011), but 
building the task around a checking scenario. It would be useful to include 
questionnaire measures, such as the OBQ-44, to assess the relationship of 
specific beliefs or cognitive distortions with the task variables. Additional 
sense of agency research relating to other OC symptoms, as well as 
depression and other anxiety disorders, would also prove highly useful, with 
further attempts to understand how agency is experienced in those with a 
range of symptoms. This is important given that such symptom diversity is 
frequently what people with OCD tend to experience. Furthermore, studies 
could include further neuropsychological measures in relation to the 
possible experiments described. This may enhance our understanding of 
the neurobiological aspects relevant to the sense of agency in the context 
of OCD.
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Implications for clinical practice
Checking compulsions are one of the most common symptoms 
amongst people with OCD (Stein et al., 1997). Consideration of the role of 
a greater SoA for people with checking tendencies could potentially have 
important implications on clinical practice. Firstly, inclusion of the SoA into 
future clinical models could potentially provide clinicians with further insight 
into the mechanisms by which current cognitive behavioural approaches 
work. For example, the modification of relevant cognitive distortions may 
well have an effect of reducing the sense of agency enhancement derived 
in action, thereby lessening the motivation to perform such actions. It has 
been proposed by Obhi et al. (2012) that changes in an individual’s sense 
of agency could be monitored during the course of therapy as a type of 
outcome measure using the intentional binding tasks (although this 
suggestion was made in relation to depression). Clearly, a robust task 
would need to be developed and normative data would have to be obtained 
in order to gain the most use from such an outcome measure. The generic 
intentional binding task in the current study would not be suitable, as it 
seems there would be too much variability in the results. However, the 
intentional binding task could be adapted to provide a measure tailored to 
different OCD symptoms using appropriate visual stimuli. This could 
potentially be developed to track changes during therapy in the degree to 
which such individuals rely on the compensatory mechanism proposed 
above, regarding increased SoA as a response certain cognitive 
vulnerabilities.
Judgement of agency tasks could also be developed as part of 
novel interventions themselves. Such an approach would seek to
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demonstrate an individual’s tendency for them to over-attribute outcomes to 
their own actions, compared with pre-determined norms. This could 
possibly be achieved using ‘illusion of control’ tasks of the kind previously 
described, but again incorporating OCD relevant stimuli. Psychoeduction 
and review of the results following on from the tasks could provide powerful 
feedback to clients regarding the formation of their enhanced sense of 
control derived through action, with potential links to their particular 
checking behaviours. Depending on whether future research is able to 
establish links between various belief processes and agency, an
individualised approach could potentially be formed, whereby recognised 
cognitive styles in the individual could determine which factors to 
manipulate in the task (e.g. responsibility or uncertainty regarding the 
outcome of task actions). An important aspect is that the consideration of 
the sense of agency in interventions could provide individuals with OCD 
with a phenomenological link between their cognitive distortions and the 
actions that they perform, viewing them as a way of restoring certainty and 
feelings of control and appeasing their sense of responsibility. All of this 
could be achieved as an adjunct to current cognitive behavioural
interventions.
Summary and conclusions
The experience of oneself as an agent in the world, with a sense of 
control over one’s own actions and through them an influence over external 
events, is a fundamental aspect of human experience. Disturbance in this
sense of agency may therefore have profound implications on the
experience of one’s actions in everyday life, and recent research has 
implicated aberrant sense of agency as a possible feature of OCD. This
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study was the first to explore both explicit judgements of agency and an 
implicit measure relating to agency, specifically with regard to people with 
checking tendencies. As noted, a judgement of agency is considered to be 
determined via the integration of various external and internal cues, 
including sensorimotor-based predictive comparisons, prior beliefs and 
contextual factors. Subclinical checking participants gave greater self­
agency ratings than non-checking individuals in a JoA task. Furthermore, 
intentional binding was also shown to be greater for people with subclinical 
checking tendencies, suggesting that implicit self-agency is also greater for 
such individuals.
Speculative suggestions were made in an attempt to rationalise 
these findings. One possibility is that underlying beliefs and/or cognitive 
distortions, frequently reported in people with OC symptoms, may have 
influenced the outcome of both agency judgements and intentional binding. 
For instance, cognitions relating to intolerance of uncertainty, perfectionism 
and/or feelings of incompleteness could potentially motivate an individual to 
attribute outcomes to their actions more greatly than others in agent- 
ambiguous situations, and thus assume greater explicit sense of agency. 
Similarly, beliefs regarding personal responsibility could also alter the 
unconscious experience of agency to a greater extent for those in whom 
such beliefs a most strong, resulting in a greater temporal binding of 
actions and effects. Alternatively, group differences may have resulted from 
a disparity between participants in how they processed sensorimotor 
information in a comparator process. Of course, it is also possible that 
differences in both high-level and low-level cognitive processes contributed 
to the findings, and further research is required in order to delineate the 
relative contributions of these factors. Both agency measures were
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moderated to varying degrees by anxiety and depression scores, which 
were also greater in the subclinical checking group. Thus, it cannot yet be 
concluded that these additional factors did not independently contribute 
towards group differences, especially in the case of depression and 
intentional binding. Nevertheless, the outcome of this study is suggestive of 
a strengthened sense of agency in subclinical checking, demonstrating the 
importance of considering the phenomenological aspects of OCD. It is 
possible that incorporating an understanding of the sense of agency into 
future explanatory models of OCD could potentially allow us to be able to 
draw together different cognitive features of the disorder, and relate them to 
the fundamental experience of action, and thus the related behavioural 
compulsions.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A. Histograms for variables in the JoA Task
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Appendix B. Histograms for variables in the IB task
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Appendix C. Online questionnaires.
Questionnaires
Please provide us with the following information about you:
How old are you? [ANSWER BOX]
What is your gender? Female [TICK BOX] Male [Tick Box]
Have you ever been diagnosed with any neurological or psychiatric 
disorder, except GOD?
YES/NO
Have you ever been diagnosed with bipolar disorder? YES /
NO
Have you ever experienced a psychotic episode, in which you have either 
experienced hallucinations OR persistent paranoid beliefs?
YES /
NO
Have you ever needed to drink a significant amount of alcohol in order to 
get through the day?
YES /
NO
If yes, please indicate how often:
Hardly Ever Rarely Sometimes Frequently
Have you ever used drugs or inhaled substances on a regular basis to get 
high, to feel elated or to get a “buzz”?
YES/
NO
230
Have you ever suffered from a severe head injury? YES / NO
[OCI-R]
The following statements refer to experiences that many people have in 
their every day lives. Please click the number that best describes HOW 
MUCH that experience has DISTRESSED or BOTHERED you in the 
PAST MONTH.
The numbers refer to the following verbal labels:
0 = Not at All 
1= A Little 
2= Moderately 
3= A lot 
4= Extremely
1 . 1 have saved up so many things that they get in the way.
0 1 2 3 4
2 . 1 check things more often than necessary.
0 1 2 3 4
3 . 1 get upset if objects are not arranged properly.
0 1 2 3 4
4 . 1 feel compelled to count while I am doing things.
0 1 2 3 4
5 . 1 find it difficult to touch an object when I know it has been touched by strangers or certain people.
0 1 2 3 4
6 . 1 find it difficult to control my own thoughts.
0 1 2 3 4
7 . 1 collect things I don’t need.
0 1 2 3 4
8 . 1 repeatedly check doors, windows, drawers, etc.
0 1 2 3 4
9 . 1 get upset if others change the way I have arranged things.
0 1 2 3 4
1 0 .1 feel I have to repeat certain numbers.
0 1 2 3 4
11.1 sometimes have to wash or clean myself simply because I feel contaminated.
0 1 2 3 4
1 2 .1 am upset by unpleasant thoughts that come into my mind against my will.
0 1 2 3 4
1 3 .1 avoid throwing things away because I am afraid I might need them later.
0 1 2 3 4
1 4 . 1 repeatedly check gas and water taps and light switches after turning them off.
0 1 2 3 4
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1 5 .1 need things to be arranged in a particular order.
0 1 2 3 4
1 6 .1 feel that there are good and bad numbers.
0 1 2 3 4
1 7 .1 wash my hands more often and longer than necessary.
0 1 2 3 4
1 8 .1 frequently get nasty thoughts and have difficulty in getting rid of them.
0 1 2 3 4
[Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale]
The following questionnaire is designed to help identify how you feel.
Read each item and place a tick in the box opposite the reply, which comes 
closest to how you have been feeling in the past week.
Don't take too long over your replies; your immediate reaction to each item 
will probably be more accurate than a long thought-out response.
1 .1 feel tense or wound up:
Most of the time 3
A lot of the time 2
Time to time, occasionally 1 
Not at all 0
2 .1 still enjoy the things I used to enjoy:
Definitely as much 0
Not quite so much 1
Only a little 2
Hardly at all 3
3 .1 get a sort of frightened feeling as if something awful is about to 
happen:
Very definitely and quite badly 3
Yes, but not too badly 2
A little, but it doesn't worry me 1
Not at all 0
4 .1 can laugh and see the funny side of things:
As much as I always could 0
Not quite so much now 1
Definitely not so much now 2 
Not at all 3
5. Worrying thoughts go through my mind:
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A great deal of the time 3
A lot of the time 2
From time to time but not too often 1 
Only occasionally 0
6 .1 feel cheerful
Not at all 3
Not often 2
Sometimes 1
Most of the time 0
7 .1 can sit at ease and feel relaxed:
Definitely 0
Usually 1
Not often 2
Not at all 3
8 .1 feel as if I am slowed down:
Nearly all the time 3 
Very often 2
Sometimes 1
Not at all 0
9 .1 get a sort of frightened feeling like "butterflies" in the stomach;
Not at all 0
Occasionally 1 
Quite often 2 
Very often 3
10 .1 have lost interest in my appearance:
Definitely 3
I don't take so much care as I should 2
I may not take quite as much care 1
I take just as much care as ever 0
11.1 feel restless as if I have to be on the move:
Very much indeed 3
Quite a lot 2
Not very much 1
Not at all 0
12 .1 look forward with enjoyment to things:
As much as I ever did 0
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Rather less than I used to 1 
Definitely less than I used to 2 
Hardly at all 3
13.1 get sudden feelings of panic:
Very often indeed 3
Quite often 2
Not very often 1
Not at all 0
14 .1 can enjoy a good book or radio or TV programme:
Often 0
Sometimes 1 
Not often 2
Very seldom 3
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Appendix D. Confirmation of ethical approval
^  UNIVERSITY OF
#  SURREY
Ethics Committee
Dr Ellen Seiss 
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Î 9 March 2012
Dear Ellen
On behalf of the Ethics Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical 
opinion for the above research on the basis described in the submitted protocol and 
supporting documentation.
Date of confirmation of ethical opinion: 19 March 2012
The list of documents reviewed by the Committee is as followsr-
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Summary of the project
Detailed protocol
Information Sheet
Consent Form
Questionnaire
Standard letters
Risk Assessment
Insurance information
This opinion is given on the understanding that you will comply with the University's 
Ethical Guidelines for Teaching and Research, and with the condition set out as 
follows:
•  Confirmation that a favourable ethical opinion has been obtained from the 
University of Surrey Ethics Committee should be added to the Participant 
Information Sheet.
I would be grateful if you would confirm. In writing, your acceptance of the 
conditions above.
The Committee should be notified of any amendments to the protocol, any adverse 
reactions suffered by research participants, and if the study is terminated earlier 
than expected, with reasons. Please be advised that the Ethics Committee is able to  
audit research to ensure that researchers are abiding by the University requirements 
and guidelines.
You are asked to note that a further submission to the Ethics Committee will be 
required in the event that the study is not completed within five years of the above 
date.
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iÿjJOJ<Ay\
Glenn Moulton
Secretary, University Ethia Committee 
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Appendix E: Information Sheet 1 (online screening questionnaire)
UNIVERSITY OF
SURREY
A study on the experience of a 'sense of control" in Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder
This study has received a favourable ethical opinion from the University of Surrey Ethics Committee.___________________ ______________________
Participant information sheet 
What is this about?
We are carrying out research at the University of Surrey, which is 
investigating how people with obsessive compulsive disorder experience a 
sense of control over their actions. We would grateful if you would help us 
with this by taking part in this study. The research could help provide a better 
understanding of OCD, and hopefully assist in the development of future 
treatments.
What does the study invoive?
This project consists of two parts and this online questionnaire is part 1. You 
can fill out the online questlonr^Ire without committing to part 2 of the shidy.
In the first part of the study, we would like you to complete an online 
questionnaire. The questions wiD ask about past and present symptoms 
relating to mental health, including depression/anxiety and obsessive thoughts 
and behaviours. The questionnaires should take about 15 minutes to 
complete.
If you choose to participate, you w l be entered Into a prize draw for a chance 
to win a £50 Amazon voucher. This prize draw is independent of your 
participation on the second part of the study.
Are fhere any downsides of taking part?
You may find some of the questions in the questionnaires quite personal, 
although this is needed to fiiKl out if it is suitable to invite you to participate in 
the second part of the study.
Please feel free to contact us If these instructions are not clear or you would 
like more Information. There are no additional benefits and no risks involved in 
this study.
How do i  agree to take part?
If you decide to take part you will be asked to go to the online questionnaire. 
You will then view the online consent form.
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What happens next?
You may be invited to take part in a second part of the study. This involves 
further research in laboratory of the Clinical Neuroscience Research Team 
(04AC04), and will include the completion of further questionnaires about 
mental health, a brief word-reading task and two computer-based tasks. The 
entire experiment should take approximately 2 hours and you will be paid 
£7.50 per hour, in addition to travel expenses.
In order to be able to contact you we will ask you to provide us with your email 
address and indicate on the online survey if you would be willing to take part 
in the second part of the study.
This address will be kept confidential and it can only be accessed by the 
researchers in the Clinical Neuroscience Research Team (CNRT). Please be 
aware that you are still free to withdraw at any time and without explanation.
All information collected will be coded and stored according to an allocated 
participant number to ensure confidentiality. All data files will be treated with 
the utmost confidentiality. No individual will be named or Identified in any 
report or possible publication arising from this study. Data will be handled in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and kept for 10 years.
Thank you 
Joseph Nemeth 
Dr Ellen Seiss
Further Infoimation
If you want to find out more about the study, please contact Dr Ellen Seiss 
(Principal Investigator) or Joseph Nemeth (Co-investigator) using the contact 
information below. The researchers can also provide participants with a 
summary of the findings on request.
Principal Investigator: Co-investigator:
Dr Ellen Seiss Joseph Nemeth
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
e.seiss@surrev.ac.uk i.nemeth@surrev.ac.uk
01483 686934
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Appendix F. Information Sheet 2 (experiment)
UNIVERSITY OF
SURREY
A study on the experience of a ‘sense of control* in Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder
This study has received a favourable ethical opinion from the University of 
Surrey Ethics Committee.__________________________________________
Participant information sheet 
What Is this about?
We are carrying out research at the University of Surrey, which is 
investigating how people with obsessive compulsive disorder experience a 
sense of control over their actions. We need people with and without 
symptoms of OCD to volunteer, and we would grateful if you would help us 
with this by taking part in this study.
The research will help provide a better understanding of OCD, and hopefully 
assist in the development of future treatments.
Do / have to take part?
It is entirely up to you. Before you decide whether you want to take part, it is 
important for you to read the following information carefully. Feel free to 
discuss it with others if you wish. You can also get in contact with us via email 
or telephone (details below) if you would like more information. Even if you 
agree to take part, you can withdraw from it at any time without giving a 
reason.
What does the experiment involve?
You are invited to attend the University to carry out two computer-based 
tasks. You will be asked to sit at a computer and follow clear instructions 
which will be provided for you. You will need to press some computer keys, 
and listen to some resulting tones through headphones which will be supplied. 
You will be required to answer some basic questions about the tones that you 
heard. This will be carried out with two different tasks that you will be asked to 
complete, and you will be offered a tea break in between these tasks.
Will I have to do anything else?
We will also ask you to do a very brief word reading task, and answer further 
questions relating to aspects of mental health.
Will I receive anything for taking part?
You will be compensated for your time and effort with a payment of £10. In 
addition, the participants who have obsessive compulsive disorder will have 
their travel expenses reimbursed. University psychology students who take 
part can receive two lab tokens instead of payment, if they wish so.
Are there anv downsides of taking part?
There is no known risk for any of the procedures that will be used in the study. 
Concentrating during the tasks could become slightly tiring for you, but a
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break is offered halfway through to help with this. Some of the questions 
regarding mental health may be quite personal, but this Is needed to order to 
obtain some clinical history.
What happens if  something goes wrong?
The University of Surrey holds insurance which covers claims for injury or 
deterioration in health which arise directly from participation in clinical trials 
but that it applies only in those situations where the University can be shown 
to be legally liable.
How Iona will it take?
The whole experiment should take a maximum of 1.5 hours.
Do I have to give mv name?
If you decide that you would like to be a participant, you will be asked to sign 
a form giving your informed consent to take part. However, you are free to 
withdraw yourself and your data at any time in the process without having to 
give the researchers any explanation. Your participation in this study will be 
completely anonymous. All information collected will be coded and stored 
according to an allocated participant number to ensure confidentiality. All data 
files will be treated with the utmost confidentiality. No individual will be named 
or identified in any report or possible publication arising from this study. Data 
will be handled in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and kept for 
10 years.
Does the experiment have therapeutic benefits?
No. Please note that this project is for research purposes only. It does not aim 
to directly provide practical therapeutic benefits.
Thank you 
Joseph Nemeth 
Dr Ellen Seiss
Further information
If you want to find out more about the study, please contact Dr Ellen Seiss 
(Principal Investigator) or Joseph Nemeth(Co-investigator) using the contact 
information below. The researchers can also provide participants with a 
summary of the findings on request.
Complaints or concerns
Any complaints or concerns about any aspects of the way you have been 
dealt with during the course of the study will be addressed. Please contact Dr 
Ellen Seiss (Principal Investigator) using the information below.
Principal Investigator; Co-investigator:
Dr Ellen Seiss Joseph Nemeth
e.seiss@surrev.ac.uk Trainee Clinical Psychologist
01483 686934 i.nemeth@surrev.ac.uk
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Appendix G. Recruitment e-mail
Dear All,
Apologies for another recruitment drive!
We are looking for participants aged 18-40 years with good sooken English ability, 
and who are /Tof currently taking antidepressant medication.
I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist at the School of Psychology. I am carrying out 
a research study which is investigating the 'sense of control' over our actions, and 
we need participants to take part in a simple computer based experiment at the 
Psychology Department.
You would be paid £10  fo r your tim e. The experim ent wouid take 
up to 1 .5  hours.
In order to take part, you must first complete an online eligibility ouestionnaire (5 
mini. If  you do this, you can enter a prize draw to win a £50 Amazon voucher.
Follow this link to the online eligibility questionnaire & for taking 
part: httD://www.fahs.surrev.ac.uk/survev/sense of control/
Please don't hesitate to contact me if you would like any further information. 
Thank you in advance!
Best wishes 
Joseph Nemeth
The study has received a favourable ethical opinion from the University of Surrey Ethics 
Committee.
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
University of Surrey 
j.nemeth@surrey.ac.uk
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Appendix H. Consent Form
UNIVERSITY OF
SURREY
Ethics Committee
A study on the experience of a ‘sense of control’ in Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder
Participant consent form
I the undersigned voluntarily agree to take part in the study on "Sense of Control' in 
OCD.
I have read and understood the Information Sheet provided. I have been given a full 
explanation by the investigators of the nature, purpose, location and likely duration of the 
study, and of what I will be expected to do. I have been advised about any discomfort 
and possible ill-effects on my health and well-being which may result. I have been given 
the opportunity to ask questions on all aspects of the study and have understood the 
advice and information given as a result.
I agree to comply with any instruction given to me during the study and to co-operate 
fully with the investigators. I shall inform them immediately if I suffer any deterioration of 
any kind in my health or well-being, or experience any unexpected or unusual symptoms.
I consent to my personal data, as outlined in the accompanying information sheet, being 
used for this study and other research. I understand that all personal data relating to 
volunteers is held and processed in the strictest confidence, and in accordance with the 
Data Protection Act (1998).
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time without needing to 
justify my decision and v/ithout prejudice.
I acknowledge that in consideration for completing the study I shall receive the sum of 
£10. I recognise that the sum would be less, and at the discretion of the Principal 
Investigator, if I withdraw before completion of the study. If I am a  Psychology student at 
the University of Surrey, I can receive lab credits instead.
I understand that in the event of my suffering a significant and enduring injury (including 
illness or disease) as a direct result of my participation in the study, compensation will be 
paid to m e by the University (or sponsor where a clinical trial is sponsored by a 
pharmaceutical company), subject to certain provisos and limitations. The amount of 
compensation will be appropriate to the nature, severity and persistence of the injury and 
will, in general terms, be consistent with the amount of damages commonly awarded for 
similar injury by an English court in cases \where the liability has been admitted
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I confirm that 1 have read and understood the above and freely consent to participating in 
this study. I have been given adequate time to consider my participation and agree to 
comply with the instructions and restrictions of the study.
Name of volunteer (BLOCK CAPITALS)
Signed
Date
Name of researcher/person taking consent (BLOCK CAPITALS).
Signed
Date
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Appendix I. Debriefing Sheet
UNIVERSITY OF
SURREY
A study on the experience of a ‘sense o f control’ in Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder
Participant debriefing sheet
Thank you very much for giving up your time and taking part in our 
experiment.
The study aimed to investigate how people with obsessive compulsive 
tendencies experience a sense of control over their actions, and whether they 
differ from control groups in this respect. Previously reported research has 
suggested that people who have symptoms of compulsive checking behaviour 
have a reduced ‘sense of control’, but a higher ‘desire for control’, in certain 
situations.
The first experiment aimed to test whether people with compulsive checking 
tendencies are more or less likely to believe that their actions (a button press) 
produced an effect (the tone) than those without checking symptoms. The 
second experiment aimed to see if their actions (button press) and effects (the 
tone) were perceived to be closer together in time for people with compulsive 
checking symptoms compared with controls.
Your contribution to this study is much appreciated. However, if you have now 
decided that you do not want the data related to you to be included in the 
study anymore, piease contact the researchers (details on next page). You do 
not have to give a reason, and the data will be destroyed.
Data used in the study will be treated in the strictest confidence. All 
participation will remain anonymous. No names v/iii be included in the study 
report or any future publications.
Thank you again 
Joseph Nemeth 
Dr Eiien Seiss
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Further Information
If you want to find out more about the study, please contact Dr Ellen Seiss 
(Principal Investigator) or Joseph Nemeth (Co-Investigator) using the contact 
information below. The researchers can also provide participants with a 
summary of the findings on request.
Useful Contacts
MIND -  The Mental Health Charity 
http://www.mind.org.uk/
0300 1233393 
info@mind.org.uk
OCD UK -  National OCD charity 
http://www.ocduk.org/
0845 120 3778 
suPDort@ocduk.org
OCD Action -  National OCD charity 
http://www.ocdaction.ora.uk/
0845 3906232 
support@ocdaction.org.uk
Complaints or concerns
Any complaints or concerns about any aspects of the way you have been 
dealt with during the course of the study will be addressed. Please contact Dr 
Ellen Seiss (Principal Investigator) using the information below.
Principal Investigator: Co-investigaton
Dr Ellen Seiss Joseph Nemeth
e.seiss@surrev.ac.uk i.nemeth@surrev.ac.uk
01483 686934
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